

ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL CONVERSATION  
ANALYSIS MEETS INTEGRATIONAL  
LINGUISTICS

\*

**TOWARDS A NEW ANALYTICAL  
PERSPECTIVE ON ATYPICAL INTERACTION**

by

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## English summary

The main contribution of this thesis is aligning methodology from *ethnomethodological conversation analysis* (EMCA) with theoretical principles from *integrational linguistics*, promoting a quality of life-focused analytical approach to acquired brain injury (ABI) and aphasia in the context of everyday institutional life. While a pure EMCA approach focuses on the joint construction of meaning and identity through a lens of social order, the integrational perspective can add a critical analysis of the content of the interaction, centering the analysis on the perspective of one participant: the individual with impairments' participant perspective.

In the first part of the thesis, the extent to which the two approaches can be combined is under scrutiny, investigating theoretically how they may be applied in order to investigate the participants' experience empirically. By singling out the perspective of the individual who has impairments in the social ensemble, the analysis aims at enhancing life quality, seen from the perspective of the individual who has impairments in accordance with the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF; World Health Organization [WHO], 2001, 2013).

The second part of the thesis investigates the participant's experience in an analysis of interactional conditions between individuals who have impairments due to ABI and their neurotypical co-participants in everyday life at a care home. The study used video ethnography to record institutional life using several cameras, both stationary cameras and portable (GoPro Hero) cameras. The analysis of this thesis approaches interaction in a fine-grained analysis, drawing on video analysis with the tools from EMCA, and theoretical principles from integrational linguistics. This new approach is discussed thoroughly as divergences and agreements between the two are being analyzed. An illustrative analysis probes this new analytical perspective to elaborate on combining the two approaches in investigating the interactional consequences of living with ABI and aphasia for one case participant.

In this thesis, a single-case study examines the (joint)interaction between one individual who has functional impairment and the co-present participants. This case participant uses a wheelchair to move around with help from assistant therapists (due to partial paralysis and spasticity from traumatic ABI years prior) and their speech has aphasia characteristics. The co-participants include other individuals who have impairments due to ABI, occupational therapists, pedagogues, students of occupational therapy and the participant researchers. The study focuses on the trajectory of the case participant's participation during three significant recording

days during the data collection. In the fall of 2012, a series of meetings, breaks between meetings and one excursion were video recorded (30 hours). These pilot phase recordings form part of a larger study on routines of everyday institutional life with ABI.

In the analysis, the innovative approach identifies a novel discrepancy between the case individual and the therapists in what interaction analysis refers to as “trouble-talk,” meaning the organization of the conversation regarding problematic issues/talk about problems in understanding, which was often characterized by several repairs possibly without agreeing. Through detailed description and analysis, both the case participant and their display are characterized as competent. This is contrasted with the therapists conveying and responding to the participant as incompetent (i.e. non-ratified participant) in encounters due to their impairments. Seemingly, they perceive and orient to the case participant as someone who does not understand the situation correctly, sometimes merely complaining about institutional life. This asymmetrical relationship conceptualizes the case participant as a non-ratified participant, resulting in the case participant’s recurrent withdrawal from dialogues. This is deemed an undesired institutional ramification due to an uneven relationship between individuals who have impairments and individuals who do not have impairments. However, the analysis also demonstrates the individual’s creative participation and demonstrable “integrational proficiency” (Harris, 2009a, p. 71) in their drawing on other situated resources than “language” (Goode, 1994b) to express themselves and participate creatively, such as gesture, repetition of others’ and own contributions and gaze. The contrast demonstrated in the gatekeeping of participation and the identifiable integrational proficiency demonstrates by use of the new participant’s perspective that the case individual competently participates, resulting in a deep analysis of participation with ABI and aphasia.

The combination of EMCA tools and integrational linguistic theory thus offers a novel empirical insight into the workings of communication and language and its institutional ramifications. With the new participant’s perspective, this thesis considers practices as complex and entangled with recurrent inclusion/exclusion practices in interaction that professional practitioners could pay more attention to by downgrading the force of apparent misalignments in gatekeeping trouble-talk consciously e.g. with a “let it pass strategy” (Wilkinson, 2011) as focal point.

This thesis has the form of a monograph, drawing on three background publications (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). Parts of Klemmensen (2018) significant to answer the research question are adapted to this thesis. The book chapter (Nielsen, 2015) and the research article (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019) are discussed at relevant places. However, the latter two are not submitted for the assessment of this thesis.



## Dansk resumé

Afhandlingens hovedbidrag er en sammentænkning af metoder fra *etnometodologisk konversationsanalyse* (EMCA) og teoretiske principper fra *integrationel lingvistik* ved interaktionsanalyse af senhjerneske og afasi i institutionelle hverdagskontekster og forankring i livskvalitet. Fælleskonstruktion af betydning og identitetsskabelse er i fokus hos en ren EMCA-tilgang der tager udgangspunkt i social orden. Det integrationelle perspektiv kan bidrage med en kritisk tilgang til indhold i interaktioner med fokus på den enkelte interaktionsdeltagers perspektiv, i denne sammenhæng individet med funktionsnedsættelse.

I afhandlingens første del fokuseres der teoretisk særligt på i hvilken udstrækning sammenstilling af de to perspektiver kan anvendes til at undersøge deltagerens oplevelse med empirisk. Ved at udskille individets perspektiv i den sociale sammenhæng, tilsigter analysen at bidrage til inddragelse af det funktionsnedsatte individs perspektiv jævnfør Verdenssundhedsorganisationens klassifikationsmanual for funktionsnedsættelse, handicap og sundhed (World Health Organization [WHO], 2001, 2013) og herved forudsætning for livskvalitetsforbedring.

I afhandlingens anden del undersøges deltagerens oplevelse i en analyse af interaktionsforhold mellem individer med funktionsnedsættelse på grund af senhjerneske og deres neuro-typiske deltagere i hverdagen på et plejehjem. Studiet anvendte videoetnografi fra livet på et plejehjem optaget med flere kameraer, hvor såvel stationære kameraer som bærbare GoPro Hero kameraer blev anvendt. Afhandlingens analyse af interaktion er en detaljefokuseret næranalyse med baggrund i videoanalyse med værktøjer fra EMCA og teoretiske principper fra integrationel lingvistik. Denne nye tilgang diskuteres tilbundsgående gennem analyser af modsætninger og ligheder mellem de to tilgange. En illustrativ analyse undersøger nærmere sammentænkningen af de to tilgange og deres bidrag som analyseperspektiv til afdækning af de interaktionelle konsekvenser senhjerneske og afasi har særligt for en af studiets deltagere med funktionsnedsættelse.

I analysen undersøges (sam)handlen i et kvalitativt single-case interaktionsstudie mellem et individ med funktionsnedsættelse og tilstedeværende deltagere. Individets tale bærer præg af afasi, og han anvender en kørestol med hjælp fra plejepersonalet til at bevæge sig rundt grundet delvis lammelse og spasticitet fra en traumatisk senhjerneske for år tilbage. De andre deltagere i studiet er individer med funktionsnedsættelse på grund af senhjerneske, ergoterapeuter, pædagoger og ergoterapistuderende samt deltagende forskere. Studiet fokuserer på et individ med funktionsnedsættelse og *hans* deltagelsesmønstre på tre signifikante dage fra

optagelserne under dataindsamlingen. I efteråret 2012 blev en række møder, pauser samt en ekskursion videooptaget (30 timer). Disse optagelser fra pilotfasen (2012-2013) udgør del af et større studie i rutiner i institutionshverdagslivet med senhjerneskade. Analysen identificerer med den nye tilgang en diskrepans imellem deltageren med funktionsnedsættelse og terapeuten i hvad der i interaktionsanalyse kan kaldes ”problemsnak” (*trouble-talk*), hvilket vil sige organisering af samtalen om problematiske forhold/snak med forståelsesproblemer, der er præget af mange reparaturer muligvis uden opnåelse af fælles forståelse undervejs. Gennem en karakteristisk og detaljeret analyse af hans interaktionsbidrag beskrives deltageren med funktionsnedsættelse som kompetent, hvilket modstilles med terapeuternes respons på ham som til tider inkompetent. De opfatter ham tilsyneladende som og behandler ham sommetider som en der ikke har forstået situationen korrekt og blot klager over institutionslivet. Terapeuternes kontrol af beboernes deltagelse understøtter et ikke jævnyrdigt forhold mellem individet med funktionsnedsættelse og individer der ikke har funktionsnedsættelse, eftersom de fagprofessionelles kontrol manifesteres gennem hans deltagelsesmuligheder og resignation. Det beskrevne asymmetriske kommunikationsforhold placerer ham i en rolle som ikke værdig deltager, hvilket resulterer i at han trækker sig fra dialoger. Analysen fremhæver også hans bidrag som kreative ved at fremhæve hans ”deltagelsesfærdigheder” (*integrational proficiency*, Harris, 2009a, p. 71), idet han med sin funktionsforstyrrelse anvender andre situerede ressourcer end ”talesprog” (Goode, 1994b), såsom gestik, gentagelse af andres og egne bidrag samt blikretning til at udtrykke sig med, og herved deltager på kreativ vis. Det nye analyseperspektivs identifikation af et kontrastfuldt forhold mellem udøvet deltagelseskontrol og case-individets udvisning af deltagelsesfærdighed resulterer i en dybere analyse af deltagelse med senhjerneskade og afasi.

Kombinationen af EMCA-værktøjer og integrationel lingvistik kan således tilvejebringe ny empirisk indsigt i kommunikationsmekanismer og disses utilsigtede institutionelle konsekvenser. Denne afhandling viser ved anvendelse af det nye analyseperspektiv, at praksisser er komplekse og forbundet med tilbagevendende inklusion/eksklusionspraksisser som sundhedsprofessionelle med fordel kan være mere opmærksomme på — og nedtone kraften af tilsyneladende fejljustering af deltagelseskontrol i problemsnak med individer med funktionsnedsættelse ved for eksempel at gøre bevidst brug af en ”lad det passere-strategi” (Wilkinson, 2011) som fokuspunkt.

Denne afhandling er en monografi med baggrund i tre publikationer (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). De dele af Klemmensen (2018), der er væsentlige for at besvare problemformuleringen er inddraget i afhandlingen. Bogkapitlet (Nielsen, 2015) og forskningsartiklen

(Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019) diskuteres på relevante steder. De to sidstnævnte er dog ikke indsendt til bedømmelse af afhandlingen.



## **Abbreviations**

ABI	Acquired Brain Injury
CA	Conversation Analysis
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
EMCA	Ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis
GDPR	The European General Data Protection Regulation
ICF	International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health
QOL	Quality of Life
UN	United Nations
WHO	World Health Organization



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I am thankful for the permission from Palgrave Macmillan (Springer Nature) to include my book *Integrating the Participants' Perspective in the Study of Language and Communication Disorders: Towards a New Analytical Approach* (Klemmensen, 2018) in this thesis. Furthermore, I am grateful for the kind permission from Stephen Farrow, literary executor of Roy Harris, to include in this thesis the unpublished piece by Roy Harris, *Notes on First-Order Experience* (Harris, unpublished). Again, with Stephen Farrow's kind permission, this original piece is placed in its full length (1500 words) in the Appendix (see Appendix 3-1). I acquired a copy of it from Jesper Hermann for my master thesis (Nielsen, 2002) and have scanned it into electronic form. To the best of my knowledge, the original paper copy from Harris no longer exists. Since I started studying language psychology in 1999, Jesper Hermann and I have maintained contact; I thank Jesper for friendship and long-lasting inspiration.

I am indebted to the IAISLC-community ([integrationists.com](http://integrationists.com)) for willingly discussing my work in progress. Since 2011, I have participated in various IAISLC-events around the world [Birmingham (2011), Switzerland (2014, read by Jytte Smedegaard), Copenhagen (several), Hong Kong (2016) and Rome (2018)], sharing ideas about integrationism. Especially, I thank Dorthe Duncker and Christopher Hutton for indulging me with hope.

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Over the years, I have been teaching graduate courses in language psychology and worked with colleagues in language psychology at the University of Copenhagen as an external examiner. As an external examiner in pedagogy and disability for students in logopedics and audiologopedia, I have also worked with the habilitation and rehabilitation research group at Center for Social Practices and Cognition (SoPraCon) at the University of Southern Denmark in Odense, which has provided me with further insight into professional practice and the training of professionals. I am grateful for all of the opportunities I have had to pursue my academic interests. In my ordinary work life, I teach Spanish and Visual Arts and mentor students with difficulties due to developmental conditions and psychiatric diagnoses at Hasseris Gymnasium and IB World School. A kind thank you to my workplace for supporting my academic endeavor.

On a more personal note, I have experienced the impact of ABI in my family twice through my mother and her, thankfully, nearly full recovery from cerebral apoplexy strokes (further described in Nielsen, 2015, p. 251), gaining a personal insight into her lifeworld with physical and cognitive impairments through our many conversations about problems and solutions to cope in everyday life.

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## **Background publication**

The thesis expands upon my previous book, which forms the spine of this thesis but has a broader scope than this thesis. Parts from the final author version of the book are adapted by permission from Palgrave Macmillan: *Integrating the Participants' Perspective in the Study of Language and Communication Disorders: Towards a New Analytical Approach* (Klemmensen, 2018).



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# Preface

## ABI and atypical interaction

The thesis addresses a new analytical approach to the study of language and communication disorders. The journey undertaken in this thesis is linked to my positioning, which is entangled with my research motivation, specifically within the area of “atypical” interaction (see Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2020 for further research on atypical interaction).

The motivations for the study were:

- To contribute with research that pays more attention to interactional consequences with aphasia and ABI in institutional life and rehabilitation; and
- To contribute with research that informs clinical practice and policymaking by considering the participants’ perspective (cf. Klemmensen, 2018, p. 98).

These motivations are elaborated, methodologically, in the three background publications: Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019.

## Empirical study

A video observational study of interaction targeted at investigating recurrent inclusion/exclusion practices of institutional life form the empirical basis of this thesis. The study was carried out in a Danish care home for residents with severe language and communication disorders due to ABI. A series of encounters involving a case resident, therapists and participant researchers was documented via video recording (30 hours) and fieldwork over a period of one year, between 2012–2013.

## Combining integrational linguistics and ethnomethodological conversation analysis

The dataset has been analyzed by adopting an approach that combines integrational linguistics and ethnomethodological conversation analysis (EMCA) (Klemmensen, 2018). Thus, the pros and cons of the combination of integrational linguistics and EMCA are discussed with excerpts from the empirical study.



# 1 Introduction

My empirical data of atypical interaction are from the area of acquired brain injury (ABI) and aphasia, whereas the approach adapted for studying the dataset is derived from a combination of ethnomethodological conversation analysis (EMCA) and integrational linguistics.

## 1.1 ABI

Two main categories of ABI are trauma (damage to the head from accident) and stroke (bleeding from the brain or apoplexy; blood clot found blocking blood flow). A third category is ABI from disease.<sup>1</sup> When trauma, stroke or failed brain surgery occur, they intersect a person's life and routines. The result of an injury to the brain can range from complete recovery to lifelong treatment or death. According to the Danish Health Board, 150,000 persons live with ABI in Denmark (Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2014, p. 7), and an average of 20,000 adults and 1,500 children acquire an injury to the brain every year (Hjerneskadeforeningen, 2020). Almost 20% of individuals who wake up from surgery, wake up with symptoms of ABI (Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2014; Hjerneskadeforeningen, 2020).

Everything changes in a moment for the person whose brain is injured, including between them and their family and peers. An ABI can cause a range of symptoms including physical, cognitive, social, emotional, and behavioral changes. Typically, injury to the brain is followed by a process of hospitalization, restoration, stabilization, and rehabilitation.

No matter the cause or at which stage in an individual's life ABI occurs, life changes thoroughly. Some immediate changes are manageable, others require acquisition of new routines, skills, and habits through hard work in physiotherapy and occupational therapy. Overall, (new) proficiencies are required, including in communicational proficiency. Following an incidence of stroke or trauma causing ABI, a strong, qualitative change in the experience of world and self can occur. Changes can be severe, depending on the injury, stroke or disease, and the individual's sensitivity to it.

Modern health care has advanced the technical level of recovery from damage: Thrombolysis therapy (medical clot bursting) and endovascular thrombectomy (removing a blood clot via surgery with catheters led through arteries) can remove an obstacle blood clot and, hence, minimize damage to the brain extensively and help

restoration of the person. Unfortunately, not all individuals reach the hospital in time for complete restoration. Lifelong rehabilitation due to severe ABI is the consequence for approximately 800 persons who live as residents in permanent specialized care homes distributed across the Denmark's regions (Socialstyrelsen, 2017).<sup>ii</sup>

## 1.2 Institutional life due to ABI

The journey towards permanent residency in an institution due to ABI starts with a fast pace and can end with a sense of timelessness. Significant transitions along the journey include being hospitalized after trauma or stroke to receiving a diagnosis of ABI and agreeing on a treatment plan. At the point of hospitalization, the clinical damage is assessed and evaluated. Hereafter, immediate lifesaving treatment is initiated. In the beginning, the individual with injuries is continuously assessed by health professionals at the hospital. During the process of treatment, the individual in clinical care transitions from needing immediate attention to being able to manage basic tasks. Typically, the individual in treatment is transferred to a specialized rehabilitation center a few weeks after trauma. Still, the individual is under constant observation and treatment plans are created and updated continuously. Once the individual is stabilized, rehabilitation comes into focus as the main activity. As the individual in rehabilitation moves from one phase to the next, progress is registered. New initiatives are discussed with the individual in rehabilitation and their care team along recovery. Once the individual in rehabilitation can manage everyday tasks, they are ready to return to home. In the case of severe impairments after trauma, little or no progress emerges during the months of rehabilitation. In this case, the individual is reassessed, rated, and categorized, and treatment is often ended without the individual reaching recovery. These cases are categorized as Phase 4 when there is little or no chance for further improvement following hospitalization, medical treatment, and rehabilitation. Persons who are categorized in Phase 4 are considered stable but not recovered. In addition, these individuals require lifelong care and attention at different levels. Accordingly, the national law regulates how society treats and engages with individuals who have impairments (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 106).

Since 2007, the rehabilitation of individuals with ABI in Denmark has been decentralized to local governments and municipalities, meaning that access to services varies across the country. For some individuals with acquired impairments, spending the rest of their life in a residential care facility is an inevitable option. There are, however, standards being developed at a political level for how inclusion is to be implemented. Politically, it is suggested that individuals are socially included regardless of their physical or cognitive impairments. Unfortunately, the reality is that

individuals with ABI are more than likely to be excluded from societal everyday life (Rasmussen, 2016, p. 849), besides routines are limited and repetitive. Psychologically, emotional and identity disturbances are registered after treatment, rather than during rehabilitation (Glintborg, 2015). Bio-psycho-social factors due to ABI are experienced as alterations of identity and a sense of being “disabled and not normal” (Glintborg, 2015, p. 8). Immobility and/or a temporal or a lifelong condition of aphasia changes a person and their whole outset for communicative behavior, linguistically and socially (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 107).

### 1.3 Aphasia characteristics

Aphasia caused by ABI is traditionally considered linguistic impairment, focusing studies on production skills, impairment of production and the detailed problems in processing language with impairment. Therefore, aphasia is characterized by functional problems in the production of speech. Part of the two most common features of aphasia are typically from ABI: (a) lack of word retrieval (anomia) or (b) non-fluent/disfluent aphasia characterized by problems in basic grammar and syntax, production problems causing effortful speech exhibition, partial loss of speech, effortful expression (Broca’s aphasia), and where communication is often characterized by repair (Nielsen et al., 2019; Wilkinson et al., 2020).

### 1.4 Atypical interaction and aphasia

Within interaction studies in aphasia, aspects of participation are primarily researched using EMCA (Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013; Goodwin, 2003a; Perkins, 2003; Wilkinson, 2011). A growing body of interaction studies contrasts a biomedical paradigm with ethnographical studies, demonstrating that individuals’ interaction competencies are overlooked (Goodwin, 2003b; Goodwin, 2018; Leudar & Costall, 2011; Ochs et al., 2004; Sterponi, 2004, 2017). CA has shown to be a reliable tool with its detailed understanding of action to decipher how persons who have difficulties actually manage the interactional tasks that they “fail” in tests (Schegloff, 1999). The study of atypical interaction covers a range of atypical populations, including aphasic communication (Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013). Certainly, ethnomethodology has engendered a “sociality perspective” of language impairment in interaction studies targeting participation (Goodwin, 2003a; Goodwin & Goodwin, 2004). Studies in atypical interaction describe and analyze language disorders and disability starting from the social constitution of the impairment rather than the individual experience of it. Demonstrably, individuals with ABI do not behave

according to their diagnosis (Goodwin, 1995; Wilkinson, 2011). This is why an interactional approach to aphasia is adopted in this study.

## 1.5 The international classification of functioning and aphasia

The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health model ([ICF] World Health Organization [WHO], 2001, 2013) was conceptualized for practitioners to assess functional ability and focus is set on the individual who has impairments. Detailed categories and subcategories in the ICF framework help health practitioners with checklists to assess and draw a unique profile of an individual's function and disability. The ICF focuses on two broader perspectives, namely, the body and the individual in society (WHO, 2001, 2013). From an EMCA perspective, the ICF's concept of *participation* as an individual's participatory activity in life situations is criticized for being *monological* and "disregarding how other participants act to include and exclude them in interactional processes" (Krummheuer et al., 2016, p. 722). It is argued that no focus is put on dialogical aspects of local interplay and, thus, assessment of co-participants' impact on social relations with individuals who have language and communication impairments (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). Therefore, the present study draws on the framework of the ICF but includes the missing interaction approach to linguistic impairment and aphasia.

### 1.5.1 Lifeworld of ABI and putting the human first

In 2016, a national report published a dire status of the provision of rehabilitation services to residents after ABI (Rigsrevisionen, 2016). The report requested the Danish Ministry of Health to improve the coherence and quality of services provided across the country. The largest problem proved to be securing services for complex cases in need of specialized care (Rigsrevisionen, 2016, p. 11). Furthermore, Rigsrevisionen (2016) found a discrepancy between the number of actual cases appointed to specialized care services in the regions (49 individuals) and the number of individuals presumably in need of such services (350–450 individuals) based on data from hospitalization (p. 12). The following year, in 2017, a national service check of rehabilitation after ABI surveyed the clients' perspective and revealed further dire aspects (Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2017). Crucially, the lived experience of ABI was reported as poorly understood in professional care and in the assessment of individual needs for rehabilitation after ABI. Individuals with ABI reported feeling extensively excluded in the process of rehabilitation. In the same period, Danish research on brain injury from various areas made a call for improved understanding of the situation of

the individual who has ABI, deeming it necessary to grasp their lived experience, which is missing (Glintborg et al., 2018; Glintborg & Birkemose, 2018; Wallace et al., 2017). A new national survey project, *Indtryk og Udtryk [Impression and expression]* (2020), was initiated targeting clients' experience of transition to rehabilitation and satisfaction with services (cf. recommendations from the service check, Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2017). The project is managed by a national task force consisting of a large number of regional and institutional partners in the field, including several Danish universities. Preliminary findings point towards mediocre satisfaction with the experience of coherence and quality, largely on behalf of the respondent relatives (cf. *Indtryk og udtryk*, 2020). This can be interpreted as a need for further investigation of the experiential side of rehabilitation after ABI.

As a response to the need for improvement, enhancement of a "human first" policy was suggested by the chair of the union of occupational therapists (Altinget, 2019). Human first denotes awareness of empowerment by humanizing discourse and by foregrounding the human behind the condition or diagnosis (Curtis, 2006, p. 205; Glintborg et al., 2018). In line with critical disability studies (Hughes, 2007), the present study supports the enhancement of a human first policy and a lifeworld perspective by investigating a participant's perspective in local interplay of interaction with consequences of ABI.

## 1.6 First part of the thesis

The thesis is organized in two parts. The first part of the thesis is a theoretical discussion of the adopted approach that combines two approaches: integrational linguistics and EMCA. In this part, agreements and divergences are discussed with the purpose of distinctly conceptualizing an operational ground for analyzing the data from the empirical study. Data analysis is limited to exemplary analysis since the major contribution of this study lies in methodology. Emphasis is put on discussing theoretical mitigation and prerequisites for an analytical approach.

### 1.6.1 Integrational linguistics

This study draws on the radical development into inquiry on language formulated by Harris, who termed the approach *integrationism* (Harris, 1996, 1998). In the book *The Language Myth* (1981), Harris initiated this program of demythologizing traditional Western assumptions about language and communication. In its pure form, Harris and fellow integrationists claim that integrationism has far-reaching implications for



social, political, legal, philosophical and psychological issues.<sup>iii</sup> “At best, over the past 40 years, integrationism has proved capable of defending the orthodox legacy of its own demythologizing practice. Consequently, not much interchange with the rest of the scientific community has taken place” (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 2).

The first part of this thesis is theoretical pendulation between integrational linguistics and its possible applicability. This seeks out the possible application of central ideas from integrational linguistics on language and communication and its contribution to the study of language and communication disorders. Integrational linguistics is a specialized inquiry into language and communication within the language sciences. It shares interests with EMCA in the processuality and creativity of human interaction.

Integrational linguistics has no established program for studying face-to-face interaction, while the methods for grasping processuality of human interaction are well-established within EMCA. Integrational linguistics is a personalist view on language and communication promoting person-centeredness (Hutton, 2019; Klemmensen, 2018), in differentiation to EMCA promoting a social approach to human interaction. The hope is to grasp the experiential aspect of ABI and aphasia by adopting an approach that combines EMCA and integrational linguistics and move the overall focus from the social to the individual in interaction. The suggested interdisciplinary perspective combines basic assumptions of integrational linguistics with descriptive elements from EMCA. Without this combination, an integrational linguistic approach is missing in the study of language and communication disorders.

This first part of the thesis leads a twofold discussion. First, the literature review in Chapter 1 outlines developments within the study of the functions of language leading towards integrational linguistics, and the study of language and communication disorders in an interactionist perspective. Importantly, it is foregrounded that two schools of integrational linguistics exist. I ground this claim in the observed tendency that there is an inclination towards a post-Harrisian trend in Scandinavia, and why I term this trend “Nordic integrationism.” This distinction is novel. The other contemporary school is the orthodox Harrisian school. In discussing integrational linguistics, Nordic integrationism is singled out for positioning purposes (cf. Klemmensen, 2018, p. 98). In contrast to traditional integrationism, Nordic integrationism does not overly criticize empirical research, yet this new tradition is somewhat true to Harrisian perception of language and communication. The discrepancy between the argument from traditional integrational linguistics in the Harrisian sense, and the “principles” of an applied Nordic integrationism, is that they contrast in their analyses, where the Nordic tradition discusses applicability of an empirical integrational stance. Besides these two schools, a number of other trends

exist with a range of inclinations towards other traditions, since the community of integrationism is growing continuously.

### 1.6.2 Integrational linguistics and EMCA

Second, the theoretical and methodological sections in Chapters 3 and 4 take the framing of integrational linguistics and empirical research further in the search for analytical tools for interaction analysis of language and communication disorders. In these sections, EMCA is included because of its solid investigation of atypical interaction and its major achievement in changing research discourse in language and communication disorders towards a “how-abled” perspective (Klemmensen, 2018; Raudaskoski, 2013). As already revealed, the combination of integrational linguistics and EMCA is not unproblematic and a number of ontological divergences exist between the approaches. Therefore, these sections discuss the contrasts and agreements necessary between integrational linguistics and EMCA in order to combine them.

An integrational linguistic logic problematizes any linguistic assumptions or methods predicated on “norms” or “typicality/atypicality” of linguistic communication. Yet, pure ethnomethodology turns out to resemble the integrational approach because:

(...) ethnomethodologists assert that wherever in the society one looks, wherever one turns one’s attention to the concrete activity empirically on display, one will find, right then and there, social practices productive of, by and for the members, all of the micro/macro matters of relevance for those members in that specific setting (Hilbert, 2009, p. 170).

However, the notion of data for empirical analysis is divergent between integrational linguistics and EMCA; this is why the stance on data is discussed in the first part of this thesis before the next step is taken: a case study informed by this approach. The pursuit of a diffractive (Barad, 2007) combination calls for downscaling a programmatic stance and for upscaling harmonization (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 70). The methodological section in Chapter 4 outlines the methodological frame and presents the collection of empirical data. Chapter 7 discusses issues of divergence and agreement between the approaches, which are singled out in Chapters 3 and 4 and are revisited and elaborated further after the analytical sections in Chapters 8 and 9.

## 1.7 Second part of the thesis

The second part of the thesis includes two chapters: 5, the analytical framework, and 6, the analysis. Chapter 5 present the context of the empirical data and the adopted approach, and Chapter 6 demonstrates the chosen approach with excerpts for exemplary analysis of inclusion/exclusion processes. Chapter 6 presents a discussion of results and conclusions of the analysis, which are readdressed and developed in Chapters 7–9 for illustrating consequences of the combination of the two approaches outlined in the first part of the thesis.

### 1.7.1 Empirical study of institutional life

The second part of the thesis uses the combined approach to investigate interaction between occupational therapists and individuals with severe language and communication disorders due to ABI. The analytical part of the thesis is based on a video observational study of interaction, targeting the investigation of inclusion/exclusion practices of institutional life. The empirical part of this study was carried out in a Danish care home facility for residents with severe language and communication disorders after ABI. A series of encounters involving a case resident, occupational therapists and participant researchers was recorded with video (30 hours) and fieldwork over a period of 14 months, between 2012 and 2013, where three significant recording days in the beginning of this period have been selected for analysis.

The analysis probing the combination of integrational linguistic concepts with EMCA targets what can be labelled *trouble-talk* — how talking about trouble is formulated, received and responded to (Goodwin, 1983; Jefferson, 1988; Kupferberg & Green, 2005; Schegloff et al., 1977). With reference to trouble-talk encounters between a case resident and an occupational therapist, the trouble spots can be identified when the case resident takes initiatives and/or addresses criticisms, which may be heard by the occupational therapist as complaints about institutional life (Heinemann, 2009). Such perceived criticisms are responded to by the occupational therapist from their gatekeeping position. In drawing attention to instances of manifest misalignments in the data, practices of inclusion and exclusion are seen as emergent in the interaction itself, which can have further institutional ramifications (Klemmensen, 2018).

Notwithstanding the sole focus on the individual, the ICF framework<sup>iv</sup> aims at promoting an empathetic and appreciative discourse of individuals with impairments (WHO, 2001, 2013). The ICF is interrelated with the assessment of an individual's quality of life (QOL) and personhood for individuals with cognitive and physical

impairments. QOL is addressed through the implementation the ICF. Importantly, the right to participate in everyday activities in society on equal terms with individuals without impairments in functioning is foregrounded (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 71). Despite good intentions, individuals with impairments are likely to be underestimated and excluded unintentionally from participating in social interaction on equal terms. This is demonstrated thoroughly in the literature within the research field (Goode, 1994a; Heinemann, 2009). Therefore, a series of studies call for an interaction-based understanding of language and communication disorders to enhance an assessment of the relational problems, rather than solely focus on language skill problems, as introduced above in the section on aphasia (Glintborg & Birkemose, 2018; Isaksen & Brouwer, 2015; Pilesjö, 2012; Wallace et al., 2017). To illuminate the complex sociality, awareness of local interplay needs to be enhanced to a larger extent than the ICF does (Krieger et al., 2018, p. 2; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019; Rimmer, 2006). The assessment of local interplay, social relations and inclusion/exclusion in institutional life remains underdeveloped (cf. Heinemann, 2009). Goode's informing of professional practice on QOL standards for persons with disability (1994a, p. 141) is an area to be explored further by interaction studies, since social inclusion/exclusion are considered coordinated by the participants themselves in interaction (Klemmensen, 2018).

### 1.7.2 Inclusion/exclusion practices

With tools derived from the EMCA perspective, social inclusion/exclusion are considered based on two things: first, the assumption of mutual understanding; and second, the accomplishment of a local order.

If anything is axiomatic to ethnomethodology, then, it would be that 'there are' social practices available for the seeing, and that wherever one finds them, social order will be right there. That these practices are not subjective or 'interpretive' is indicated by their very empirical availability. That they are not individualistic is indicated by the fact that nobody is ever 'free' to do just anything and have it count as competent membership. There is just as much constraint, on everyone, as Durkheim imagined (Hilbert, 1992, pp. 27–82), and trouble with the constraint leads to just as much anomie (pp. 83–103). But the constraint is observable in the very work being constrained. Members constrain one another, in that sense, though collectively they often experience the constraint as coming from outside the immediate setting — as

policy, as tradition, as culturally mandated, as structural (Hilbert, 2009, p. 171).

In short, the occupational therapist as co-participant is considered to interact in concert with the individual with impairment as scaffolder and gatekeeper. Together, they constitute practices of inclusion/exclusion. Yet, participants with impairments often have a less entitled say in coordinated activity than their interlocutors without impairment. This is demonstrated by Robillard's first-person account of life with severe disability, immobilization and language and communication disorders:

I have a neurological disease, with severe muscular dystrophy. I am in a wheelchair. I cannot speak or move my vocal cords. I have tracheostomy. This station has afforded an ethnomethodological opportunity to observe the essentially hidden (...), absorbed (...) structure of how the body and voice, in concert with the bodies and voices of others, initiate, maintain and close every kind of social setting (Robillard, 1996, p. 17).

Robillard's description of social life with severe disability centers on his prevention from participating with bodily and vocal impairments; it emphasizes injustice and social exclusion as consequences for the individual with impairments, who is prevented by their own body to fulfill sequential expectations. Robillard reports that his condition not only prevents him from participating and accomplishing desired actions; in a series of examples, he closely describes his inability to participate in social interaction by normative standards. Simply, he is systematically excluded by well-meaning (neurotypical) co-participants, even his wife and every care partner in everyday life exclude him due to his condition. Exclusions include prevention from participating in everyday conversation and deciding about the handling of his own body in everyday routines of moving around with the carers. He tells that his participation is often disrupted by others in social encounters when, for instance, a Mr. X — his most emotional and dire example — physically removes him, against his will, from a social opportunity at a party (Robillard, 1996, p. 24). In a first-person perspective, however, this is experienced as a general condition “over and through the course of interaction with me, as I try to effect normatively understood communicative moves ‘interpretive asymmetries’ (Coulter, 1975) happen between me and my interlocutors” (Robillard, 1996, p. 17). Robillard's insider account by no means states an even relationship between him and interlocutors: “I am a virtual black belt in giving and receiving affronts to Alfred Schutz's (1967) assumption that we are in a common, intersubjective world” (Robillard, 1996, p. 17). Refuting theory of intersubjectivity in a first-person perspective by foregrounding individual agency,

Robillard's account of social exclusion and disrupted encounters are stressed as being the constant order of the day with severe disability, leading to his anger in the social, and demonstrating what this thesis is essentially addressing. His account inspired this thesis' step towards analytically foregrounding "the individual agent from within the social ensemble" (Duncker, 2017, p. 148) in accordance with the integrational approach to language and communication. Importantly, two things are drawn from Robillard's account and, hence, foregrounded as inspirations for undertaking this study. First, the possible exploration of an analytical first-person perspective draws from observation. Second, it foregrounds a real need to analytically emphasize everyday practices with disability underpinning the human right to participate in everyday activities in society on equal terms with individuals without impairment in functioning regardless of physical, cognitive, social, emotional or behavioral ability (cf. United Nations [UN], 2006; WHO, 2001).

The study of severe disability and aphasia after ABI is researched with tools derived from integrational linguistics, which turns language and communication disorders into an ontological matter based on the assumption of an integrated system of language and communication from a first-person perspective (Klemmensen, 2018).

(...) the exercise of a biomechanical capacity or the fulfilment of a circumstantial condition 'may — but does not necessarily — presuppose a macrosocial practice or proficiency', while every macrosocial practice or proficiency does presuppose some biomechanical capacity (Harris 1996, p. 44). The point is that sign making as such is not impeded because of macrosocial factors, but problems relating to biomechanical or circumstantial factors may render it effectively impossible to accomplish communication (Duncker, 2017, p. 135).

Following Harris (1996, 1998), Duncker's view foregrounds the individual person's capacity as a biomechanical factor. Adding person-centeredness and a person's rights perspective to the idea of social order accomplishment, the biomechanical focus of integrational linguistics foregrounds the persons communicating rather than communication itself.

Instead of a macrosocial endeavor (cf. Hilbert, 2009), or the opposite "autonomous agentive self in a traditional humanist sense" (Zhou, 2020, p. 208), integrational linguistics is constituting a personalist stance in the study of human behavior in language and communication practices (Hutton, 2017, 2019; Klemmensen, 2018; Zhou, 2020). To the study of practices of inclusion/exclusion, this study adds person-centeredness as an extra layer of analysis of individual participant practices in the social ensemble (cf. Duncker, 2017).

### 1.7.3 A person-centered approach to the study of language and communication disorders

In conclusion, the thesis claims that integrational linguistics is a useful approach to add to the study of language and communication disorders because of its person-centered position and an overall interest in singling out and enhancing the understanding of the individual in communication within the social ensemble (Duncker, 2017). This aspect of interaction analysis is missing in EMCA studies that focus more on social aspects and logistics between the participants. However, the two approaches need to be combined in order to conduct analyses of data, since integrational linguistics is missing a methodology for approaching an interaction analysis in its own right and EMCA can offer a such (Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 84–88).

Integrational linguistics is an approach to language and communication that distinctly reflects upon human life matters from a personalist perspective (Hutton, 2019). It claims a more humanized analytical practice (Pablé, 2017) resembling a human first policy. According to Harris, this is grounded in relationality:

The difference between a ‘normal/abnormal’ distinction and a ‘common/uncommon’ distinction cannot be exaggerated where human beings are concerned. It affects the whole range of personal relations between one individual and another. To treat a fellow human as ‘abnormal’ is to postulate an immeasurable gulf between this unfortunate creature and yourself. To take one example among many, a woman who had a stroke in 2008 writes: ‘I have noticed the difference in how you are treated when you are unable to talk. I am often ignored by people or considered stupid.’ This is not an uncommon experience (Harris, 2013, p. 103).

Considering the interest in lifeworld perspectives in health communication, the communicational practice of individuals who have language and communication disorders is explored from an integrational linguistic perspective in this thesis. The research category of *atypical interaction*, often applied in studies in language and communication disorders (cf. Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013), is under scrutiny in this thesis (Klemmensen, 2018). The study discusses the premises of this research category versus the integrational claim of a “more humanized approach” (Pablé, 2017; Pablé & Hutton, 2015) throughout the thesis.

As a result, this thesis proposes a novel analytical approach that combines the EMCA notion of atypical with the integrational linguistic notion of an analytical first-

person and more humanized perspective, which together contribute to the establishment of a new discourse in the study of communicational difficulties. In discussing the analysis, the main finding is that integrational linguistics can help analyze what it is that the participants are trying to do in interaction regardless of their categorization as individuals with impairments or typical participants. Furthermore, it is argued that the implication of close integrational attention to the persons communicating is that it promotes a person-centered approach to QOL (with disability) (Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 149–150).

Throughout writing this thesis, my research interest has been *what actually goes on* in interaction with language and communication disorders. Observations of inclusion/exclusion practices are described and expanded on determining what was successful and what was not successful in real encounters probed by the perspective of the combined analytical approach. Finally, the question of how we can benefit from the observation of lived experience was of interest.

In the empirical part, the thesis' three background publications contribute with knowledge on three strands: (a) how to analyze instances of manifest misalignments in the data extracts; (b) how practices of inclusion and exclusion are emergent in the interaction itself and in the material settings; and (c) how it can have further institutional ramifications based on the above call for analytical improvement.





## 1.8 Research questions

The research questions center on the possibility of integrating EMCA with integrational linguistics and the application of the two as a basis for analyzing video ethnographic data (30 hours) and fieldwork of a series of encounters recorded over a period of 14 months between 2012–2013, involving a case resident, occupational therapists and participant researchers (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). The recordings were made at a Danish care home facility for residents with severe language and communication disorders and ABI. This study sets out with a theoretical discussion before the probing of analysis.

The twofold order of the research questions is:

1. To what extent can the approach of integrational linguistics and EMCA combine in a study of language and communication (disorders)?
2. (How) can the observational study of inclusion/exclusion be approached with this combination of integrational linguistics and EMCA?

The first part of the thesis undertakes a critical analysis of aspects of similarities and divergences between the joined approaches (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015). The second part of the thesis probes an empirical analysis of inclusion/exclusion practices of institutional life by adopting an approach that combines integrational linguistics and EMCA (Klemmensen, 2018).

Notwithstanding the existence of divergences between integrational linguistics and EMCA, the expectation at the outset was that the two approaches could enrich analysis of language and communication disorders in practice because of their many similarities, mutuality and inform each other's missing aspects. Though the number of followers of Harrisian thinking has increased and recent research is popular in top publication houses, little positive response from the rest of the scientific community has been received (Săftoiu & Pablé, 2018; Linell, 2018; Weigand, 2018).


The thesis aims to contribute to this missed opportunity of dialogue. Therefore, this study gives attention to the differences and divergent perspectives of EMCA and integrational linguistics with inspiration from the idea of *diffraction* (Barad, 2007, p. 72). As methodology, the idea of diffraction, labeled by Barad (2007, p. 72), is to give attention to the differences of existing and divergent perspectives. Diffraction is conceptualized from a physical phenomenon in the natural sciences, but it is applied figuratively in the present thesis (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 70). In sum, divergences between integrational linguistics and EMCA are not overcome in this thesis, but they

are downscaled throughout a dialogue constituting this thesis' critical discussion before the approaches are combined in an illustrative analytical probing.

On the next page, Fig. 1.1 shows the research process, illustrated as distributed and progressing across the publications that form the background of this thesis. The illustration of the research progression as a movement from interest in theory towards methodology and probing of analysis is demonstrated over the course of publications; therefore, these are included in Fig. 1.1. Three colors distinguish the different publications. The greener sections represent the major background publication: the book and the book's seven chapter articles.<sup>v</sup> The grey and orange sections mark the two other background publications.

At the center of Fig. 1.1, the illustration of the book contains all three tones: grey/blue, green and orange to illustrate how the book transcends the three publications and binds to other research as well. Importantly, standing on the shoulders of others, which this research does to a high degree, is illustrated by the blue background that is also included as a gradient color of the main publication section.

**Fig. 1.1. Development of the research progression in background publications**



*Note.* IL is an abbreviation for integrational linguistics.

## 1.9 Purpose

The study has a threefold purpose:

1. The premises of integrationism are discussed and their applicability are demonstrated to a non-Harrisian audience. Central points of integrational semiology are discussed critically and incorporated in analytical reflection with extensive explanation.
2. The claim of the thesis is that “data” can be studied, based on an applied integrational linguistic ground, in order to approach the individual in their social ensemble. A second aim is, therefore, to invite followers of a Harrisian semiology to realize the pros and cons of this opportunity instead of discarding empirical data analysis.
3. The thesis invites interaction analysts from the EMCA paradigm to collaborate on the opportunities of working with a person-centered perspective in language and communication disorders, as probed and discussed in the thesis.

## 1.10 Reading guidelines

Since the attempt has been to harmonize two approaches which share similarities as well as differences, it is important to keep in mind while reading that the aim has been to uncover their mutual benefit of combination, not their polarities. Thus, a guiding principle has been to downgrade a traditional ideologically loaded writing style within the integrational camp. However, I do want to defend the confrontative writing style within integrationism on one node. The traditional Harrisian position on demythologizing the language and communication concepts applied in the language sciences can only be understood through critical discussion and direct confrontation. In the thesis, efforts are taken for bias-free language, particularly in regard to writing about disability with inclusivity and respect. Furthermore, nongendered pronouns are used unless referring to known individuals (i.e. research participants or another author), where that person’s identified pronoun may then be used.

## 2 Literature review: meaning-making in practice

This section is based on ideas and text from Klemmensen (2018) discussing the literature that form the background for the present study. Importantly, it discusses significant perspectives relevant to this thesis' investigation of the possible combination of EMCA and integrational linguistics, further elaborated in Chapters 3–4, in the still growing body of contemporary studies of *meaning-making processes*. The aspect of making meaning in interaction with atypical resources is explored in more detail in the outlining of the analytical framework and the sections discussing the new analytical approach (see Chapters 5–9).

### 2.1 The functions of language

The functions of language in social interaction were studied by Malinowski and further elaborated by Jakobson in the early 20th century, well before the pragmatic approach to language became a general agenda in the language sciences. Malinowski's ethnography uncovered the importance of context by reference to the experience of customs and community practices necessary to understand the determinacy of linguistic manifestations. Language and semiotic units were not to be understood as mere representations, but as the actual habits and actions constituting a community (Malinowski, 1923). While addressing the question of style, Jakobson (1987) introduced a model of communication which includes Malinowski's concept of context (Senft, 2009, p. 227). The message is at the center of Jakobson's model, surrounded by context.

In contrast, the mathematical theory of communication of Shannon and Weaver (1945/1969) is based on the idea of transmission of information, where the only contexts included are noise and disturbances. The mathematical model gave rise to a dominant cognitivist approach in the language sciences known as computation. The *transmission* term advocates the idea that signs and symbols are being transmitted through a process of physical and mental coding and decoding (Reddy, 1979, p. 303). Ontologically, tendencies are that all of the above draw on structuralism, which is encapsulated in Saussure's idea of signs as representations for "something else" (cf. Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 8–9).

### 2.1.1 Objectivized content in linguistic representations

Direct and programmatic observations of language draw on the idea of an observable system. A theory was necessary in order to categorize and decode the systematical concept of meaning logarithmically. The approach to language considered as composed of tangible units of sign-meanings is known from Saussure's semiology, or general science of signs. Saussure conceived the independent study of the linguistic sign and, as such, linguistics (cf. Saussure, 2013, foreword by Harris, p. xv).

In short, traditional scientific descriptions of "sense-making" have been based on visible and audible linguistic and extra-linguistic signs, and the interpretive content of scientific descriptions of sense-making have been based exclusively on the observation and description of visible and audible linguistic and extra-linguistic signs. Accordingly, this structuralism-based sign theory regards the content of signs as a mirror of a system which structures meaning ordered in "language." In other words, the structuralism-based assumption of language is that signs are inherent materialized reflections of a representational language system. In this view, the system itself is what generates the meanings negotiated culturally and historically and recorded in language. Consequently, meaning is presupposed to lead back to or to "represent" something: ideas, objects, phenomena, events, perceptions, or direct experiences. In a structuralist view, language users pick meanings from the representational, preestablished, historical body of language and meaning, like in a dictionary. However, questions about *whose* perception and experience it might be are nowhere addressed in structuralism. Crucially, the question of agency is central to the integrationist position on signs and meaning (Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 17–18).

In structuralism, content (the signified) has the status of a reflection of something else, which is what ascribes content as inherent to language. Moreover, it objectivizes meaning, as structuralism assumes that the signification is a reflected phenomenon arbitrarily encapsulated in a sign. In this view, content is attached to language and not to actions. Signification is derived from its linguistic representation. This heritage from Saussure's theory of signs is based on distinguishing the "signifier" from the "signified," yet representation and meaning are assumed to be present in the very representation: the sign (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 56). In the structuralism-based paradigm, agency is addressed only syntactically as the subject of a sentence. Therefore, content has nothing to do with real-life situations (Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 17–18).

## 2.2 Ethnomethodology: provisional meaning by negotiation

Overall, researchers in ethnomethodology focus on the processes by which the members of society negotiate meaning, constitute situations and provisional identities. In ethnomethodology, the analyst starts with the situation, following the tradition after Goffman (2017). Originally, theorists from the tradition of ethnomethodology critically questioned the meaningfulness of isolating and observing interaction as directly and programmatically as, for instance, described in traditional linguistic studies.<sup>vi</sup> In *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967), Garfinkel does the opposite of examining rules and programs: “Just as commonly, one set of considerations are unexamined: the socially standardized and standardizing, ‘seen but unnoticed,’ expected, background features of everyday scenes. The member of society uses background expectancies as a scheme of interpretation” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 36). Instead, Garfinkel describes how background expectancies are conventionalized following the tradition from Schutz (1962).

In a line of experiments, Garfinkel demonstrated how conventions become noticeable when broken, because people orient to their breaching. Garfinkel’s so-called “breaching experiments” reveal how expectations underpin situations: A question requires an answer. A participant’s breach of the pairing question-answer is oriented to by the co-participants as problematic and thus reveals the expectation of an answer. The correlation between expectation and response to what is going on in interaction conceptualizes the participant as respondent to something (earlier) understood or experienced and invoked and synthesized in a next contribution. Hence, determinacy of what is going on in situations is not predefined, but circumstantially negotiated and settled.

### 2.2.1 EMCA from ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodology and CA, abbreviated together as EMCA, account for a history of dialogue and entanglement between the two. Throughout the thesis, I use the abbreviation EMCA for a synthesis of them: ethnomethodological conversation analysis. This abbreviation applies both to an EMCA perspective and to a pure CA perspective (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984; Sacks et al., 1974). EMCA and CA are similar in many respects yet different in their analytical consequences. The empirical study of the mechanisms of human interaction is based on the methodology of CA, derived from ethnomethodology. As an example, the ethnomethodological fact that a participant’s breach of the pairing question-answer is oriented to by other participants as problematic, whether rude or in another sense non-ordinary, and is referred to as an *adjacency pair* with a CA technical term. EMCA’s cumulative purpose is to reveal



a set of micro-orientations, which are assumed to be governing (any) human interaction. A recording and a micro-transcription are used as data in the process of analysis.

Typically, the analyst follows an inductive strategy that can be stepwise (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997). First, the analyst may choose a sequence. Second, the analyst may characterize which actions occur in the chosen sequence. Third, the analyst may describe the modes of production that the language users display. These are the conventionalized forms of “linguistic materiality,” which occur in the chosen sequence and which must be readable in a transcript produced by the analyst in the next step of analysis. Finally, the analyst may discuss how sequential organization, timing and turn-taking contribute to establish the participants’ understandings of the meaning of the interactional actions, based on the transcript and video which the researcher entirely has produced and edited. In addition, CA raises factuality in applying a positivist discourse. Hence, the analysis of the data is characterized with expressions such as “display,” “data,” “account” and “demonstration” to describe cooperative meaning-making and social human agency.

### 2.2.2 CA: a science of meaning-making in conversation

Classic CA studies focus on mundane everyday interaction (Sacks, 1972, 1992; Sacks et al., 1974), emphasizing micro-analysis. CA’s doctrine of sequentially-organized analysis underlines the interest in the socially-oriented display of meaning and orientation towards forming new shared meaning. CA is primarily used for transcription, and thus for making video observation analyzable in this study. Since CA offers a wide range of analytical concepts, it can be used to describe and to categorize. CA is a tool that is excellent for identifying relevant places for analysis in interaction because it rolls out the interaction sequentially (Jordan & Henderson, 1995; ten Have, 2007).

Within the tradition of CA, data represent social interaction or, simply put, sense in the making, inclining towards positivism, because of empiricism. The CA analyst regards context a co-constructed, interactional enterprise which is organized sequentially in a forward rolling time perspective (de Kok, 2008, p. 890; Fleming, 1995; Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997). CA conclusions are generally based on generalizability and known rules of conduct in conversations as we cumulatively know them from research, whereas EMCA conclusions are restricted to derive from the situation in question (Bjelić, 2019), after Goffman (1981). Conversation is considered a situation “under construction” (Fleming, 1995, p. 92). CA thus operates a local concept of context. Turn-taking and displays are at the heart of the analysis and the analyst’s attention.

### 2.2.3 Display of meaning-making

Generally, studies in social interaction rely on ontologies of communication and action in contexts. Current positions within the interaction research field have much in common, though they diverge in the basic assumption of signs and their interpretation. In traditional studies in CA, interaction and understanding have been widely covered, starting from the early days of the field (Sacks et al., 1974). The aim of CA is to understand the participants' perspective, which is noticeably different from traditional discourse analysis.

Traditional discourse analysis frames concepts (e.g. speech acts) which are prerequisites for analysis. CA builds upon the grounds of an analytical strategy, relying on recordings (tape, digital sound, or video recordings), which are processed into transcripts demonstrating micro-level speech: pronounced words, sighing, micro-linguistic feedback, and gesturing. These traces of social interaction are interpreted with a "proof-procedure," which serves as the scientific validation of the CA analyst's interpretation of individuals' "displays" of understanding in conversations (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 729).

A broader sense of the analytical situation challenges several applied linguistic approaches, including the programmatic CA procedures of proof-finding in local context (Sacks et al., 1974). Within the current EMCA community, there are ongoing discussions on how narrowly or broadly the tools from CA ought to be interpreted. The journal *Discourse Studies* dedicated a special issue (2016) to discuss CA's proof-procedure as temporal fixing of determinacy versus Heritage's extensive work on epistemic engine markers (such as "oh") as regular markers, which provide determinacy for changes of states in conversations. In sum, proof-procedure is still at the heart of CA and determines its analytical perspective. Essentially, CA analysts are interested in how people go about conducting everyday life in various settings. However, this point has been highlighted and demonstrated as a distinguishing feature of an integrational linguistics perspective on several occasions (Fleming, 1995, 1997; Taylor, 1982).

### 2.3 Integrationism: meaning-making of the individual

The program of integrationism — or *integrational linguistics*, as founder R. Harris labelled this approach (Harris, 1998) — departs from traditional linguistics with the aim of demythologizing linguistics.<sup>vii</sup> Within the approach of integrationism, signs are made in communication ongoingly: Signs do not exist as predetermined items in

a system of “language.”<sup>viii</sup> Moreover, signification is not regarded as mirrored and reflected in a sign itself, but considered “a function of the integrational proficiency which its identification and interpretation presuppose” (Harris, 1996, p. 154). In contrast to the Peircean notion of the dynamic sign, including the idea of semiosis that presupposes an autopoietic world of signs actualized by interpretation (Peirce, 1994; Raudaskoski, 1999, p. 55), Harris’ integrationism considers indeterminate processes of human sign *creation* and is, ultimately, an anthropomorphic approach (Duncker & Perregaard, 2017): “The individual participants in any communication will each contextualize what happens differently, as a function of the integrational proficiency each exercises in that situation” (Harris, 2009a, p. 71). Therefore, analyzing the presuppositions of the linguistic sign in traditional linguistics is often labelled *segregationism*; the distinction of the signifier and the signified are at the heart of integrational investigations. Harris had a history of issues with structuralism since translating Saussure’s *Course in General Linguistics* (2013). Especially, the structuralist distinction between signifier and signified is believed to dominate modern linguistics and communication theory far more than supposed in pragmatics. For this reason, this particular notion is revisited in a series of demythologization of theories linking signifier and signified (structuralism-based ontology) in integrationist literature (Harris, 1996, 1998; Klemmensen, 2018; Pablé, 2019; Pablé & Hutton, 2015).

Contrastingly, in an integrational sign conceptualization, content is considered meaning in the making and signification is perceived to exist only as part of somebody’s communicative enterprise; signification, in its own right, is conceptualized a direct experience of the perceivable meaningfulness of something to someone. It cannot preexist as a reflection of “a meaning” inherent in language in the integrational ontology, nor does it exist as a reflection of someone else’s materially recorded experience. However, the applied integrational perspective relies on its own principles and on its own ontology of a lay-oriented language approach. This perspective is a rare approach to language and communication with a semiology of its own.

### 2.3.1 Integrational linguistics: an internalist perspective?

An integrational strand emphasizes that “signs are not either linguistic or nonlinguistic: crucially, they are the result of a sign-maker’s contextualization. In other words, the sign-maker makes something into a sign according to his or her contingent needs” (Pablé, 2013, p. 96). Therefore, integrationism can be argued to have affinity towards a theory of action rather than language and communication. Accordingly, context is substantiated in integrational linguistics and attributed to

persons in the process of sign-making, rather than to the settings or to the surroundings of language and communication taking place, as in the case of earlier models of language and communication which mainly aim to define linguistic determinacy. However, to claim integrationism an internalist perspective is a misunderstanding, according to Taylor (1986).

Different perspectives on integrational linguistics described within the language sciences have so far discussed a theoretical perspective starting from Harris's book *The Language Myth* (1981), which provocatively stated a "myth theory" (Linell, 2004, p. 30) that Harris claims is the object of study in traditional linguistics. However, to this day, no thorough account combining the insights of integrational linguistics with studies in everyday practices exists (Fleming, 1997). Nor is there an account of how to operate analytically on the grounds of the broad sense of a "communication situation" formulated within the integrational linguistics discourse. Yet, several studies discuss social interaction from an integrational perspective (e.g. Harris, 1998; Hutton, 2017; Taylor, 1986, 1992).

### 2.3.2 Integrational linguistics and other approaches

It has been claimed by integrationists, and by Harris as well, that the basis of integrational linguistics is radically different from traditional linguistics and the language sciences.<sup>ix</sup> Therefore, integrationism has, for decades, stood back-to-back with the rest of applied linguistics and studies in pragmatics.<sup>x</sup> Integrational linguistic literature has been extremely critical towards unifying the approaches of integrational linguistics and ethnomethodology (and hence, CA) because of their divergent approach. In the eyes of critics, the problem is addressed to exactly semiology and thus presuppositions of language and communication (Hutton, 2017; Taylor, 1982, 1992; Taylor & Cameron, 1987). In short, the clarification of connections in this chapter demonstrates the associative consequences of adopting an integrational linguistic approach to language and communication.

### 2.3.3 A decompartmentalized linguistics

Importantly, integrational linguistics departs from both compartmentalized, traditional, general linguistics and from structuralism-based, modern, applied linguistics. These assume inherent systems of meaning in the traditional Saussurean sense. Consequently, the integrational linguistic perspective is moving towards "a non-compartmentalized study of human interaction" (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, p. 59). Epistemologically and ontologically, integrational linguistics suggests a radical sign

theory and an alternative to traditional notions of meaning as something inherent in signs. Finally, it informs the established tradition in modern applied linguistics with an important supplement.

#### 2.3.4 Harrisian semiology: recurrent meaning creation

Harris's semiology is presented in various contexts with the aim of communicating its theoretical aspects and their discrepancies with traditional linguistics and the philosophy of language (Love, 2004, 2007; Pablé, 2010; Taylor, 1986, 1992; Toolan, 1996, 1997). This introduction is short and focuses solely on the aspects of the Harrisian semiotics which underpin practice studies as a point of departure.

Four principles of Harris's semiotics (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 14):

1. Signs are made in certain, actual communication situations.
2. Signs are unique.
3. No process of communication is without context.
4. Communication is processual and dynamic by nature.

Accordingly, an integrational semiology is based upon the notion that a sign is not autonomous but integrated into the situation in which it occurs. Whoever engages in the understanding of any sign, so to speak, by merely engaging or identifying it, applies a form of agency which, in Harris's terms, is best described as "integrational proficiency" (Harris, 1996, p. 154).

The above integrational linguistic sign axioms have been criticized by Lund as insufficient to meet the criteria of "signhood" (Lund, 2012, p. 4). Lund claims to refute Harris's central theses by examining them rhetorically. Lund offers a summary of central themes in Harris's semiotics, primarily targeted towards linguists, confirming the orthodox premises in traditional linguistics.

Harris's own central claim is that "signs are not given to us by Nature" (Harris, 2009b, p. 87) but need to be continuously created by us. Therefore, signs articulate the complexity of our own situation and "their creation is itself the creation of knowledge, and, more importantly, the creation of untold possibilities for its further expansion" (Harris, 2009b, p. 87). This claim is of interest to the present project since it is relevant to a practice approach as the persons communicating, their actions and their agency are the point of departure for a new applied integrationism. In the analysis of language and communication disorders, biomechanical abilities are prerequisites which afford a necessity for an analytical focus on multimodality rather than on language and linguistics (Harris, 1998; Thibault, 2007). Since the persons

communicating are at the center of the analysis, a broad definition of the notion of *communication situation* is needed, as situations are experienced differently by each one of us (Harris, 1996, 1998, 2009a).<sup>xi</sup>

Communicational processes are, according to Harris, characterized and governed by three kinds of factors that come into play in every communicational activity: biomechanical, macrosocial, and circumstantial factors (cf. Duncker, 2018; Harris, 1998, p. 29; Harris, 2009a, pp. 75–76; Klemmensen, 2018). Harris defines *communication processes* as governed by this set of individually determined factors; biomechanical, macrosocial, and circumstantial factors are to be understood as follows (Harris, 2009a, p. 76):

#### Biomechanical Factors

Biomechanical factors are, for example, neurophysiological abilities to communicate without disability, to simply perceive the sound of talk, or may be having a disorder and not being able to speak or pronounce certain words.

#### Macrosocial Factors

Macrosocial factors are matters such as understanding the same language, knowing social game rules, being polite, having humor, and knowing how to perform social common practices such as not showing up late for an appointment.

#### Circumstantial Factors

As an example of a circumstantial factor, Harris points to a story where a friend has had a car accident on their way to church and therefore has not shown up to a wedding. This circumstantial factor would overrule the macrosocial factor that one should not show up late for appointments.

In theory, there is a hierarchy since circumstantial factors rule out or change the other factors' impact on meaning-making. Circumstantial factors are more important, since they point to situational-specific occurrences and thus control the need for making new meaning and provoke new understanding (Harris, 2009a, p. 76).

### 2.3.5 Integrational communication: experiential meaning-making

According to Harris (1998, 2009a), no neutral observation points exist, which implies that integrations are individual and understood as recurrent activities that “go on” in

someone's understanding and self-experience as a person (cf. "communicational proficiency," Harris, 2008b, p. 44; "the stream of thought," James, 1950, pp. 224–290). Two main concepts suggest the integrational approach to communication and language: contextualization and the principle of cotemporality. First, *contextualization* is a wide concept which characterizes the circumstances of the activity of engaging in processes of communication, for example, everyday life (Harris, 1998, p. 100). On the one hand, contextualization is a process in which our communication and actions are embedded; people talk about something and are situated at localities. This implicates that meanings exist only as integrated by persons and their activities. Since persons think and talk in situations, the integrational concept of contextualization embeds language in a greater activity enterprise (Harris, 1998, p. 98). Therefore, language cannot be separated from communication for followers of integrational linguistics; communication always comes first (Harris, 1998, p. 5). This is demonstrated by the principled concept of *cotemporality*. Harris notes that:

In short, we are brought to recognize what the integrationists calls the 'principle of cotemporality'. The chronological integration of language with events in our daily lives requires us to suppose that what is said is immediately relevant to the current situation, unless there is reason to suppose otherwise (Harris, 1998, p. 81).

The principle of cotemporality conditions contextualization. Hereby, Harris points to the integrational principle that linguistic activities do not have any special temporal status which separate them from the rest of our existence, as supposed by traditional linguists. In an integrational semiology, linguistic activities cannot be released from contextualization, which link the activities to circumstances due to the principle of cotemporality. " (...) in Heraclitan terms, 'one cannot step into the same context twice'." (Harris, 1998, p. 98). In short, contextualization and the principle of cotemporality are inseparable. This has an analytical consequence, " (...) determinacy is provided by the context of the activity" (Harris, 1998, p. 101). As will be discussed, the notion of contextualization is central to this study because it represents a person-centered approach to communication. In addition, it distinguishes the integrational linguistics conceptualization of communication from ethnomethodology's notion of procedures of sense-making. In short, contextualizations always occur in *somebody*, they are recurrent, and may not be considered as backdrops against which meaning is negotiated but as ongoing as the stream of thought; thus, integrational linguistics represents a more detailed approach to communication as integrational activity. Most importantly, communication is a means by which we generate meaning in ourselves and about ourselves (cf. Harris, 2009a, 2009b; James, 1950).

In sum, nothing is performed by language itself. Harris claimed that all considerations of “having a mind” are “inextricably bound up in various ways with “having a language,” and that it is simplistic to treat the latter as an evidence of the former (Harris, 2008c, p. vii). In fact, in an integrational linguistics perspective, there is no predetermined system of language (Harris, 1996, 1998), nor a predetermined idea of the mind. As noted, meanings are individual and not supposed to be fixed in a system of language; therefore, no normative way of interpreting linguistic or non-linguistic activity is presupposed. On the contrary, only the free flow of communication *as it is* exists and may be the object of study and, in my view, observational.

Therefore, because of an individualist approach to language, within integrational linguistics, communication is primarily defined in terms of persons’ contextualizations. The integrational linguistics notion of contextualization emphasizes three key aspects of communication: processuality, persons and activity (Harris, 1996, 1998, 2009a). Sense-making procedures require an agent or a subject who can undertake the action of making sense. According to an integrational understanding of communication, it makes sense to involve oneself alongside with the persons in question, since to understand is a “sign-making business” involving real people’s understandings that are actually taking place. It is therefore crucial to involve people’s own understandings of their situations when research is undertaken from an integrational view of communication. In CA, understanding is considered processual intersubjectivity, demonstrated by how participants show to each other their understanding of the previous action (turn-at-talk, gesture, etc.) in the present action (turn-at-talk) to accomplish shared meaning ongoingly. On the other hand, integrationists conceive meaning as individual; an enterprise undertaken by “the integrating self with emphasis on its implied relational sociality” (Zhou, 2020, p. 208).

### 2.3.6 The temporal status of meaning in integrationism

In *Introduction to Integrational Linguistics*, Harris accounts for the situational anchoring of utterances (Harris, 1998, p. 68): The integrationist treats meanings not as semantic units established in advance by a fixed code, but as values that arise in context out of particular communication situations. The participants assign these values as part of the integration of activities involved. In this sense, for the integrationist, communication involves a constant making and re-making of meaning. Simply, our engagement with language is a continuous, intrinsically creative process: “ (...) meanings are not correlations of particular words and particular experiences (...) Rather, meanings are created to the demands of communication. (...) Thus what matters is what needs to be known in order to further a particular communicational



purpose” (Harris, 2006, pp. 57–58). Creativity is on demand to motivate and stimulate meaning-making.

Following this, Harris’s threefold characteristics are introduced to begin the conceptualization of an applied integrational linguistics-inspired analysis of practices. First, meanings are processual and hereby dynamic, they are not preestablished; thus, signs and words cannot be meaningfully isolated from the situations in which they are produced. Second, meanings are results of modes that actual persons are in while they are doing something else, for instance, as they are trying to go about understanding something. Third, meanings are “provisional determinacy” (Harris, 1998, p. 85) because understanding and contextualization are constant activities which entail a constant dynamic (individual), person-centered production of meaning (Harris, 1987, p. 7). According to Harris, we cannot meaningfully isolate signs, words or persons who are engaged in understanding something.

In *Integrationist Notes and Papers 2006–2008*, Harris specifies that “(m)eanings are values conferred upon signs by their role in articulating the integration of activities. Signs are made this way” (Harris, 2009a, p. 76). Meanings are, thus, regarded as produced by individuals in communication situations and persons do change their understanding all along communication, as demonstrated by EMCA researchers (Goodwin, 1979; Sacks, 1985; Schegloff, 1992).

Understandings can be demonstrated explicitly by producing a turn in a dialogue, and they can also be implicit. Whether understandings are explicit, interpretative, linguistic signs or implicit self-knowledge (Harris, 2009b, p. 87), the communication situation applies to the total of persons, sign production and situation, according to an integrational linguistics perspective (Harris, 1998, p. 68). Harris’s theoretical semiotics investigated in *Signs, Language and Communication* (Harris, 1996, pp. 63–78) describes communication processes broadly, including communication between natural phenomena and humans. However, this study is limited to the study of interaction between humans and humans, and their use of objects in the material setting.

The benefits of integrational linguistics and its potential analytical perspective are twofold. First, it is creating an outline for the possible application of an ethnomethodological theorizing on language and communication, based on an integrational ontology stating that language is indeterminate in the sense that indexicality and approximation in meaning is uniquely individual rather than uniquely social (Harris, 1987, p. 7). This applies to the integrationist, as opposed to CA assumptions. Second, it is developing a potential methodology for analysis based on new basic assumptions regarding signs and meaning.

### 2.3.7 Towards applied integrationism: tracing meaning-making

Harris's notion of integrational semiology (Harris, 1996, p. 154) has been discussed in various branches of the language sciences discipline. Only lately has it been taken seriously and applied in empirical studies.<sup>xiii</sup> Namely, applied linguistics and pragmatic studies with a focus on aspects of communication have taken an interest in an integrational linguistics ontology and integrationism as an applied theoretical perspective, and contemporary integrationists are preoccupied with further exploring the theoretical implications of integrational linguistics (Pablé, 2017). For instance, radical indeterminacy in language is unfolded as demonstrable indeterminacy in a person's understanding of the stream of consciousness, drawing on the personal anecdote as data. Hence, indeterminacy is enhanced and explored as a broadening advantage of the theory (Orman, 2017).

Yet, three key notions in integrational linguistics have not been defined for analysis, essential if integrational linguistics is to be applied. The following concepts distinctly address integrational linguistics analytically, in my perception:

1. The broadly defined sense of communication situation.
2. The notion of contextualization.
3. The principle of cotemporality.

Earlier attempts to distinguish integrationism from EMCA and CA have demonstrated the pros and cons of operating on a combined basis (Fleming, 1995; Hutton, 2008; Taylor, 1982, 1986). The strong use of sequentiality in CA versus contextualization and cotemporality in integrational linguistics is compared and discussed. This thesis will illustrate attempts to apply integrationism as an analytical practice. It will remain clear that this is an attempt to synthesize integrationism with the tools of EMCA. As such, there are several considerations: Strong divergences exist and must be critically examined and settled before a combination of the two is afforded.

### 2.3.8 The epistemology of an integrational analysis

Analyses carried out with an integrational linguistic-inspired approach to the study of language and communication alter the status of observable units and the interpretation of their content. For instance, the study of dialogue dynamics in modern applied linguistics draws on presuppositions of orderliness and normativity in language use, thus pointing to a traditional framework. The starting point for the development of an integrational linguistic-inspired methodology is the integration of theories of integrational linguistics, the workings of language and communication, and

considering and describing the mythical assumption-based framework of structuralism, which still dominates basic beliefs about the signification of displays in EMCA (Fleming, 1995; Harris, 1996, 1998; Pablé & Hutton 2015; Toolan, 1996).

## 2.4 Ask the speaker methodology

Following Davis' (2001) integrational approach to the study of words, researchers of integrationism consider sign production and sign interpretation as persons' understandings. Several accounts of interaction patterns exist from EMCA, but we know little about what is actually *understood* by the individuals in interaction, though we all possess lay knowledge and can account for our own understandings. As demonstrated by Svenstrup (2001, 2008), individuals, when confronted with the analyst's results of their interactions and situated understandings, often reply that the analytical result was not what the individual was trying to say, nor even close to their own interpretation of the situation and the sequence analyzed. This places us with a methodological challenge when discrepancies occur between individuals' experienced world and the experts' data representations of the experiences of the individuals.

The first step towards incorporating integrational linguistics in the science of languages is to thus position as a folk science, a folkloristic interaction perspective, so to say (Nielsen & Solvang, 2012). This perspective is rather different from the more philosophical perspective stated earlier by integrationists (Love, 2007; Pablé, 2010, 2017). The proposition of an analytical approach takes integrational linguistics in a new and different direction, underpinning the study of language and communication as practices.

### 2.4.1 Empirical research in Nordic integrational linguistics

As indicated above, the traditions for applied integrationism are rather narrow (Fleming, 1997). However, a recent turn in the tradition of Danish integrationism shows growing inclination towards relying on data (Damm, 2016; Duncker, 2018; Duncker & Perregaard, 2017; Høegh, 2017; Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Perregaard, 2016; Worsøe, 2014). This turn affords prosperous methodological probing. I affiliate with the Nordic version of integrational linguistics. Prevalently, Nordic studies in integrational linguistics compromise the orthodoxy of Harris' integrational linguistics (Conrad, 2011; Damm, 2016; Duncker, 2005, 2011, 2018; Duncker & Perregaard, 2017; Høegh, 2017; Nielsen, 2011, 2015; Perregaard, 2016; Thibault, 2017b, 2018; Worsøe, 2014). These studies which favor probing applied

aspects of integrational linguistics are gaining ground in Europe and gaining appreciation globally (Pablé & Hutton, 2015). As well, a Hong Kong group of contemporary integrationists has taken a stance on data, which, in my opinion, is rather theory-based. From my perspective, it has contributed to building upon an applied integrationism. However, the practical application of the theoretical perspective needs to be investigated further, since suggestions become entangled in a language-philosophical discussion rather than in hands-on analyses (Duncker, 2018; Pablé & Hutton, 2015).

Seemingly, both traditional integrationists and the contemporary integrationists who seek a practical application continue to agree on the claim that the ontology of integrationism is radical and different from that of traditional language science (Duncker, 2018; Duncker & Perregaard, 2017). This claim may be considered troublesome since, for decades, integrational linguistics has been regarded a mere negation of the language sciences and linguistics. Therefore, I argue that integrational linguistics could be considered differently: a specialized, but not radical, perspective within the range of perspectives in the language sciences. On this basis, this thesis will demonstrate that integrational linguistics can be applied in analyses of the practice of meaning and combined with EMCA.

Shifting to an integrational linguistic-inspired ontology in the study of language and communication provides an invitation to foreground agency within the approach by introducing a person-centered perspective. In sum, two schools of integrational linguistics exist: the Nordic tendency towards the post-Harrisian trend and the orthodox Harrisian school. In contrast to traditional integrationists, Nordic integrationism does not overly criticize empirical research, yet this new tradition is somewhat true to Harrisian perception of language and communication. The discrepancy between the argument from traditional integrational linguistics in the Harrisian sense and the “principles” of an applied Nordic integrationism is that they contrast in their analyses, where the Nordic tradition discusses applicability of an empirical integrational stance.

Staying true to integrationism, communication is approached as processual practices of meaning in line with a CA approach, rather than as a decoding of meaning: the common, contrasting, structuralism-based assumption about the activity of communication. However, indeterminacy plays an important part, ontologically, in separating an integrational perspective from a pure CA approach. Whereas CA aims at orientations towards temporal determinacy, the integrationist aims at uncovering understanding as something more than displays in local contexts. The integrationist investigates communication processes as human states of being and human modes of action necessary for survival (Harris, 1996, pp. 63–78; 1998, p. 29).

## 2.4.2 Integrationism and EMCA

Traditionally, integrational linguistic scholars have discarded a marriage between EMCA and integrational linguistics altogether (Harris & Wolf, 2008; Hutton, 2017; Taylor, 1982, 1992; Taylor & Cameron, 1987; Zhou, 2014). My endeavor is to encourage a development of integrational linguistics<sup>xiii</sup> by reaching out to other approaches. One of the overall differences between EMCA and integrational linguistics is that EMCA scholars tend to favor empirical investigation over theoretical. To critics, this atheoretical preference gives CA inclined research an element of naive empiricism:

(...) Observers can do no more than interpret, on the basis of their individual linguistic experience, what is said or written (...) A tape recording does not establish what was said or what was meant, but simply registers the acoustic product of an utterance (...) it still requires interpretation, and that interpretation is still dependent on the interpreter's own linguistic experience. The 'agreement' between observers is subject to the same caveat. That too is an interpretation. It is often taken to *presuppose*, but does not *demonstrate*, their common mastery of 'the same language' (Harris, 2013, p. 14).

Traditional integrational linguists, on the other hand, tend to be cautious, if not reluctant, when it comes to empirical scrutiny. In the eyes of critics, this tendency endows orthodox integrational linguists with an element of armchair linguists. With the purpose of mitigating both approaches by including both similarities and divergences between integrational linguistics and EMCA, these divergences between them are at least refocused, if not overcome, in this study. Emphasis is put on the adaption and investigation of a combination of the two underpinning the practice aspect of meaning-making (Klemmensen, 2018).

## 2.4.3 Integrationism and dialogism

Following an integrational perspective, interaction is located in communication situations, which apply to the total entity of persons, sign production and situation (Harris, 1998, p. 68). Like many dialogists, integrationists consider meanings as the continuum of practices that humans go around doing (Linell, 2009; Márkova & Foppa, 1990). To start at the macro level, meaning-making is considered dialogical

(Linell, 1998). Dialogically, meaning-making is the activity that participants are engaged in when they are going around communicating in various situations. Moreover, this is validated by the analytical demonstration of persons often changing their opinions and understandings “as they go” (Linell, 2009). The dialogical approach accounts for a dynamic strand in meaning, similar to the approach of integrational linguistics and CA.

In *Dialogicality and Social Representations* (2003), Márkova considers the meaning of studying social practices and suggests a change of focus, questioning what discursive practices actually mean. In other words, the need to involve real people and their contexts is foregrounded as a knowledge cursor to seize momentum of what the discursive practices actually reflect (besides sign theory), and to capture time-typical trends of collective everyday interpretations of official and private knowledge (Márkova, 2003, pp. xi–xii). Márkova points to the study of perspectives in dialogue as a tool to avoid cultivating a static perspective.

A scope of a new discourse analysis underpinning knowledge creation is supported by three scholars: Harris (2009b, p. 87), Valsiner (2009, p. 11) and Linell (2009, pp. 241–242), who independently, in the same publication year, pointed to a linkage between communication and knowledge, a notion earlier raised by Márkova (2003). Knowledge acquisition is, according to Linell, a broader notion. It is what we “go around doing” in the dynamic interactional process we call “communication” (Linell, 2009, p. 241). At first sight, this resembles Heritage’s notion of epistemics [-K(knowledge)/+K(knowledge)] that is guided by other-oriented social action (Heritage, 2018). However, a person-centered focus is, according to Linell, important to maintain in focus: how something is made relevant by someone in any particular respect (Linell, 2009, p. 242). Simply, focus is taken away from the logistics of language and centered on dialogue and persons’ cumulative affairs with one another. This view resembles the person-centered approach of language psychology underpinning integrationism.

#### 2.4.4 Integrationism and language psychology

Researchers of traditional language psychology regard understanding and meaning-making as an individual enterprise carried out in situated and contextualized practices (Gregersen, 2004; Hermann et al., 2005; Hermann & Gregersen, 1978; Hermann & Larsen, 1973, 1974; Jespersen, 1925; Mortensen, 1972; Rasmussen, 1980; Rathje & Svenstrup, 2004). In addition, and as discussed by Nielsen (2015), language psychology is inclined more towards the integrational program of formulating a new general science of language. The integrational notion of contextualization and the concept of *relevance structure* from Danish language psychologists Hermann and

Gregersen (1978) are similarly unique: they single out a uniquely person-centered view on language and meaning grounded in a person's experiential history, rather than a socially-oriented view popularized from discursive psychology and EMCA (Tileagă & Stokoe, 2015; Wiggins & Potter, 2008). In contrast, contemporary language psychology largely draws on EMCA (Nielsen, 2012) and defines communication as actual, situated practices (Gregersen, 2004; Hermann & Gregersen, 1978; Nielsen, 2005, 2015), investigating how persons integrate meaning: their understanding of what they are trying to do (Goodwin, 2000, pp. 1490–1492; Nielsen, 2011). Discursive psychology (Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999, pp. 105–120; Wiggins & Potter, 2008) is considered to be a branch of contemporary language psychology (Nielsen, 2012). It draws on EMCA and investigates social accomplishment and psychological display in everyday and institutional situations. Social order is in focus in discursive psychology; therefore, I consider discursive psychology to be a distributed social psychology rather than an individual psychology (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 50).

#### 2.4.5 Integrationism and the distributed language view

Since the early 2000s, several embodiment perspectives have been debated and discussed. In particular, notions of the concepts of *language* and *cognition* are phenomena distributed among more than one person (Cowley, 2011; Linell, 2013, 2015; Steffensen, 2015, 2016). Other schools, including integrational linguistics, have criticized the concepts of a distributed mind/cognition and a distributed language. Seemingly, to integrational linguistic theorists, it is impossible to localize such a mind, cognition, or language because it is dislocated (Harris, 2004; Orman, 2016; Zhou, 2020). In contrast, the embodied perspective of integrational linguistics is straightforward to localize since it is embodied in an individual person's body and mind. Summarizing, the uncommon ground between the distributed language view and integrational linguistics is that ontological similarities may be traceable. An anti-structuralism ontology could be co-operated. However, distributed language advocate Steffensen (2016) deduces integrational linguistics to be a mere criticism of 20th century general linguistics and fails to see the theoretical potential of qualifying integrational linguistics as an applied science. Rather, Steffensen refers to integrationism as a critical voice to bring to bear when challenged by common beliefs of the language myth (cf. Harris, 2004; Love, 2004). The very core of this discussion leaves no doubt, however, about a categorical difference between the distributed mind, cognition and language views, and integrational linguistics. Even the concept of distribution is claimed a "category mistake" by integrationists (Harris, 2004; Orman, 2016). This leads to a diverged path. The premise of integrational linguistics

is founded in a general theory of language and communication, which builds on the very persons communicating, something which is sharply underpinned. Moreover, this premise seems to be the main distinguishing feature and the “(un)common ground,” in Orman’s words (2016), between the distributed view and integrationism. An integrational approach insists on an individual take but is willing to discuss the intentionality and autonomy of such a being, at least as a localizable one. In short, as Pablé and Hutton intensely underpin the embodied aspect of integrational linguistics, “even if the self is not autonomous, it is nonetheless uniquely situated at the intersection of semiological processes” (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, p. 5). In sum, integrationism has little to do with the distributed language view and theory (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 58–59).

## 2.5 Inquiry into meaning-making with language and communication disorders due to ABI

### 2.5.1 Approaches to the study of meaning-making with brain injury

Brain injury, whether acquired at birth or later in life, traditionally has been regarded as a malfunction. It has been approached and understood as a biological deficit and as a cognitive disability. Linguistic impairment and brain damage are often associated. A biological understanding of disorders in language and communication often presupposes an array of interrelated processing in the individual. This view is closely related to a cognitivist view. Thus, language and communication deficiencies are perceived as bound to certain physiological dysfunctional biological mechanisms or atypical neurological states. In this view, disorders are considered linked to certain damage to the functional system, which may include body, mind, and relations to other bodies and minds. In a bio-perspective, the damage is the very point of departure of a system breakdown which leads to states of cognitive deficiency. Whenever individuals have what most traditional frameworks label as “communicational deficiencies,” the analyses of communicational possibilities are primarily based on a cognitive model. Several researchers now position themselves as critical towards strictly clinical approaches, which biologize human conditions in different fields in health communication (Brinkmann, 2010, pp. 27–28). Health research now tends to call for a broader focus on social aspects (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 28–29).

Overall, the WHO’s conceptual framework for the ICF model liberates the individual from a potential burden of responsibility for their “disability” (WHO, 2001, 2013). In addition, a functionalist understanding of language and communication



disorders takes point of departure in the above conceptual framework implicitly, as it is grounded in observations of everyday challenges to the individual. The interactional field research and inquiries into language and communication disorders are notably unified. A special issue of the journal *Aphasiology* (2015) demonstrated and summarized advances in the field, drawing on CA. This view allows for a functionalist study in both speech therapy and everyday settings, where pathologists and peers close to the individual with aphasia are studied with an analytic focus on the concept of repair in speech in interaction (Wilkinson, 2015, p. 259). This research is carried out in CA tradition. This contemporary analytical perspective in the study of aphasia aligns with the recommendations from the WHO (2001, 2013, 2020) as it explicitly distinguishes the biological damage from participatory abilities in everyday life and in society. Internationally, the functionalist view is growing in popularity and is becoming a preferred approach in disability studies, as well as at a more general level in professional health and social care. Regarding both the conceptual framework and the assessment of interventions, the WHO is trialing previous norms for practices, adding both to professional practices and to research. Ultimately, the idea of conceptualizing intervention standards worldwide can be discerned as an attempt to secure the well-being of individuals and the population at large by promoting a person-centered awareness in society, including health research and professional practice (WHO, 2016; this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 31–32).

Drawing on Vygotsky, a dialectic understanding of disability and language and communication disorders is an approach which considers disability and disorders inseparable from considering every person's psychology as cultural-historical phenomena (Böttcher & Dammeyer, 2010, p. 33). This view is closely linked to a Harrisian approach to communication and language, as Vygotsky considers the importance of understanding the complex relationship between inner biological (biomechanical) and outer social (macrosocial) factors (Böttcher & Dammeyer, 2010, p. 33; Harris, 1998, p. 29; Klemmensen, 2018, p. 33).

### 2.5.2 Extended EMCA: embodied meaning-making

The expanding boundary of the study of language and communication disorders are in part a consequence of a general growing interest in interdisciplinary studies within applied linguistics and interaction studies, leading towards an applied practice perspective for intervention among those who work with people with such disorders. This upcoming focal area of investigating *how it is done out there in the field* owes much of its interest to the influence and traditions of EMCA. Sacks' and Schegloff's studies of conversation and conversational settings gave Goodwin and Wilkinson the

tools to carry out their pioneering studies in language and communication disorders and speech therapy.<sup>xiv</sup> Within studies of language disorders, Goodwin's (1995, p. 235) focus has been on activity since their first studies of aphasia. Moreover, there has been a more general interest and request to make embodied talk and materiality relevant both in pioneering multimodal and video analyses, as demonstrated extensively by Goodwin (e.g. Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin et al., 2012).

Inquiry into language and communication disorders through video observation called for a need for multimodal transcripts where inquiry is allowed to approach the bodily expressions, such as emotions, conveyed towards the objects present or associated (Goodwin et al., 2012; James, 1950, pp. 442–485). Broader concepts of context and contextual configurations and participatory analysis (e.g. Goodwin, 2000; Wilkinson, 2011) differed from traditional EMCA studies. The augmented version of EMCA, which includes the *multimodal interaction analysis*, is much more concerned with room setting, material objects, multimodality, and communicational logistics and routines than it is with tracking mere language as in the traditional linguistic sense.<sup>xv</sup> The individual with impairment is no longer being scrutinized, but the surrounding responses to their contributions and presence form part of the whole repertoire; elements of the local institutional setting can be included, and situated discourses may be identified with multimodality (Aaltonen et al., 2014; Krummheuer, 2015; Raudaskoski, 2013; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). Objects in use can be considered important elements, and the distribution and logistics of language, minds and bodies may account for situated configurations of coordination and discursive positioning (Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 20–21).

### 2.5.3 The notion of atypical interaction: altered resources in meaning-making

In the study of aphasia, current discourse identifies and maps this disorder as a matter of linguistic deficiency, categorizing it as an atypical mode of communication (Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013). Furthermore, aphasia categorizes as memory problems, sensory disturbances, and other cognitive and physical impairments. Frequently, these features mean that the individual with impairment is limited communicatively. Limitations in communication make it difficult for an individual to engage with other people, and vice versa.

The presence of deficiencies and impairments in atypical modes of communication is a feature of a variety of language disorders; apart from aphasia, autism, Down syndrome, deafness, and various conditions of cognitive impairment may be included. Antaki and Wilkinson (2013) label language disorders into

categories of “atypical populations.” The atypical populations can be divided into three categories: the first embraces cases where cognition is intact but difficulties in speech and hearing may occur; the second contains cognitive impairments, such as those associated with autism and Down syndrome; the third includes atypical beliefs, cases where speech and language are intact but beliefs may cause disturbances and produce atypicality, as in the cases of psychotic states and schizophrenia (Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013, pp. 533–534).

CA is a preferred analytical approach to aphasic conversation (Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013). In interaction studies, the study of communicative impairment, such as the case of aphasia, typically includes a study, an investigation, and a demonstration of the person with impairment’s initiative, sustenance, and termination of an interaction. Moreover, interaction studies explore and describe mechanisms of the co-construction of meaning in CA. The presuppositions of CA are based on communication’s orderliness (Wilkinson, 1999a, 1999b). In addition, orderliness encompasses an organized, semiotic framework: the semiotic nature of signs and gesturing, as well as the semiotic nature of enactment with the physical environment (Goodwin, 2000, 2003b; Perkins, 2003; Wilkinson et al., 2011). Three main collections account for this semiotic tradition and tendency (Aphasiology, 1999, 2015; Goodwin, 2003a). Notwithstanding, this assumption-based framework of CA points to a structuralist dominance in EMCA, seen from an integrational linguistics perspective drawing on the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter (Fleming, 1995; Harris, 1996, 1998; Love, 2007; Pablé & Hutton, 2015; Toolan, 1996).

Methodologically, researchers are inevitably challenged by questions of the possible interpretation of interactional displays by the individual with impairment: How much the analyst attributes what is displayed or not displayed to the production time and the organization of repair may seem inactive and extended (Perkins, 2003; Raudaskoski, 2013). No one definitively knows how much to ascribe to intentional communication. Moreover, no one holds the answer on how to manage comprehension deficiency.

At first sight, autism and aphasia are types of atypical communication that seem to have little in common; their clinical symptoms and neuro-atypicality do diverge. However, the compensatory strategies the individuals affected by autism and aphasia after trauma use in interaction have proved to be strikingly similar. First, in aphasic conversation, the frequent occurrence of test questions (Simmons-Mackie & Damico, 2008) has been given particularly close research attention. This phenomenon often occurs in institutional settings, such as classrooms and in therapy. The teacher or therapist asks for information from the student or the individual with aphasia, which they know the answer to. Autism research has shown that persons with impaired communication abilities reject this practice as they treat it as unreal; resignation is the

interactional consequence (Harris, 2009a; Nielsen, 2011, 2015; Tammet, 2006). Persons with aphasia react similarly when exposed to unreal practices, such as treatment in occupational therapy (Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski, 2013). Furthermore, individuals with impairments like aphasia experience excessive other-initiated correction (Simmons-Mackie & Damico, 2008). The practice of test questioning as the core activity in conversation may inhibit the inclusion of individuals with language disorders in interaction as it engenders inauthenticity. Authenticity is important to rehabilitate a person after trauma, as well as maintaining and developing personhood circumstantially. Contrarily, pretense gaming is in danger of disabling the person with impairment further.

In studies on participating with language disorders, another area of attention is on repair organization and linguistic asymmetry in interaction (Goodwin, 2003a). The interactional order and the organization of repair are studied in formal and informal settings with individuals who demonstrate limited competencies in speaking and comprehension. Explicit repair work is extensive in the case of aphasia, since aphasia is characterized by problems in the production of speech (Perkins, 2003). Contrastingly, in autism research, repair work is more frequently implicit and is mainly uncovered in interviews and biographies (Nielsen, 2011; Tammet, 2006). In conclusion, different disorders and atypicality seem to have different relentless preferences for explicitness and implicitness in terms of self-correction (Schegloff et al., 1977)

A variety of applied pragmatic approaches to aphasia exist. Currently, CA is the preferred approach in intervention studies (Rae & Ramey, 2015; Wilkinson, 2011, 2015). However, micro-analyses may not present the overall picture. CA analyzes display and orientation that unfold during sequentially organized interaction. It cannot independently detect and analyze the processes this author wishes to describe regarding lifeworlds (Abrams & Deniz, 2015). For instance, we may not know from CA's abduction what a person understands beyond the social interaction they are engaged in (Robillard, 1996). The relevance of whether something is memorized correctly, for instance, will then depend on an augmented contextual configuration: which situations, persons, purposes, or connections are involved (Goodwin, 2000, 2003a; Harris, 1998). However, we may, within CA's analytical concept of next-turn proof-procedure, describe organizational patterns of social interaction. Indeed, this may be a hypostasized way of uncovering enacted meaning in an integrational critique (Fleming, 1995).

The value of the analytical CA approach is recognized widely. Traditionally, a participant's perspective is investigated through the observation of procedures, followed by research interviews with the individuals about their experiences, including reflections, emotions, fears, and suggestions. This methodology is not

impossible, but seems quite senseless when dealing with individuals with aphasia: a major challenge — apart from other physiologically induced challenges — is the production of talk in dialogue, which is the basis of a research interview. Therefore, if research in the data-driven participatory experience of aphasia in everyday communication is to take place, a new analytical approach to uncover a participant's perspective needs to be developed. Researchers need to be able to grasp a participant's perspective and utilize that to be able to, when necessary, modify or improve procedures of aphasic discourse in health communication.

However, traditions in the study of aphasic discourse are strong. Multimodal studies have been carried out for the past 20 years with great success, and the insights gained are invaluable. Goodwin (2000, 2003a) and Wilkinson (2011) have been major contributors in distributing knowledge on aphasic communication and in testing and training communication skills. There is a data-driven multimodal approach, which investigates participatory meaning-making as a multiparty happening where understandings and meanings are co-created with others. The multimodal approach is an applied CA approach, demonstrably based on the traditional methodology of CA. A multimodal applied CA approach to participatory meaning-making has long been the main key to access participatory understandings in interactions with individuals living with aphasia (Goodwin, 2003a).

The methodology applied in many aphasic studies has roots in traditional CA studies. As discussed in recent CA studies and literature, CA has evolved towards an augmented version of the traditional key CA principles. Newer CA studies investigate impairment and linguistic deficiency, aligning it with studies in everyday conversations. This turn, ideologically, has a huge impact on “normalizing” all human interaction as simply communication by means of different styles by pointing to the fact that any communication could be categorized as atypical communication. Augmented CA, thus, is to be understood as an expansion of the area of interest of CA as much as an augmentation of the group of language users in question. Goodwin edited the key work on augmented CA, a multimodal CA approach in a study of “conversation and brain damage” — a book of that title (Goodwin, 2003a).

The other major contributing scholar, Wilkinson, has ventured into creating a credible frame for analysis using applied CA relevant for peers. The object studied once again is talk and coordination in conversations with persons with aphasia, their partners, and the therapists, doctors, and practitioners surrounding them (Wilkinson, 2011, 2015). Furthermore, Wilkinson has elaborated and tested intervention programs for recovery after aphasia (2011), making major contributions to the restructuring of healthcare linguistic modules, hence improving care, and has contributed to methodologically demonstrating the usefulness of the standard CA forensic type of analysis. When the standard CA forensic type of analysis is applied to the study of

communicational situations with interlocutors with aphasia and other brain injuries, it demonstrates that turn-taking rules apply even to conversations with people with extremely limited vocabularies. Goodwin demonstrated how the availability of only three words (“yes,” “no,” and “du/and”) was more than sufficient in order to be understood and to make oneself understandable (Goodwin, 2003a). This study changed the view within interaction studies on impaired language and language disorders. From that time forward, multiple new study arenas opened up to researchers because Goodwin had enabled research to be undertaken on a whole new area of the lived life with brain damage, an area of study which previously had belonged to clinical studies and only investigated in isolated settings (Krummheuer, 2015, p. 188).

Along with an augmented approach, more context is taken into consideration. As discussed by Goodwin, situational dialogues are part of a material coordination of other actions, as well as involving other bodily expression than speech and gestures (Goodwin, 2000; Krummheuer, 2015). Goodwin’s approach to the analysis of aphasic discourse regards it as fundamentally a question of co-operation: as an injury, aphasia does reside within the skull; however, as a form of life, a way of being and acting in the world in concert with others, its proper locus is a distributed multi-party-system (Goodwin, 1995, cited in Perkins, 2003, p. 160). Perkins points to the possibilities for rehabilitation and problem-solving tools to be developed from this stance, stating that CA provides unique and precise identification of “negotiated aphasia” (Perkins, 2003, p. 160). By “negotiated aphasia,” Perkins means aphasia dealt with sequentially in interaction in the applied conversation analysis described by Goodwin (2003a) and Wilkinson (2011).

A multimodal approach is not solely directed towards speech, as this differentiated focal area augments the observable units available for analysis (Goodwin, 2000). The main tools in many CA analyses of aphasia and “negotiations of aphasia” in interactions are repair phenomena and repair negotiations (Perkins, 2003). The organization of repair in aphasia is complex and differs from what Perkins labels “normal conversation.” Also, the applied term of *understanding* as “positive evidence in the form of acknowledgement tokens or moving on to the next relevant contribution,” or such phrasing as “understanding sufficient for current purposes” demonstrates well how CA describes social order as a distributed cognitive machinery in its overall terminology (Perkins, 2003, p. 150). Hence, CA does not take an individual’s experiential perspective into consideration, but remains a researcher described interpretation of the individual’s multiparty participatory meaning-making through their sequentially organized concert of a rule-governed social order, established with the tools from CA studies (Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 1968). Meaning-making, according to Goodwin and Wilkinson, is an intersubjectively shared matter that is observed and grasped by observation and analyzed sequentially

using a CA-based methodology and a CA-based ontology, which leans on the traditional next-turn proof-procedure (Sacks et al., 1974).

In aphasia studies, “non-ordinary” has been the descriptive categorization of the person with aphasia’s non-competence, which is defining aphasia. Perkins (2003) concludes on this basis, that the communicative non-ordinariness of the repair structure in aphasic interaction defines it as a difficult matter (Perkins, 2003, p. 151). However, as Perkins points out, making the organization of talk the problem also seems problematic.

The challenge of a dominant discursive bio-perspective is that it seems to be creating a danger zone of social stigmatization (Nielsen, 2011, p. 599). In professional healthcare practice, the bio-perspective also plays a crucial role in the treatment of disorders other than autism. For instance, rehabilitating social interaction in institutional settings and in occupational and speech therapies draw on a bio-approach, as shown in the cases examined in this thesis. By considering physical deficiencies the causes of behavior, persons are no longer treated as persons but as clinical diagnoses, without a well-founded understanding of the lived experience of the individual. This may lead to unintended social exclusion and violation of a person’s right to personhood (Nielsen, 2015; Sterponi, 2004). However, disorders are, by and large, physiologically-rooted conditions which cause the deficiency in the first place. Yet, the obstacle of a dominant perspective, which discursively draws on the conceptualization of the existence of such thing as “atypical communication,” is ontological (at least, to the integrationist) (section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 27–40).

#### 2.5.4 Shared meaning-making

In all the phenomenologically-oriented traditions after Garfinkel, the dynamics of understandings are investigated in various contexts (Goodwin, 1979; Heritage, 1984; Sacks, 1984; Schegloff, 1992). Accounts of dynamic meaning-making are investigated in interaction using recordings of the interactions. Traditionally, tape recordings and transcripts of audible data served in the investigations. Today, video recordings and transcripts are used, which pose a challenge to transcription techniques and accountability, due to the need to incorporate visual data and advanced recording technology (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 47).

Within the EMCA tradition of CA, the analytical concepts of taking turns in dialogue and analytically operating a next-turn proof-procedure (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 729) are key concepts which commonly apply to the description and investigation of understandings. Understandings, or meaning-makings, are investigated as they are

displayed explicitly while producing a turn and demonstrated in a transcript of the original video data or audio recording of, for instance, a dialogue. Turn-taking and its organization is demonstrated by the analyst in the format of the transcript, while the next-turn proof-procedure is an analytical tool which validates an analyst's analysis of the displayed meaning-makings. As the notion "next-turn" implies, interaction is regarded as sequentially organized, which also accounts for the CA idea that meaning in interaction may be repaired sequentially (Schegloff, 1992). However, sequentiality may not explain all interaction phenomena in studies of language and communication disorders. The expected time of sequentiality, to some extent, has proved challenging in the study of aphasic communication, where the interaction is differently organized or, at least, sequences may be excessively delayed (Perkins, 2003; Wilkinson, 1999b; cf. Klemmensen, 2018, p. 48).

In interaction research, three main ways of describing understanding-in-interaction have dominated: First, in traditional EMCA, understandings of meaning are generally registered as minimal responses in the form of explicit interpretative linguistic signs; second, in elaborated versions of EMCA, such as in the work of Heritage (1984), understandings of meaning may be described as they occur, rather implicitly and only displayed in particles such as the token "oh," which analytically marks a supposed "change of state" in interaction; third, other-oriented production of meaning (understandings) may be described multimodally as they may be accounted for when displayed in intelligible gestures that serve as "semiotic resources" in interaction (Goodwin, 2000, p. 1489; Klemmensen, 2018, p. 48).

Multimodal studies converted gestures to observable, semiotic units, giving the analyzable units status in line with the linguistic units in traditional linguistic analysis. Both analytical approaches create an ontological problem. Following an integrational critique, when linguistic or semiotic units are made analyzable, a new coding system arises (Fleming, 1995). In consequence, CA does not correspond the idea that the entities, persons, and language exist only interdependently, because an autopoietic system of interaction is presupposed, in the eyes of critics (Taylor & Cameron, 1987). The pragmatic aspects of aphasia research have been marked by an ethnographic interest for the past 50 years (Goodwin, 1995). However, diagnostic criteria still strictly draw on clinical studies, which have been formulated from completely different backgrounds entangled in a traditional experimental research discourse, and a new analytical approach is still to unfold fully (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 48). Discarding the problem of units for analysis, I turn to practices studies because of its broader approach to processual meaning-making and practice theory's promising tools to approach processuality in interaction.



## 2.6 Studies of meaning-making in practice — practice research a rapidly expanding field

Practice research in language disorders is setting its research agenda out of a need to grasp the complex entanglements of meaning-making in everyday practice. Taking a practice stance allows for a flexible approach. It has the flux property of changing foci ongoingly during the research process as insight is gained (Scollon & Scollon, 2004). Drawing on the works of Reckwitz (2002), Scollon and Scollon (2004), Clarke (2005), Schatzki (2002), Nicolini (2009, 2012), and the recent practice anthology of Horsbøl and Raudaskoski (2016), to name the major contributors that are indebted, practices practiced are what define the practice approach to language and communication disorders applied in this study.

Reckwitz (2002) has contributed to the formulation of a theory of social practices and configurations of the social. According to Nicolini, an eclectic strategy in analysis is common ground in practice studies (Nicolini, 2012). With this view, it makes little sense to search for one overall explanation of what practice theory or practice studies is. Rather, the approaches are a range of approaches whose main interest are to target the investigation of joint activities: the social and the workings of the social. Nexus analysis is one among several of such approaches. Nicolini (2012, p. 214) underlines that a unified approach within practices studies is non-existent. An overview of practice theory and its distinct features is bound to be confusing; however, main points are redundant (Nicolini, 2012, p. 217):

- Accomplishments are regarded as social by nature, also when attributed to individuals.
- Practices are considered mutually connected and constitutive of nexus, texture, field, and network.
- Intelligibility is a key.
- Epistemic objects uncovered account for practices.

In addition, this approach adds something further than the focus on social structure found in EMCA. In contrast to EMCA, it goes beyond “investigating practice ‘as it happens’” (Nicolini 2012, p. 215). Moreover, the investigation of practice is linked to the concept “reality reconfiguration” in the sense that its objective is to make “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) and shed light on things that matter (Nicolini, 2012, p. 217). Studies in meaning-making practices, therefore, reach beyond local encounters.

Within its own arena, practice research itself is a rapidly expanding field. It includes various focal areas of interest and a variety of traditions, ranging from business communication (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2018; Nicolini, 2012), to theoretical

discourse studies (Angermuller, 2013; Angermuller et al., 2014), to media analysis (Cooren, 2015), and to environmental studies languages (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, 2007), technical system operation and maintenance, aphasia (Goodwin, 1995, 2003; Wilkinson, 2011), and researching health communication (Sarangi, 2007a). The aim is to study individuals who are routinely applying their everyday and professional knowledge to combine their actions with others in order to perform their everyday life or their profession, such as technical system maintenance, identity, or corporate identity (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 20–21).

### 2.6.1 Tools for researching meaning-making in practices

The Scollons offer a unique tool to grasp the object of practice studies independent of whichever area one is studying in the various fields within practice studies. The first step in their approach, nexus analysis, introduces a frame and methodology to navigate, identify and map practices (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, 2007; Scollon, 2015).

Placing the study of language and communication disorders and speech therapy within the field of practice studies allows for a unique analytical perspective, which this study further develops. Thereby, the present approach to a new study of language and communication disorders is placed far from traditional applied linguistics. This approach differs from the objects studied in traditional linguistics and interaction studies in the ethnomethodology tradition — which deals with language, such as talk and utterances, and which apply and operate analytical concepts, such as local context. When applying the approaches of Goodwin and Wilkinson in a practice studies perspective rather than an ethnomethodological perspective, then the lives lived with language and communication disorders are approached from a new angle (Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 21–22).

Since this study revolves around practices, I am not interested in the micro-sequential organization of linguistic impairment; therefore, my approach needs to be broadened. To capture practices such as routines and individual habits in material settings, larger frames are needed for the data analysis. The ethnographic approach nexus analysis (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, 2007), which is derived from mediated discourse analysis (Scollon, 2001), is concerned with uncovering the intersection of actions — the nexus of practice. The nexus analyst applies a material-discursive approach and can investigate situations in macro-frames as they are tracing the development of situational ecologies over time and through spaces. Change and emergent properties are converted to descriptive units and, this way, made observable and traceable to the analyst. In Scollon and Scollon's appendix *Practical fieldguide to Discourse and the emerging internet* (2004, pp. 152–178), tools are presented

which guide the query of the analyst throughout the course of investigating and localizing the nexus of practice that they follow. Discussing nexus analysis, Larsen and Raudaskoski (2016) argue it provides the analyst with framing tools to create data that reflects how individual actors behave in social settings, through social affairs, and produce various outcomes with real consequences in situations, not just interactional divergence (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 72).

### 2.6.2 Towards the foundation of a person-centered practice approach to meaning-making

Nicolini (2012) offers two main methodological “movements” to construct time and space differentiation to localize the nexus of practice: “zooming in” and “zooming out.” Social accomplishments may be studied on a micro-level with the movement of zooming in, while the recognition of interrelated links across space and time are studied “sideways” with the movement of zooming out: “zooming in on the accomplishments of practice; zooming out to discern their relationships in space and time; and using the above devices to produce diffracting machinations that enrich our understanding through thick textual renditions of mundane practices” (Nicolini, 2012, p. 219). The mapping of trajectories, that is, the events and their recognizable features that emerge from the attention given them, demonstrate the location of a nexus of practice. Practices are not “discourses” but “discursive,” as they are presumed to exist only when enacted and re-enacted. In short, practices are “social and material doings” (Nicolini, 2012, p. 221).

The main purpose for underpinning the combination of integrational linguistics and EMCA by practice studies is to achieve a closer and a wider understanding (by zooming in and out) of how social practices in interaction may be studied in relation to inclusion and exclusion. The outset for establishing a person-centered praxeology is to study a participant’s perspective in practices as they continuously unfold. The integrational concepts (the biomechanical, the macrosocial and the circumstantial factors) are applied to describe the history of a person’s interactional behavior. The concept of historical body in nexus analysis and the integrational linguistic-derived notion of the history of a person’s interactional behavior are common ground. However, they differ analytically in the sense that nexus analysis considers social interaction a scenario, whereas integrational linguistics considers an individual point of view. Apart from this distinct feature, they cover the same concept of human action.

Trouble sources in intervention and rehabilitation practices can be approached differently through the combined application of integrational linguistics and EMCA underpinning practice studies. The main purpose of this data-driven approach is to

establish a basis for the investigation of language and communication disorders due to ABI in practice. A by-product of engaging a combined integrational linguistic and EMCA perspective in practice investigations is a further exploration of the theoretical differences and overlaps of the approaches that add new, original contribution to the theoretical corpora of both integrational linguistics and EMCA. Fundamentally, *understanding* is regarded as an action underpinning the understandings of participants as they are producing them in discursive practice (Conrad, 2011; Harris, 1998; the above section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 73–75).



## 3 Theory

This section is based on ideas and text from Klemmensen (2018), drawing on the reported observations and analysis. Supplementary ideas from Nielsen (2015) provide insight into the analysis, and ideas further elaborated from Nielsen (2005) are included to complement the theoretical foundations.

### 3.1 Towards a theoretical harmonization of integrational linguistics and EMCA

To grasp the importance of introducing and applying the alternative integrational approach to language and communication in the study of language and communication disorders, a short introduction to the data analyzed in this thesis is necessary. Long-term engagement with gathering and analyzing data at a care center has led me to peculiar observations of everyday interactions between individuals with impairments (due to aphasia and/or ABI) and their occupational therapists. Regardless of local inclusion policies, exclusion of individuals with impairments recur in interaction. Individuals with aphasia and ABI demonstrate communicational proficiencies far beyond their diagnoses, yet they are often corrected, resulting in their resignation from dialogues.

Rather than engaging with the strictly therapeutic side of brain injury, this study focuses more broadly on the interpretation of the interactions observed. In particular, it draws on observations of the individuals with supposed impairments in different situations. These have proved to be so diverse and to reach far beyond the presumed abilities of the individuals, that my primary concern has become to describe the non-normativity of the interactions observed and analyzed. For instance, how could it be explained that the ambient character of therapeutic situations is phatic in linguistic style and, unfavorably, results in resignation rather than interactive participation? Contrastingly, non-therapeutic situations arise within the frame of therapy all the time, and are oriented quite differently by the individuals, both linguistically and interactionally.

These counterpointing discrepancies in the ability to participate cannot be explained by theories of signs alone. Nor can they be explained by physiological and cognitive impairment. Nor can they be thoroughly explained in the paradigm of performative theories. A new take is, therefore, to develop a theory of circumstantial

proficiency. It seems that, rather than prerequisites such as predicted and inherent “abilities,” it is the situations themselves and what is at stake communicatively that guide participation abilities. When proficiency is studied in relation to circumstantial factors, then meaning-making is at the center of the analysis and studied as processual.

Demonstrably, there are incentives for the individuals to be able to act. In short, determinacy is not predefined, but circumstantial. This take applies to an EMCA perspective and a CA perspective (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984; Sacks et al., 1974), as well as an integrational linguistics perspective and to a practice theory perspective (Harris, 1996, 1998; Schatzki, 2002). Therefore, an exploration of the pairing of an EMCA perspective and applied integrational linguistic perspective underpinning a practice theory perspective is sought for the first time. It is my belief that the ontology of integrational linguistics is underpinning practice theory (Schatzki, 2002).

The ontology of integrational linguistics differs from the ontology of EMCA regarding presuppositions of orderliness of situated social order. It offers an unexplored conceptual framework for approaching an individual’s strategies as individually creative rather than uniquely programmatic and ordered by shared methods. EMCA and CA’s use of recordings and micro-transcription in the process of data analysis is problematic at the outset for studying language and communication with an integrational approach to language and communication, simply because “data” are manufactured products which the analyst has shaped by choosing the site, the participants, the analytical perspective and thus the content of. This analyst-centered outset, a third-person perspective, contrasts with Harris’ emphasis on person-centeredness; the person’s lived experience (first-person perspective) is the basis of language and communication. The trouble for the integrationist is how, then, to approach the empirical study of language and communication:

The term integrational is intended to allude to the fact that in real life, as we all know, experience is not neatly compartmentalized into the linguistic and the non-linguistic. The two are integrated. Words are not separate from situations: they are part of the situations, both socially and psychologically (...) no rule-based model of any kind so far proposed can come to terms with the real-life flexibility of communication situations and communicational processes. Nor is there any likelihood that such a model will be forthcoming. If there were, communication would be a radically different kind of enterprise from what it is and what we, as lay communicators, know it to be (Harris, 2008b p. 44).

The central notion of lay experience captures the essence of the language and communication perspective of integrational linguistics: the lived experience of being a person communicating in real-life (also using language). The expertise of the integrational linguistic analyst has thus lied in analyzing linguistic theory and its ontology. Therefore, Harris proposes integrational linguistics as opposition to linguistic theory.

In short, integrational linguistics has been considered an opposition to linguistic theory that analyzes the logical problems with linguistic theories. In addition, integrational linguistics suggests a new approach to linguistic inquiry into participant experiential perspectives, both linguistic and non-linguistic. Integrational linguistics is highly understudied in relation to language and communication disorders. I seek out this possibility, where the integration of verbal and non-verbal characterizes the course of communication to a high degree (Goodwin, 1995; Perkins, 2003; Wilkinson, 2011).

### 3.1.1 The integrational landmark of individuality: contextualization

Harris argued that language is always imbued with a temporal stamp and this provides “a unique contextualization” for “everything that is said, heard, written, or read” (Harris 1981, pp. 154–155), but this is grounded in the individual’s lived experience and not in a shared social space. Because of the experiential approach to language in integrationism, I argue that the concept of temporality is also to be considered as lived analytically and not attached to the mechanics of clocks. Analytical direction (see Fig. 2) may, therefore, as demonstrated in Chapter 3.3.1, be different in integrational linguistics from EMCA and CA’s analytical directions. Progression through time makes language a continuously creative process (Fleming, 1995, p. 90), managed by the language-makers themselves, without any attention directed towards norms of privileged moments. An applied integrational analytic perspective cannot regard context as a renewer of the structure of social interaction as it is regarded in the CA and EMCA tradition (Fleming, 1997, p. 197).

Not all signs seem to have social anchoring in the integrationist perspective. Furthermore, this foregrounds the core Harrisian semiological stance, that “(...) signs do not necessarily have any social dimension at all: there can be private signs, meaningful for one individual only” (Harris, 2009a, p. 76). The integrational concept of contextualization, often applied in the verb form “to contextualize,” allows the analyst to approach a person’s display of understandings as integrated in the “data” and not as “treated” by the other participants; thus, proofed by the next-turn proof-procedure of the integrational linguistics-considered mechanical framework of social interaction as laid out in EMCA. The integrational concept of contextualization



demonstrates an integrational participant perspective that is more individual, and thus more person-centered, than the EMCA participant perspective, which is always socially shared. In sum, a new analytical perspective probes a participant's perspective as a matter of agency linked to the activity of contextualizing rather than focusing on the traditional mechanisms and logistics of the interaction. However, it draws extensively on ethnomethodology and EMCA studies in order to formulate its approach.

According to an integrational linguistic criticism of EMCA, the EMCA participant perspective is describing the participants only on the surface, which does not include the lifeworld-related side of descriptive practice (Taylor & Cameron, 1987). Therefore, integrational linguistics advocates would argue that a person-centered perspective in social studies is missing. Notwithstanding the divergences between EMCA and integrational linguistics, the two approaches complement each other. It is my belief that, when brought together, the two approaches can outline a desired person-centered participant perspective and raise awareness of a need for such, despite ontological divergences. Yet, this is unexplored territory, since a person-centered analytical perspective remains unexplored within integrational linguistics as well.

### 3.2 Phenomenology of understanding

Phenomenology derives a first-person perspective, which is validated by the analyst's focus on the interactants and their constitution of lifeworld (Jacobsen et al., 2010). Merleau-Ponty, in particular, discusses person-centeredness as an essential aspect of modern phenomenology. In *The Primacy of Perception* (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, 1995) and *Cézanne's Doubt* (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, 1994),<sup>xvi</sup> Merleau-Ponty distinguished himself from phenomenological predecessors Heidegger and Husserl through emphatic interest in two currents, the body and mobility, which are central to this study.

To Merleau-Ponty, the act of interpreting perception (understanding) is grounded in the experiencing body. In continuation of this, embodied meaning is perceived as a matter of "lived-experience" (cf. Rutherglen, 2004, p. 219). The terms *lived* and *perspective*, versus *experience*, both refer to the question of whose point of view is dealt with. In phenomenology, the viewpoint is centered in a particular person's experience and, consequently, in a more general characterization of bodily experience framing the individual process of making meaning in relation to practices (Perregaard, 2016, p. 189). Thus, meaning is considered an individual, person-centered, bodily experience (Nielsen, 2005, p. 22) but — importantly — it is relational to things and phenomena of the world. So, the individual lived experience of things and phenomena

of the world endows them with a particular interpretation of sense (Perregaard, 2016, p. 189). In the two essays, Merleau-Ponty's discussion of meaning-making (interpretation) is grounded in the phenomenology of mobility as an anchor for understanding and interpretation as an individual bodily experience. In a supplementary way, this idea of the crucial role of mobility is demonstrated in more general terms in *The Primacy of Perception* (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, 1995), where Merleau-Ponty argues that the wholeness of a thing can only be perceived in fragments and by means of moving around it (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, p. 15). Thus, perceptual data are contrasted with intellectual synthesis that deals with another type of data (peculiarities). Perceptual data are presupposing givenness. Due to the extent of the body (and the vision), perception strives towards gripping wholeness, even though submitted to fragmentation and, hence, unobtainable without mobility and the work of mental processing (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a; Nielsen, 2005, p. 23): "it [the lamp] is given as the infinite sum of an indefinite series of perspectival views in each of which the object is given but in none of which it is given exhaustively. It is not accidental for the object to be given to me in a 'deformed' way, from the point of view (place) that I occupy" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, pp. 15–16).

To Merleau-Ponty's single-case study, mobility is applied as pertinent in the investigation of the artist Cézanne's interpretation of *Still-Leben* [still life] described and analyzed in *Cézanne's Doubt* (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, 1994). Here, Merleau-Ponty points to the development of a communicative (personal) perspective,<sup>xvii</sup> arguing that the artist's application of multiple observation points in the interpretation inscribes the artist's various "visions" in the painting (cf. Nielsen, 2005, p. 22).

By remaining faithful to the phenomena in his investigations of perspective, Cézanne discovered what recent psychologists have come to formulate: the lived perspective, that which we actually perceive, is not a geometric or photographic one. The objects we see close at hand appear smaller, those far away seem larger than they do in a photograph. (This can be seen in a movie, where a train approaches and gets bigger much faster than a real train would under the same circumstances.) To say that a circle seen obliquely is seen as an ellipse is to substitute for our actual perception what we would see if we were cameras: in reality we see a form which oscillates around the ellipse without being an ellipse (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p. 14).

Merleau-Ponty argues that Cézanne's still life captures and communicates the perspective in modernity: the lived perspective (Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, 1994). Noticeably, the Danish translation of *Cézanne's Doubt* is enriched with the translator's interpretations. In the Danish version of the extract above, it reads "To

say that a circle seen obliquely is seen as an ellipse is the same as to exchange the actual perception with a scheme for what we ought to see, if we were photo cameras” (Merleau-Ponty, 1994, p. 20; my English translation from the Danish version). Here, the focus is actual perception (first-order experience) and the substitution of it with a schematic interpretation (second-order experience). This indicates a notion of contrast between two orders: the existence of embodied perception, and perception of a “normative” perception. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s idea of distinguishing embodied perception from schematic interpretation is crucial to the distinct differentiation of embodied versus abstract (imaginative) perception (Nielsen, 2005, pp. 22–24; Perregaard, 2016, p. 199).<sup>xviii</sup>

The interpretation in the Danish translation is crucial to this thesis’ argument: whose analytical perspective are we dealing with — the analyst’s, the participants’, or some third, abstract normative perspective? More importantly, how do we distinguish the three from one another? This line of questioning is crucial to distinguish integrational linguistics from EMCA, and in order to understand the cumulative critique of EMCA by integrational linguistics theorists.

### 3.2.1 First-order and second-order language

The concept that integrational linguists and advocates of the distributed language view agree upon is the one coined by Love and taken up by Thibault. They suggest distinguishing between two orders of language to explain the problem of structuralism’s ontology. Love and Thibault label the two orders of language currently investigated within the language sciences *first-order* and *second-order* (Love, 1990, 2007; Thibault, 2011, 2017a). First-order language covers the creative, informal, and often disorderly use of language between actual persons (Love, 1990, 2007, 2017; Thibault, 2011, 2017a).

This idea of two orders explaining a problem of ontology resembles a piece from Harris *Notes on Language and First-Order Experience* (unpublished).<sup>xix</sup> Harris’ piece describes here and now experiences as first-order (Harris, unpublished, p.1) while distinguishing this order from other orders covered by the term second-order phenomena (cf. not first-order, Harris, unpublished, p. 2). For instance, this would apply to thinking and other restructured or elaborated phenomena: “Cumulative first-order experience set us up with a first-order domain of knowledge, and this contrasts with second-order knowledge, which is derived on the one hand from the results of reflecting on first-order knowledge” (Harris, unpublished, p. 2). Comparing with the use of the notions first-order and second-order language coined by Love (1990),

Harris and Love conceive similar ideas about ontology using the distinction of first-from second-order.

Second-order language is what traditional linguists are studying systematically; therefore, linguistic determinacy becomes an issue. The distinction of the signifier from the signified is what categorizes the linguistic notion of language as a second-order phenomenon. Structuralism-based sign theory regards the content of signs as a mirror of historically structured systems of meaning ordered in “language.” In other words, the structuralism-based assumption of language is that signs are inherent materialized reflections of a representational language system. In this view, the system *itself* generates the meanings negotiated culturally and historically and recorded in language. Consequently, meaning is presupposed to lead back to or “represent” something: ideas, objects, phenomena, events, perceptions, or direct experiences. In a structuralist view, language users pick meanings from the representational, preestablished, historical body of language and meaning. However, questions about *whose* perception and experience it might be are nowhere addressed in structuralism. Crucially, the question of agency is central to the integrationist position on signs and meaning.

In structuralism, content (the signified) has the status of a reflection of something else, which is what ascribes content as inherent to language. Moreover, it objectivizes meaning, as structuralism assumes that the signification is a reflected phenomenon arbitrarily encapsulated in a sign. In this view, content is attached to language and not to actions. Signification is derived from its linguistic representation. This heritage from Saussure’s theory of signs (Saussure, 2013) is based on the idea that meaning is assumed to be present in the very representation (the sign: the signifier and the signified). From an integrational linguistic perspective, first-order experiences cannot translate into second-order phenomena but are but approximations. Simply, their nature makes them irreproducible. First-order experiences are always “now” as they emerge and unfold in time and progressively (Orman, 2017; Pablé & Hutton, 2015, pp. 28–29, 59). Simply, “ (...) In actual interaction, meaning (...) cannot exist prior to or outside the conditions of its own emergence (Toolan, 1996, p. 179).

Thus, the notion of the second-order category is a way to express the basic axioms of an integrational semiology, an integrational position on signs and meaning: “One way to understand the basic integrational position on signs and meaning making is through the assertion that ‘first-order’ experience cannot be reduced to ‘second-order’ categories (Love, 2007, p. 705)” (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, p. 28). Signs do not exist as given items in a system of language. Therefore, signs and their meaning are considered the very result of the ongoing activity we call communication. Moreover, signification is not regarded as mirrored and reflected in a sign itself but considered “a function of the integrational proficiency which its identification and interpretation

presuppose” (Harris, 1996, p. 154). Content is meaning in the making, and signification exists only as part of somebody’s communicative enterprise; signification is a direct experience of the perceivable meaningfulness of something to someone. It cannot preexist as a reflection of a meaning inherent in language, nor as a reflection of someone else’s materially recorded experience. In an integrationist perspective, meaning encapsulated within a predetermined system such as language is merely a myth (Harris, 1981). Still, it is categorized as a second-order phenomenon. According to Harris, the distinction of orders chains reflexivity and language:

Now this curious hide-and-seek relationship between the ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ categories is a direct consequence of the reflexivity of language. Reflexivity and metalanguage are head and tail of the same coin. Language enables us not only to reflect on first-order experience, but immediately to identify that reflection as a new event in our mental lives. It provides for an indefinite multiplication of items that appear to involve mirror-like replications of their own immediate progenitors (...) the same goes on for thoughts about thoughts, and their progeny, at least insofar as thoughts deploy signs, which if not linguistic signs, have the same reflexivity” (Harris, unpublished, p. 5).

Recently, a renewed critique of structuralism has risen. Integrational linguists and advocates of the distributed language view share a common theoretical interest in changing the ontological status of language as an object of study. Together, they are changing the agenda of the way language is studied and discussed, at least in some areas of the language sciences.<sup>xx</sup>

CA may be said to study first-order language in the sense that negotiation of shared meaning is what is primarily investigated in dialogues. On the other hand, second-order language refers to the neat language described in the paragraphs above on structuralism and its heritage. Second-order language is what traditional linguists are studying systematically. Therefore, linguistic determinacy becomes an issue. The above distinction of the signifier from the signified is what categorizes the linguistic notion of language as a second-order phenomenon (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 56–57).

### 3.2.2 Indeterminacy as driver in language-making

Language and human activities are considered radically indeterminate in an integrational view. Integrational linguistics’ focus on indeterminacy is opposed to the presupposed local “orders” searched for within the EMCA program (Hutton, 2017;

Perregaard, 2016; Taylor & Cameron, 1987; Zhou, 2014, 2020). However, approximations in EMCA are the only orders that exist, and EMCA researchers argue that these are necessary for us to understand, co-act and engage with the world. Yet, within integrational linguistics, these are a prerequisite for individuals to exist in the world due to the indeterminacy of first-order experiences. This lack of distinction in EMCA between first-order and second-order triggers the integrational linguistic critique claiming that it inhumanely reduces humans to automata solely occupied with “fitting into” social orders. Currently, the EMCA program is criticized by Hong Kong-based integrationists precisely for the analytical framing of EMCA. For instance, EMCA is compared to “a machine model of human behavior” (Zhou, 2014, p. 1) aligned with other contemporary approaches besides integrational linguistics. Hutton criticizes EMCA’s analytical strategies as evolutionary rather than phenomenological:

Participants experience the first-order reality of the categories and the explanatory power of their reflexive accounts, what might be termed “lived essentialism,” while the external observer perceives, in “disenchanted” Weberian fashion, an ultimately contentless, although ineluctable, drive for social order (Orbuch, 1997). This suggests that classical ethnomethodology is closer to evolutionary models of behavior than its phenomenological grounding would suggest. It is grounded in the second-order achievement of social order, as opposed to survival and reproductive success (Hutton, 2017, p. 96)

In similar fashion, since the 1980s, integrationists have criticized EMCA for its search for regularities and structures of social action rather than intersubjectivity (Taylor & Cameron, 1987, p. 161). One could argue that Hutton, in the citation given above, ascribes much will to the single individual to get things done, for instance, survival and reproductive success, by discarding the social. Yet, the social is recognized by me in a triangulation (see Chapters 5–8).

Notwithstanding the orthodox Harrisian tradition of heavy criticism of all other ontologies than integrational linguistic ontology, this thesis purposefully attempts to unfold a downgraded version of conflict with other approaches in my suggestion of an applied integrationism, insisting that a person-centered approach is operational. The fact that no integrationist has yet elaborated successfully on Harris’s notion of a macrosocial component of the infrastructure of communication has led to this attempt at applying integrational linguistics principles in a joint analytical framework. This is methodologically inspired by EMCA in the sense that, for instance, the notion of

members' methods is incorporated analytically, as well as the application of other CA-inspired vocabulary.

I, however, believe that contemporary EMCA studies, notwithstanding an interest in revealing the overall organization of talk and multimodal interaction, are so fine-tuned in their ontological considerations that a new attempt at harmonization is relevant and operational. Integrationists in the 1980s and 1990s critique that, for instance, EMCA frames a presupposed system which is explored and no longer holds. A nuance is left out in this critique, since it is the traceable consequences of talk and multimodality in interaction that are investigated, not the system organizing it. Findings are drawn from these data, not from the organizational system. Because of the historical divergence between integrational linguistics and EMCA, there are inert ontological divergences in the integrational linguistics-EMCA approach underpinning practice theory, which are attempted to be solved by the above positioning.

The integrational linguistic concept of radical indeterminacy promotes the observation that radical transitions inherently occur both in linguistic form and in the perceived meaning of actions (Orman, 2017). However, these are not necessarily shared in any way and may occur implicitly as well. The observation that linguistic form and meaning radically fluctuate does not facilitate the traditional way of dealing with data. For this reason, Orman criticizes empirical sociolinguistics for being positivist (for political reasons) and for buying in on orthodox linguistics' binary of linguistic determinacy versus linguistic indeterminacy (Orman, 2017). Simply, Orman argues that it is contradictory in its enterprise. By introducing integrational linguistics in a joint framework underpinning practice theory, the rules and units from EMCA are downgraded and the role of temporality upgraded. I, therefore, argue that the practice theory underpinning of integrational linguistics-EMCA may be seen as a result of a fine-tuned analysis of divergences for the purpose of the development of tools for analysis (cf. Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015).

To the integrationist, "(t)he self-awareness of lay members is of a different order to the reflexive perspective of the ethnomethodological analyst" (Hutton, 2017, p. 96). This is a key analytical difference between integrational linguistics and EMCA. By pointing to this, the analyst avoids discussing the premises of contextualization and cotemporality any further, since they obviously also apply to the analyst's temporal contextualizations (Duncker, 2011, 2017, 2018; Harris, 1998, p. 98). Applying the dichotomy endogenous understanding versus exogenous understanding, this critique of EMCA analysts' categories is also discussed by Linell (2009, p. 419). Yet, Linell offers no solution to the problem. In sum, I argue that the suggested person-centered approach relies on a rendered ontology of language and communication in alignment

with integrational linguistics. It is important to bear in mind the distinction of first- and second-order (this paragraph draws on Klemmensen, 2018, p. 81).

### 3.3 Divergences between EMCA and integrational linguistics

The analyst's status as expert in the omni-ordered structure of human interaction is widely accepted in modern linguistics. CA's promising use of a positivist vocabulary has attracted health professionals and medical researchers to engage in interaction studies within the study of language disorders. However, too strong of a positivist approach may fall short of grasping important features of aphasic interaction. It is considered a professional practice of CA analysts to uncover the mechanisms of "atypical communication," such as the case of aphasia, and limit the studies of aphasia as social interaction to the accomplishment of meaning. For example, this course prevents interventions in a human rights perspective; thus, this tendency downplays a humanistic stance in the study of language disorders and contrarily further develops a positivist stance. Hence, a new analytical approach is required to initiate an assessment of development tendencies and an initial dissection of the analyst.

#### 3.3.1 Segregating the epistemology of "data"

In CA, data mirrors the "the making of sense" in social interactions. *Context* within the CA framework is defined as a sequential, interactional concept (de Kok, 2008; Fleming, 1997, p. 196; ten Have, 2007). The conversation analyst considers context as created in common through interaction (de Kok, 2008, p. 890; Fleming, 1995; Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997). The conversation is considered as a situation "under construction" (Fleming, 1995, p. 92). Conversation analysts describe, apply, and operate a local concept of context where focus is set upon the interaction, hereunder turn-taking and interaction contributions. The contributions in interaction are regarded as "context constructing units" in a forward-directed time perspective (Stax, 2005, p. 175).

Analysts employing CA have been criticized for over-focusing on the structural aspects of interaction (de Kok, 2008, p. 887). Critics argue that sequentiality and the local anchoring of the concept of context take up all of the analyst's attention (de Kok, 2008, p. 887; Fleming, 1995, 1997). Aside from access to study patterns and their recognition and problems and disturbances (repair), how do researchers get beyond the micro-level and see things in a larger context? CA seems to have an imperative requirement to only consider analyzing what the interlocutors display and show each



other (and thus the analyst) that they orient to, exactly where it arises during the interaction (Sacks et al., 1974).

Despite its development, over time, the use of the term “data” is treated as unproblematic in EMCA studies. Nevertheless, methodological objections are to be raised. For instance, *framing of data* is not explicitly discussed, epistemologically nor ontologically. As stated, the CA analyst frames and edits the mechanisms of interaction; the production of data formats preserved by tape or video recordings are transformed into transcriptions by the analyst or research assistants and then analyzed as data. Therefore, the notion of *data* is to be considered a result of the observer’s work process and nothing else; the claim of factuality is too strong within the traditions of CA (the above is adapted from, Klemmensen, 2018, p. 77).


On the contrary, all observations of phenomena are subject to the principle of complementarity. Phenomena, be it adjacency pairs on a micro-level or aphasia on a macro-level, exist only inseparable from the researcher’s established observational system, be it the CA transcript or analysis. As a result, the tracing of turn-takings or adjacency pairs are not data in their own right, but descriptions of the observational situation in which these phenomena were produced. They are merely products of the observational system applied in each case. For this reason, the compound system of data, observer and instruments *together* capture the phenomena observed and interpreted (cf. complementarity, Bohr, 1985).

Simply stated, the very focus in the analysis changes when applying a person-centered approach. It changes from the CA perspective which is observing interaction and context as a scenario in which conversation takes place, to a person-centered approach that deals with and focuses upon the persons communicating, verbally or non-verbally, about their understandings. This has consequences for the integrationist’s possible interpretations of interactional actions. Furthermore, this focus identifies the contribution of a person-centered approach. A participant perspective is approached in a new way: for instance, since “sign” can be private signs, meaningful for one individual (Harris, 2009a, p. 76), then the integrational analysis includes individual timescales as well as shared timescales, as demonstrated in Fig. 2, below. By placing two squares inside a rectangle, this entity symbolizes a shared timescale. Another square is placed outside the shared timescale symbolizing an individual timescale. In addition, one of the squares inside the shared timescale is put in parenthesis because one may be living both timescales at once in the same situation. Therefore, the analysis may be conducted in a forward as well in a backward perspective and including both shared and individual timescales, depending on the type of integration in question. Integrationism views *temporal integration* as fundamentally about the human mind and human experience (Harris, 2009a, pp. 72–73); the integration of present, past and the future:

(...) the integrationist assumption here is not that ‘time is absolute’ in any Newtonian sense, but that, logically and psychologically, the concept of a sign is parasitic on recognizing the triple distinction between now, before, and after. That measure of psychological complexity (at the very least) is essential (p. 73).

As consequence the individual’s perspective must be flexible in direction, analytically portraying the individual’s integration of present, past, and future (when empirically traceable). The individual’s temporal integration is not in focus in traditional EMCA studies where the analysis is always considering the *organization* of social actions. Therefore, in EMCA, sequentiality is moving the analysis forward and, in line with CA, the analyst is concerned with describing *where* exactly something arises during interaction (cf. Sacks et al., 1974). This distinction between the forward-directed perspective in EMCA and the individual’s perspective in integrational linguistics is illustrated in Fig. 3.1.

**Fig. 3.1. Analytical direction: EMCA versus integrational linguistics**



*Note.* IL is an abbreviation for integrational linguistics

### 3.3.2 The observation of understanding

Within integrational linguistics, contextualizations are considered private. They are partially implicit as they draw on a person’s experiential knowledge, which is unarticulated but materially, socially, and spiritually present. In consequence, the history of every individual is unique (Harris, 1987, p. 7). Therefore, a person-centered

approach indeed encourages the inclusion of a lay perspective in scientific descriptions (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, pp. 50–51). Persons' individually determined mental states are motored by common mental functions and by habit. Such states include feelings, associations and memories present in the stream of thought (James, 1950). Not all is displayed observable, far from it, but this does not imply that it cannot be investigated theoretically and empirically. According to Taylor (1986), "Communication is not a private, internal process; it is a public, co-operative activity" (p. 180. This note is important not to confuse contextualization with communication. In elaborate discussions, Taylor (1986, 1992) accounts for the failure of the Lockean notion of communication and understanding (Locke, 2001) and claims this has encompassed areas of modern language science. Taylor targets the problem as the notion of *understanding*, by pointing to Locke's idea about the scapegoat to be the imperfection of words as causing troubles in mutual understanding: "(...) so, if all words signifying complex ideas were defined in terms of their component simple ideas, the threat posed by the ordinary imperfection of words could be averted" (Taylor, 1986, p. 172). Furthermore, Taylor argues that Locke's idea of understanding as private, mental events is grounded in a telemental idea (Toolan, 1997), because Locke's solution to understanding resorted to the transfer of mental ideas packed into linguistic expressions of such ideas and communicated in components of mutual understanding ideas (Taylor, 1986). It cannot be exaggerated that telemental ideas do not apply to the integrationist observation of understanding. Rather, philosophy of phenomenological externalism applies to the integrationist idea of being in the world (Perregaard, 2016; Zahavi, 2008).

Yet, analytical possibilities and challenges between integrational linguistics, EMCA and practice studies still must be carefully discussed and accounted for. By questioning traditional scientific conditions for descriptive practice, it is possible to get a bit closer and approach the participants' perspective complementarily. This turn that Harris' semiotics introduces, turns the spotlight in language disorders away from traditional linguistic inquiry as we abandon sign interpretation and decoding what the signs stand for. According to Harris, nothing stands for anything (Harris, 1996, 1998). Sense-making is not a question which can be made factual by multiple interpretations and supportive arguments from researchers referring to the way which the mechanism of interaction at times are established in data sessions and thereafter mapped and published within the CA tradition. I partially disagree with this. On the one hand, yes, it does seem odd that the number of participants interpreting justifies the validation of interpretation (cf. social responsivity, Asplund, 1987). On the other hand, practices are coordinated performances, sometimes of private contextualizations, which may be traceable in, for instance, documents, video data and transcripts, or which may not be traceable at all. All the while, communication is public and co-operative (Goodwin,

2018; Taylor, 1986, p. 180). Therefore, it could be an integrational point that every move is personal and structured by personal and by social relevance (cf. Fig. 2, above):

Observers can do no more than interpret, on the basis of their individual linguistic experience, what is said or written. They may entertain no doubts about the well-foundedness of their own interpretations. But that does not automatically promote what they agree upon into an independent ‘fact’ about the language in question (Harris, 2012, p. 43).

As well, the forensic approach of CA to search for accounts and “factuality” raises a methodological problem: “This gap between presupposition and demonstration, the integrationist will say, is what gives rise to the problem (...)” (Harris, 2012, p. 44). Simply, CA misses the individual, personal aspect.

Moreover, this applies to both the observation of the infrastructure of the conversation examined and for the extra-situational interpretations of the analyst (Taylor & Cameron, 1987). All sense-making is subject to this condition. What is being analyzed is regarded as something which has derived from the actual situation in which it was produced or otherwise demonstrated and nothing else (Harris, 1996, 1998, 2008a; Harris & Wolf, 2008; Hermann & Gregersen, 1978; Ruus, 1995). “For the integrationist, linguistic inquiry begins not with a search for invariant units underlying speech communication in a given community, but with an investigation of the presuppositions underlying the linguistic inquiry itself. (...) linguistics is a form of philosophy” (Harris, 2008a, p. 25). Consequently, studying the presuppositions of communication and understanding, importantly, Taylor (1986, 1992) uncovers that intersubjectivity is located in understanding itself as an interactional phenomenon (Taylor, 1986, p. 180). Meaning that understanding is not the same as contextualization, which is private; understanding can be observed publicly, studied empirically and (hopefully) with an approach that, as a prerequisite, distinguishes the individual and studies the individual within the social ensemble (Duncker, 2017, p. 148; Zhou, 2020, p. 208).

### 3.4 Harmonization of EMCA and integrational linguistics

This study aims at developing an analytical practice which can study the single trajectories through situations in the contexts in which they are found, with the purpose of being able to discuss new aspects and initiatives. The aim is *not* to generate generic knowledge about general-level patterns of social practice. Within the language sciences, this can contribute to create new assessment criteria for interaction

observation and interventions. All aspects of language and communication will never be comprehensively accounted for by the use of video observation and analysis, even if supplemented with eye tracking, EKG (heart rate measurement), EEG (brain wave measurement), the use of 3D cameras or virtual reality.

Aspects of language, such as historical bodies, the stream of thought of the individual, pre-understanding, chemistry, and willingness to communicate cannot be covered extensively by the above listed methods (to name a few). This does not mean that traditional theories and methods are not contributing. Certainly, they are drawing the outline of an ideal extensive description of the dynamics of processual understanding. A person-centered approach is, however, in no way striving to be more ideal than other methodological approaches, nor is it to be considered ideal, but situational and grounded. Moreover, it is to be considered a profound and close exploration of processual understanding and its dynamics. This angulation twists the observational status of the expert (Harris, 1998; Pablé & Hutton, 2015). Focus in the analysis is different, as the analyst is not an expert in the professional practice of aphasic communication but an expert in describing integrational proficiency in any communication. The language makers, with or without aphasia, are the experts in their own mode of communicating. This may lead to the discussion of epistemological and ontological challenges in some traditional schools in the language sciences. Also, if fully applied and its consequences undertaken, it may lead towards a paradigm shift in linguistics and psychology around the status of the analyst as expert.

Earlier, the integrational discussion of data has missed the opportunity of accounting for a credible, productive critique (Duncker, 2011, 2018; Fleming, 1995, 1997). It is my hypothesis that a person-centered approach can incorporate an EMCA-inspired analysis, underpinning practice studies on integrational premises. The divergences must be clarified, and the intention of the analysis must be stated clearly. As well, ownership of the interpretation of data must be stated responsibly (Duncker, 2018). In Chapter 4 (Methodology), I suggest how to incorporate notions from the integrational ontology of language and communication in an approach that uses tools derived from EMCA.

## 4 Methodology

This section is based on ideas and text adapted from Chapters 4 and 5 of Klemmensen (2018) in developing the theoretical combination into tangible methods for investigating the dataset.


### 4.1 Promising tools from EMCA and practice studies

In continuation of Chapter 3, an integrational linguistic approach to the study of language and communication is believed to alter the status of observable units and the interpretation of their content. This has consequences for analyses carried out with an integrational approach. However, the integrational perspective is foremost theoretical, which is why it affords inspiration from an approach such as CA, to study interaction in practice. Inserting the tradition from CA into an ethnomethodological frame, forming an EMCA framing, contributes towards approaching a participant's perspective. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, the phenomenological stance in EMCA and integrational linguistics diverge on the question of the status of the analyst. The starting point for the development of methodology building on integrational linguistics is to clarify the integration of theory from integrational linguistics on the workings of language and communication. As well, the consideration and description of the mythical assumption-based framework of structuralism, which critics argue dominate basic beliefs about the signification of displays, also applies to the framework of EMCA and must be considered at the outset (Fleming, 1995; Harris, 1996, 1998; Hutton, 2017; Love, 2007; Pablé & Hutton, 2015; Toolan, 1996).

However, EMCA has proved useful to study language and communication disorders due to ABI, and I deem it necessary to try to mitigate the transcriptional practices of EMCA in order to make it possible for the integrationist to analyze dialogues and navigate in the data at different levels, including micro-data of conversations without fluent speech and video data. In order to include extra-situational knowledge about the participants' behavior and invoking of themes through time, I focus on contextual configuration (Goodwin, 2000): the material setting; the place as architecture, the site of the action; the place as psycho-socio-historical setting (Middleton & Brown, 2005; Schatzki, 2002); and, thus, larger cycles of discourses (Scollon & Scollon, 2004). In short, I suggest revisiting applied integrationism with my open-ended proposition of considering the contribution of the

approach of integrational linguistics as more than a critique of the language sciences (Steffensen, 2016). As another option, I align its novel approach to the linguistic indeterminacy of social action (Harris, 1998; Orman, 2017) with the processuality approach derived from practice studies (Nicolini, 2009, 2012; Schatzki, 2002, 2013). The outset for a practice approach is to study practices as they unfold continuously. The approaches I have merged form the baseline of this study's analysis of social interaction, following integrational standards (Duncker, 2017, 2018; Taylor, 1986) as analytical practice. This means that there is a hierarchy to be found in this construction, where EMCA forms the baseline for empirical analysis, thus is placed at the base of Fig. 4.1, below. Integrational linguistics is at the top, because of its open-ended approach to semiology ranging over that of EMCA and practice studies. Yet, it is underpinning practices studies' interest in processuality and indeterminacy, thus practices studies is placed between the two as bonding mediator.

**Fig. 4.1. Hierarchy of the merging of approaches**



Technically, the person-centered focus is brought about by the merging of approaches, by the analytical application of the concepts of contextualization and cotemporality from integrational linguistics, which is individual, and practice studies' inclination towards the concept of emergence and emergent activity, which is social (Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 83–84; Schatzki, 2013). In Chapter 3, Fig. 2 demonstrates that the analytical direction, roughly speaking, differs between pure EMCA-oriented analysis and an analysis informed by integrational linguistics underpinning practice studies. I argue that the EMCA context perspective was stiffer and targeted on the social scene, while the integrational observation of understanding was individual within the social (sometimes) and could operate on different timescales (a shared and

an individual timescale). This point requires some elaboration. The integrational concept of cotemporality is crucial for scrutinizing methodology because it suggests that cotemporality entails semantic indeterminacy (Harris, 1998, p. 84). Time tracks each lived moment as novel and varied because of the novelty of it, as opposed to EMCA's determinacy, which is provisional and not radically indeterminate as the integrational concept presupposes (Orman, 2017). The integrational inclination towards indeterminacy is contrasted with the presupposed local orders searched for within the EMCA program (Hutton, 2017; Taylor & Cameron, 1987; Zhou, 2014). Harris agrees on the time-boundness of communication, while disagreeing on the intersubjective stance of EMCA (cf. Chapter 3):


(...) to say that communication is intrinsically time-bound is to say that all assignments of meaning are made by time-bound agents. We have no alternative but to interpret particular episodes of communication by integrating them into the unique temporal sequence of events which constitutes our previous experience. Which in turn entails that where two or more participants are involved a message must be open to two or more interpretations. And these cannot be guaranteed to coincide. Furthermore, where they conflict, no one interpretation hold a privileged position vis-à-vis another (Harris, 1998, p. 84).

This requires elaborate tools for observing demonstrated interpretations as individual instead of social. Yet, Taylor argues that communication is public and supposedly analyzable, but crucially adds that: "(...) we must learn not to study the public face of verbal interaction simply for the value it supposedly has as a window on the private events of the mind, where the 'real' and essential activity is occurring" (Taylor, 1986, p. 180). This would trap us back in Locke's failure of promoting telementation, discussed in Chapter 3. My suggestion is to expand the range of material included as data. Simply, it requires longer stretches to inform the analyst of previous events that may connect to present invocations of understandings displayed (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). Otherwise, the analyst is bound to study only semantic indeterminacy on a scattered and linguistic basis. Referring to Saussure's commonly known "talking heads" model — illustrating two talking heads transmitting ideas from Head A to Head B and vice versa by means of stippled lines illustrating sound/speech from the heads' mouths accompanied by arrows from one head's mouth towards the other — Harris argues that: "There are relations between at least three presumably relevant interpretations to be considered: A's interpretation, B's interpretation, and the investigator's" (Harris, 1998, p. 23). Instead of exclusively applying the categories of EMCA, therefore, interpretation in the analysis is a base of



the person-centered approach, which is founded in the relation between the actual persons in the situation examined and the analyst's observation and interpretation, as demonstrated by Fig. 4.2. The integrational model of interpretation roughly visualizes two individuals communicating (squares with individual shapes) and an individual analyst (triangle), and the three of them as interpretants, each with individual interpretations (X, Y and Z).

**Fig. 4.2. The integrational relation between participants, analyst, and interpretation**



Another dire argument between the two approaches has been the problem of data and the perception that “ (...) one cannot step into the same context twice” (Harris, 1998, p. 98), which stricter integrational linguistics scholars withhold because “we make meaning of experience in any given context” (Harris, 2009a, p. 59). Therefore, no moment is privileged and experientially maintainable. This is also argued by language psychologists (Hermann & Gregersen, 1978, p. 108), since the stream of thought, and thus the process of understanding, is unstoppable due to time (James, 1950, chap. 8). First-order experiences and reflexivity link to the stream of thought. For instance, critics argue that what EMCA analysts make of recorded interaction is more correctly second-order products: more a reflection of the analyst's cumulative insight into the details of the recording's richness than what went on for the participants in their understanding (Fleming, 1997).

The fact that communication and new understandings happen recurrently (Gregersen, 2004, pp. 69–70; Hermann & Gregersen, 1978, pp. 104–113) is not taken into account. This also applies to the analyst, who is not privileged in this respect. Furthermore, the integration of signs depends on what is going on in a person's situationally-grounded experience and links to their past experience, in the sense that

all signs are always having the status as “new” because they are deemed to be perceived as variations, due to their temporal integration. Obviously, an analysis will be carried out under new (contextualized) settings, different from the situation in which a recording of an interaction was made. Due to the principle of cotemporality, time has passed and this will affect the interpretation of the analyst co-present (or not) in the actual situation and recording of the data (Fleming, 1995, 1997; Harris, 1998, 2009a, Pablé & Hutton, 2015). Of course, the analyst has their own time-bound understanding of their own analysis, but they are also subject to the reflexivity of their interpretation bouncing between first-order and second-order experiences, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, I believe it is possible to deal with this methodological aspect, following Harris’ observation (Duncker, 2018; this paragraph is adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 85).

A solution to the problem is introducing the principle of complementarity into the methodology. When applied to discussing approaches to human interaction and to meaning-making, complementarity opens a (relieving, in the eyes of critics) discussion of a firmly established discourse led and defended by EMCA and CA analysts (Taylor & Cameron, 1987). In EMCA and CA discourse, researchers argue that analytical proof-proceeding ensures the opposite of the Harrisian approach: an objective status of interpretations drawn by analysts. Objectivity is reached with the data-driven methodology of traditional CA analysis (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 729).

While CA may have a fixed focus on tracking patterns and mapping social interaction as outmost rule-governed business, in my analysis, this methodology can also be translated and adapted to grip an observational point pertaining to one specific perspective (the analyst’s) amongst other infinite possible participant interpretations (the participants’) or formal instrumental systems of observance (the technology used for the recording of encounters) (cf. complementarity, Bohr, 1985). I do not consider this problematic. Using CA tools with an integrational ontology is possible as long as complementarity is added to the equation of observing the communicative acts of interpretants. Following Bohr (1985), the principle of complementarity presupposes that objective observation does not exist because the phenomenon only makes itself available for observation relationally founded in the relationship between observer and observed — individual body/formal system of observance and perception/recording of phenomenon.

Complementarity, thus, is in strong agreement with the primacy of perception of Merleau-Ponty (1962), discussed in Chapter 3.2. Without someone’s perceived understanding, reliability becomes an issue for the integrationist. On the other hand, reliability becomes an issue to CA scholars, who tend to favor empirical above theoretical scrutiny without systematic observation. Therefore, hardliner CA researchers claim that the methodology of CA is a tested, formal system in which

individual interpretation is irrelevant. In the eyes of critics, this preference gives CA research an element of empiricism and positivism. Reliability may seem questionable in an integrational interaction analysis; however, this would discard phenomenology altogether as qualitative research methodology. The question remains where to draw the line between approaches and position this study.

The quantitative aspect of CA is irrelevant to my endeavor. My solution to this problem is to position my study in humanities in an area with clear preference to qualitative studies, meaning closer to traditional psychology than to clinical psychology. Again, I position myself closer to language psychology than to traditional psychology. On the other hand, integrational researchers have been almost reluctantly cautious when it comes to empirical scrutiny, so novel methodological probing is a reasonable quest, as long as ontological and epistemological prerequisites are discussed carefully.


This person-centered approach, as an alternative to a pure CA approach, can be said to have set another focus of observance, drawing on phenomenology's qualitative outset. This allows the researcher to approach the participants of the interaction through the analyst's interpretation of the participants' communication, which may even uncover new aspects, and can account for a participant perspective rather than social pattern recognition. Analysts who are true to the CA program are inclined to believe social pattern recognition suffices as analysis of communication (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997). A phenomenological approach in the integrationist tradition may account for different aspects than analysts who, for example, have their focus fixated on the coordination of actions as embodiment perspectives (Goodwin, 2000), or on turn-taking and meta-linguistic units as intervention studies, which discourse of intervention studies that have emerged from EMCA do (Goodwin, 2003a; Wilkinson, 2011, 2014). An analysis on the grounds of a person-centered approach can supplement the EMCA approach with more focus on the persons communicating (cf. Klemmensen, 2018, p. 75), rather than having a fixed focus on the patterns of the interaction in itself (de Kok, 2008; Fleming, 1995, 1997; Harris, 2009a, 2009b).

The CA methodology is a token baseline in the integrational analysis up for discussion, whereas the wholeness of the analytical process of the communication of the persons targeted, the researcher's contextualization of their data, etc. all form the data — the analyzable “material” (Duncker, 2005, 2011, 2017, 2018; Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2011, 2015). A new logistics of understanding can, therefore, be said to be at the center of interest. In order to embrace the logistics of communication and understanding as an integrational concept, a model of understanding must undergo a forensic analysis (the above section is adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 85).

## 4.2 An integrational model of practicing understanding

Duncker (2005, p. 141) draws the outline for an integrational practice model of communication by drawing a silhouette of the infrastructure of a communication situation and the persons communicating in it. The model expands on Harris' interpretive prerequisite stance visualized above in Fig. 4.2. Duncker's model contains multiparty communication with the illustration of a possible sequence of initiative and a following response (an adjacency pair). But the integrational linguistic ontology adds something more since it exactly accounts for indeterminacy in interaction through the inclusion of possibilities and possible scenarios. In Fig. 4.3, I present a simplified model to demonstrate how Harris' factors are coordinated and governed in situated multiparty interaction. My modified version of Duncker's model is based on their original model (Duncker, 2005) that outlines an integrational communication model portrayed in a silhouette depicting the infrastructure of situated multiparty communication. The model reads as follows: The possible sequence initiative from A is followed by a response by B and/or C (indeterminacy, rather than adjacency pairs), which is delivered in consequence of A and D (free radical; possible interlocutor or concept), not directed towards A, yet form part of the socio-material setting that is embedded by Harris' three factors governing all communication (B-biomechanical, M-macrosocial and Ct-circumstantial) (cf. Klemmensen, 2018, p. 87).

**Fig. 4.3. Simplified version of Duncker's integrational model of communication**



In this view, interaction is conceptualized as processual and close to the practice theoretical view of the unfolding of things through actions in practice studies, as discussed above (Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 2002). Duncker argues that the model provides new observation points for the analyst as opposed to traditional models of communication. I find the model interesting because it relieves a normativity perception of communication and its interlocutors, due to the free radical (D) that marks that everything and may be oriented to by the participants and at individual levels (cf. Harris, 1998, p. 84).

The intention of the initiator is demonstrated and the interlocutors' following possible actions and responses are represented in the model. All participants, all intentions, all responses, all interpretations and all coordination are being governed by the principles of Harris' three factors (Duncker, 2005, pp. 141–142): the biomechanical, the macrosocial and the circumstantial factors (Harris, 1998, p. 25). Referring to these factors, Duncker points to the potentials of dismissing traditional models of communication and adapting the integrational model which enhances the allowance of new observations and new observational points for the analyst. Deficit communication or concepts such as misunderstandings will, Duncker argues, be considered normal and may even contribute to develop a new approach which investigates the dynamics of communicational processes with an integrational model of communication (Duncker, 2005, p. 143).

The person-centered approach which I wish to outline draws not only upon the directly observable; therefore, it cannot be categorized as a strictly empirical approach to human interaction, as does the CA approach to human interaction. For classical as well as contemporary CA analysts, understandings are the focal area of investigations of talk-in-action. Thus, the participants' understandings are the *displayed* phenomena to be accounted for by the CA analyst in the transcripts of interaction (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 729). The analyst uncovers the various strategies applied by the participants communicatively. It is, however, presupposed that participants do display understandings. Also presupposed, is that participants in the next turn do display their understandings of their own previous turn or of other participants' turns displayed in previous turns (Sacks et al., 1974). This forward-directed interpretive method procedure is supposed to account for understandings and to supply a "proof" for the analyst's interpretation of the participants' understandings in talk-in-action (Sacks et al., 1974, p. 729). This argument is supported by Fleming (1997, p. 199), who emphasizes that Sacks and fellow analysts (Sacks et al., 1974) themselves originally stated that the organization of turn-taking is their case and not "the particular outcome in particular setting" (cited by Fleming 1997, p. 199). In a person-centered approach, contrastingly, the participants' sequential contributions in the transcripts of video data

are not analyzed merely as attempts at participating in social interaction, but as attempts of integrating their temporary expressed and (for some reason) unexpressed understandings as they are processed and displayed explicitly or implicitly in the examined situational dialogues. Therefore, on this ground, attention is drawn to the integrational perception of the logistics of communicational situations as a focal area, e.g. in the integrational model of communication by Duncker (2005; this section is adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 86–88).

#### 4.2.1 A person-centered approach to studying practices

The mechanisms of conversations that CA seeks to uncover and map systematically (Sacks et al., 1974) are used as navigational tools by this study's person-centered approach. Meaning-making is sometimes displayed and sometimes implicit; it is partially displayed and accounted for analytically (sometimes) using CA strategies. Therefore, meaning-making is not to be considered a phenomenon inherent in language nor in social interaction, but as *symptoms of being human* and *of the dynamics of communicational processes*, and as *traces of the participants' attempts* at integrating. The participants' integrational proficiencies are in focus, but these are not measured by their productiveness in the interaction or dialogue per se. Moreover, their proficiency is sought revealed by their abilities to and attempts at integrating themselves, and only partially by coordinating in the situation with interlocutors and with the material setting. This distinction contributes more agency and free will to the individual from integrationism than does EMCA, which considers all action social response demonstrating accountability (Garfinkel, 1967). As noted by Fleming (1997, p. 203), the person-centered approach does not align sequentiality with cotemporality, which also embraces simultaneity. We are not governed by the clockwise sequentiality that CA is inclined to make us believe. In real life, we are active language-makers and we make up language as we go. Hereby, creativity is explained and accounted for by the person-centered approach.

As we make language and as we communicate, other things are also created, for instance, "power relations," "violence," "inclusion," "exclusion," "ideology," etc. These concepts occur simultaneously within linguistic time and might even stay hidden to us and hidden in a transcript's lines of turn-takings (Fleming, 1997, p. 203). Therefore, Fleming argues not to reduce "time" to the type of sequentiality applied by CA analysts when analyzing and thinking about language (Fleming, 1997, p. 205). Fleming, contrarily to Duncker (2004), argues that an integrational rhetoric would account for a "radical contextualization" (Fleming, 1997, p. 205), meaning that an analysis of human acts are ascribed to attend to both particular situations and distributed over time. In short, the rigidity of CA's sequential organization of the

analysis rooted in the next-turn proof-procedure must be abandoned to study more closely a participant perspective founded on “empirically situated discursive action” (Fleming, 1997, p. 207).

EMCA critics from integrational linguistics have claimed integrational linguistics to be more phenomenologically-grounded than the EMCA program in its outset because integrational linguistics favors a personalist perspective (cf. Hutton, 2017, 2019). Part of the critique derives from claims that EMCA imposes extra-situational categories from a general resource of analytical concepts derived from other situations, whereby new material is encoded and thus framed in a third person analytical perspective (Hutton, 2008).

EMCA either does not acknowledge this “unnoticed” fallacy or its researchers do not reveal this coverup, uncovered by the demythologizing integrational linguistic analyst experts. However, EMCA is not theoretically driven, defenders will argue (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984), so integrational linguistic critique falls short of its own premise on this key. Furthermore, what is there to study if situations cannot be not observed and approached analytically, one may ask. As noted by Silverman (2001): “However, as always in science, everything will depend on what you are trying to do and where it seems that you may be able to make progress” (Silverman, 2001, p. 163). I strive to open the abandoned dialogue between integrational linguistics and EMCA (the above section is adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 88–89).

A final point of divergence, but where harmonization is possible, is regarding the concept of turn-taking (de Kok, 2008; Taylor & Cameron, 1987), which appear stiff in its presupposition on reciprocity. The problem, to the integrationist, is that this view completely sets aside inner dialogue, individual experience, and intentionality (Perregaard, 2016). However, all depends on what sort of phenomenon is studied. Yet, if the phenomenon of EMCA is not first-order experience, then it is true that its phenomenological outset has lost terrain. But what is the phenomenon of EMCA, then, if not the phenomenology of everyday life? Certainly, the formalized structure of conversation does not allow improvisation and creativity (cf. integrational linguistics’ radical contextualization of language, Fleming, 1997, p. 183).

Because language is situated communicative action, Harris (1981, pp. 154–155) argues, language is always imbued with a temporal stamp, and this provides 'a unique contextualization' for 'everything that is said, heard, written, or read'. Progression through time therefore makes of language a continuously creative process (Fleming, 1995, p 90).

So, if it is not what people go about doing, then Taylor and Cameron's (1987) critique of EMCA analysis of conversation still holds as ontological critique. Specifically, CA has been criticized for over-focusing on structural aspects of interaction, including the CA conceptualization of context, rather than focusing on the persons communication and the discursive framework (de Kok, 2008, p. 887) and materiality. In contrast, the concept of context in integrational linguistics is both person-bound and situationally anchored. However, all individual contextualization may not be observable, and many aspects can still be observed with the use of modern technology (McIlvenny, 2020).

Sacks (1992) studied telephone calls on a suicide call line because this data was technologically available, and its structure puzzling. Obviously, overhearing and analyzing how "talk is done" or what goes on in conversation were the first CA objects of interest. Advanced recording equipment and computer technology allows exploring other aspects of human interaction, such as the use of space (Goodwin, 2000; Mondada, 2014; Scollon & Scollon, 2004), mobility (McIlvenny, 2018, 2019), the use of objects (Mondada, 2014; Raudaskoski, 1999), and touch (Cekaite, 2016; Goodwin, 2017; Goodwin & Cekaite, 2018). Even simple GoPro cameras, such as the ones worn by the researchers and used as recording devices in the primary excerpts analyzed in this observational study, alter what can be observed, questioned, and answered regarding interaction practices. The GoPro cameras become active parts of the interaction and are no way part of a fly-on-the-wall setup (Raudaskoski, 2010a) one sees in traditional recording of interaction. Interesting to integrational linguistics, the analyst's perspective is further integrated situationally, since the researchers are co-participating with camera extensions attached to their bodies or places at the table in front of them in the interaction. This means that the capture reflects the situated body of the analyst and the interlocutor. Participants are also co-present in the analysis, since recordings are reviewed and commented on together in, at least, one occasion where it shows how contextualizations are integrated in shared space with various individual perspectives.

### 4.3 An integrational EMCA stance

The purpose of this interdisciplinary pursuit can be summarized as an attempt at progress to downgrade and discard orthodox positionings in both camps and answer: To what extent is a marriage between integrational linguistics and EMCA possible and affordable? The expectation is a modified view of both directions' essences through the agency of a real need to enhance analysis. Accordingly, this will contribute to solving practical (communication) problems for individuals who live with or participate in lives with language and communication disorders after ABI, simply by improving the understanding of "what goes on" for the persons



communicating. Employing person-centeredness through an analytical conduct can bring us closer to meaning-making in emergent action, entailing abandonment of the idea of joint co-constitution as the only way to approach the participants, and by substituting the idea of “data” as innocent tellers of experience with an integrational notion of experienced events. The participants’ experiences are inaccessible without telling (multimodally or talk-wise), but we can interpret traces of communication; participants can report experiences in a variety of ways through affective activity, verbal behavior, multimodality, etc. (cf. Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019).

At this point, the dissection of the status of the analyst is necessary to continue synthesizing the approaches. Analysts cannot share or reconstruct a first-person perspective apart from their own. First-order experiencers may be observed multimodally (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019) but second-order categories are needed to communicate them. Researchers can use phenomenology, discussed in Chapters 3.2, 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, as a theory to try to grip the wholeness of a person’s communicative enterprise and the problems they confront when researching longer stretches of data.

As transcribers of recorded materials, we have a serious responsibility for the creation of the data we produce, with an integrational stance on the “empirical” study of language and communication, and thus turn it into an interpretive study by means of a renewed honesty about methodology (Duncker, 2018). For instance, the textualization of sound and image, which we shall see in the following analysis, *is* an interpretive result to the integrationist. As demonstrated in the background publications of this thesis (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019), several transcripts of the data exist. There is no, so to say, “end result.” Following the requirement of integrational methodological honesty, I declare that the transcripts have been edited by myself (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015) and by myself and my supervisor (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). As noted by Demuth (2018), recorded materials are never to be claimed as direct reflections of reality. Rather, Demuth promotes an authored view similar to Duncker’s (2018), that research material (for video analysis) categorizes and is considered as “seen as” elements because of the choices that lie behind every observation and collection of item (Demuth, 2018, p. 5). However, Demuth does not focus on the personal contribution of the researcher’s reports to the extent that Duncker does. Rather, Demuth presupposes research integrity from a standard and normative perspective. However, the outcome of their claiming authorship is similar at the outset. Materials are claimed explicitly produced and authored by us, the researchers, who are reporting *our* reports of the participants’ speech and action. Yet, they are different in their orientation to scientific standards. The question remains, however, how to interpret Duncker’s integrational view. To what extent should the individual researcher’s

individual experience be prioritized? Where should the line be drawn between subjective science (individual experience) and objective science (transparent observation)? To these questions, I am afraid that integrationism falls short in standard scientific acceptable answering. Data represents what was captured/shown/told to me/us and represented here as my/our interpretation. So, while I make no claim to show data “as it was,” just because it was recorded, I do not necessarily agree on an integrational data stance, and choose to follow Demuth (2018) as another exhibitor of contemporary standards since Demuth has a similar but less radical data stance.

Demuth (2018) and Duncker (2018) agree that a set of choices were behind the recording setup: the intersection of time, space, participants meeting up and participating, the material setting’s construction, the decisions behind the architecture’s design, the economical projecting of the care home residency in policies, etc. My integrational stance in this thesis is modified and affords the notion of authority and of authorship of data processing as professional practice, but with a less radical stance, claiming research transparency rather than scientific subjectivity.

The video recordings that I have worked with contain spoken clips and visual images, they are not textual. I have elaborated the excerpts from the digital video, turned them into text and ordered them as extracts. The raw recordings are two hours long each. This process was not innocent; I have followed several methodologies and made personal choices at every microscopic step of this process using a range of transcription protocols: I have used Jefferson’s protocol for transcription of talk data, elements from Goodwin’s visual analysis transcription, and Mondada’s micro-action protocol. The transcription of the excerpts was done by me and assessed and informed by peer researchers in data sessions and at conferences where I presented my preliminary findings and results. The techniques for peer assessment included showing anonymized video excerpts and presenting transcribed sequences of the videos using the simple Jeffersonian transcription conventions (Sacks et al., 1974, pp. 731–733). These were later supplemented with multimodal annotations authored by Goodwin (Goodwin et al., 2012; Goodwin, 2018, pp. 19–20), reviewed again, and enriched with details using Mondada’s protocol for multimodal transcription (Mondada, 2014, 2016). Orthographic supplements have been added to communicate the multimodal details in a more fine-grained way, which have come to my attention as a result of the research process of noticing with video analysis (Jordan & Henderson, 1995; Laurier, 2014a). But the ownership does not end at this stage. I, for one, have focused my *individual* attention on certain aspects and left others out. It is impossible to make an exhaustive, objective transcription in any system because the data is so rich. Subjective choice of foci must be made in order to complete the process of exosomatic translation that the transforming of image and sound practices require

when turning them into textual products (Iedema, 2003; Mehan, 1993). In this sense, I consider data more than the preservation of practices, as EMCA tends to innocently do. Rather, I consider data preserved interpretations in a hermeneutic sense.

Over the course of working long-term with a dataset, importantly, phenomenological experiences occur (cf. Goode, 1994b). Getting to know the persons and their communicative habits beyond the recording situation I co-participated in allows for a deeper acquaintance and new experiences, also at new points in the research process. I spent time with the participants before and after recordings and informed myself about them and their everyday routines, which allowed me to uncover patterns of similarity without losing sight of indeterminacy. Furthermore, this co-supports occurrences of perceived sameness as my perception of repetition, meaning my experience of the data — which conceptualizes an interpretive first-person perspective — is endeavored with an integrational stance at the outset. In addition, as this section demonstrates, a demand of methodological transparency and honesty is necessary at outset for claiming an integrational stance underpinning EMCA. This is a different and more empirical course that I suggest than the course of the anecdote derived from introspection, often used as basis of integrational analyses of perceived understandings. For all of the above reasons, I choose to call the integrational EMCA perspective person-centered rather than a first-person perspective, not to confuse it with cognitivist notions or with subjectivism (this section draws on Klemmensen, 2018, p. 97, 105).

#### 4.3.1 A lifeworld approach to interaction with disability

The data description that an integrational EMCA perspective can target is an experiential perspective underpinning practice research. By adopting an approach that combines EMCA and integrational linguistics, data are seen as reported experiences that are interpreted in the data rather than unprocessed. This is done by thematically orienting to the non-ordinary orderliness of interaction that is perceived and responded to by the participants in communication as, for instance, atypicality in managing conversation. But rather than assessing the participants' competences from an expert analyst position, which inclines towards a bio-approach, observation of competency and how-abledness (Raudaskoski, 2013) is preferred and conceptualized as a participant's concept, and thus considered a personal, affective and socially complex entity accessible in interaction (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). Rather than to see interactional displays as individual performance or functional competence, which is a possible fallacy of a strict integrational linguistic view, atypicality is considered in a participant's perspective, not a researcher's perspective. In short, this approach considers an empirical lifeworld investigation of interactional consequences

of language and communication disorders due to ABI. In avoiding interactional trouble, the expected contribution to studies in language and communication disorders due to ABI is tools for analysis of the participants' own perspectives in interaction, with suggestions for how to downgrade the force of apparent misalignments and minimize interactional exclusion to counterclaim the practice of excessive correction (Simmons-Mackie & Damico, 2008), which has proved inefficient and excluding (Klemmensen, 2018).

#### 4.3.2 Meaning is someone's

This study is directed towards the methodological question of the extent to which a cross-disciplinary approach may help distinguish experienced communication as practiced by individuals from analysts' interpretations (Fleming, 1995; Harris, 2009a; Sarangi, 2007a).

In an integrational view, meanings are defined as being attached to persons' experiences rather than to language. Crucially, Harris considers understandings first and foremost private and — in contrast to other interaction approaches — points out that they may sometimes be implicit, which should be taken into account (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010; Harris, 2009a; Ruus, 1995). However, though meanings are regarded as private, individuals are subject to account for their social performance (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984, p. 3). Therefore, the perception of unaccountable behavior produces problems in social interaction.

Methodologically, integrational linguistics does not limit the analysis to the study of formal mechanisms in conversation in transcripts of various kinds, which Harris would consider “scriptism” (Fleming, 1995, p. 73). Moreover, the notion of temporality is much wider in integrational linguistics and not limited to the notion of a local sequentiality, as in the case of CA. Ontologically, both are oriented towards uncovering lay methods and a lay rationality in social behavior. The divergence in ontology lies within the limitation of CA to the study of informal interaction, whereas integrational linguistics covers premises about all language and communication. An integrational linguistic criticism of CA, for instance, has been directed at the normativity of the search for structures in interaction (Fleming, 1995, p. 85). The procedural reproduction of structures in social interaction that integrational linguistics advocates is a hypostasized entity which presupposes a system underneath the enactments: “a system unproblematically abstracted from particular events which it governs” (Fleming, 1995, p. 85). As discussed, as an alternative, Harris introduces three factors governing all communication. The problem of the system underneath leads to the main ontological divergence between CA and integrational linguistics. The orientation towards situatedness within EMCA becomes a situatedness on the

surface of structuring mechanisms (Fleming, 1995, p. 88). Therefore, the CA fallacy — in an integrational linguistics perspective — is that CA may end up studying the system at work rather than particular outcomes. After discussing a promising merging of CA-oriented ethnomethodology and integrational linguistics, Fleming (1995, p. 94) suggested a new “panchronic” analysis which would allow for contextualizing the present, the past and the anticipated future in a meta-situated analysis. This would lead towards a new constructionism, which reaches beyond the limits of EMCA. Later, Fleming (1997) suggested such analysis would produce a close, detailed, empirical analysis of situated discursive action. It may seem hard to distinguish CA from integrational linguistics in Fleming’s proposal; therefore, I will specify three things which may clarify the distinguishing features of EMCA and integrational linguistics: (a) meaning as it is applied in this study; (b) how integrational linguistics differs from EMCA; and (c) pinpoint where the notion of meaning within integrational linguistics diverges from the notion of meaning within EMCA (this section is adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 51–52).

### 4.3.3 Experiential meaning

Historically, meanings and individual experience have been linked. Gadamer, for instance, considered all understanding a response to something earlier understood (Gadamer, 2004). In *The Principles of Psychology* (James, 1950), habits and action patterns are described as interconnected to modes of understanding, since James considered meanings linked to self-perception and to the individual’s acquisition of knowledge underpinned in language psychology (James, 1950, pp. 104–127; Nielsen & Hermann, 2010). Contrastingly, Garfinkel described meaning-making as socially shared in *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967). Despite an ontological divergence between Gadamer, James, and Garfinkel regarding orientation towards the individual versus social meaning-making, the thoughts of these predecessors to integrational linguistics all link two key notions more or less explicitly: (a) the notion of experiential meaning (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, p. 1), and (b) the notion of situational meaning. In a similar fashion, Harris is concerned with articulating a science of language, which does not start with language but, distinctly, with the processual understandings of individuals communicating. Crucially, Harris points to the argument that linguistic activity does not have a special status which separates it from the rest of our daily life activities. Linguistic activity is as contextualized as all the other activities we engage in that is integrated by ourselves:

Context, for the integrationist, is always the product of contextualization, and each of us contextualizes in our own way, taking into account whatever factors seem to us to be relevant. The individual participants in any communication situation will each contextualize what happens differently, as a function of the integrational proficiency each exercises in that situation (Harris, 2009a, p. 71).

The analysis must be able to deal with emergent meaning, or semantic indeterminacy, contained in the integration of understandings by participant individuals. How to analytically approach the individuals' understandings with this perspective in mind will be fully unfolded and explained further in the following chapters.

In an integrationist perspective, an anecdotal narration is as reliable as a video recording (Duncker, 2018, pp. 129–134; Orman, 2017; Pablé & Hutton, 2015, p. 39). This has nothing to do with cognitivist ideas; rather, Duncker argues the anecdote provides language material to study: “The personal anecdote is a report of a particular individual’s linguistic experience. It is a first-person report of a first-order experience as remembered as reconstructed by that person, and in that sense, it constitutes personal evidence” (Duncker, 2018, pp. 129–130). However, a problem arises following Harris’ distinction between first- and second-order language (Harris, unpublished). If the anecdote is applied, it at least categorizes as second-order since writing it down requires elaboration and thus translation of thoughts, as discussed in Chapter 3.2.1. The idea to use researchers’ reports to study linguistics without claiming objectivity (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, p. 39) could work regardless of it categorizing as first- or second-order. But the problem of bias needs attention because it is not a given that the researcher produces or edits material appropriately. Therefore, transparency of explicitness and implicitness in practices of understanding are important, whether displayed simultaneously or during recontextualization in narratives. Research protocols and scientific standards should be no different to the integrationist. Both literary sources from informants and anecdotes from the researcher display and contextualize, equally, persons’ experiences of communication and consider how understanding and perception changes with time. Therefore, narratives, such as literary cases on lived language disorders, are as interesting to study as the personal anecdote. Comparatively, both inform the analyst’s findings as they, sometimes, do refute observable behaviors. Therefore, a central claim could be that the more “technical” the analysis, the less “humanly” it may treat the experiential nature of the interaction. Yet, some degree of objectivity (research transparency) is desirable if integrationist analyses are to be validated.

Hence, integrationism is to be considered an account for why we often do not agree on something (Harris, 2009a, p. 71). An applied integrational agenda must

include a broad definition of a communication situation, since it is the personal integration of an individual's own understandings which is the interactional premise. In CA, the interactional focus is different (cf. Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997). A scenario of understanding or of interaction in isolation, cannot be the object studied within an applied integrational perspective (Fleming, 1995, 1997). However, the object studied is how actual persons integrate their own understandings of what they are trying to do as they go about doing it. Therefore, an applied integrational perspective sheds light upon what persons are doing in and with their language. Hence, it is clarified by the very premise of an applied integrational linguistics, that the object of study calls for interdisciplinarity. The study of actual persons and their integration of what they are trying to do as they go about doing it overlaps with the approach of practice studies (Nicolini, 2012). This points to the very premise of an applied integrational linguistics in order to qualify its practice affordance. This is done in order to position it closer to practice studies with the purpose of considering it an ecological approach to the study of language and communication.

The persons communicating are at the center of this approach. Hence, "understanding" is not just a matter of interaction patterns but must also incorporate personal integration of one's own understandings. This person-centered premise is quite different from the interaction-centered focus in CA (Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997). Since Harris states that the concept of "context" is not a "neutral backdrop against which communication takes place" (Harris 2009a, p. 71), then, it must follow that the object studied cannot be a scenario of understanding nor the interaction patterns in isolation, when approaching meaning-making integrationally. The object of study in an integrational linguistic perspective is opposite by nature. It studies how actual persons integrate their own understandings of what they are trying to do as they go about doing it. Therefore, an analytical aspect of the integrational linguistic perspective is approaching and studying more closely what actual persons are doing (also in and with their language).

In sum, the persons who have impairments are placed at the center of the analysis. This alternative conceptualization of a participant perspective is discussed by Nielsen (2011) and Klemmensen (2018), drawing on Harris's semiotics. A similar conceptualization is that of Leudar and Costall (2011), who draw on critiques of the dominant theory of mind discourse. The narrations of individuals with language disorders are useful for the purpose of triangulating and supplementing a strict interaction approach and a strict clinical approach to language disorders. They portray the emotional side of living with impairments, which are themes that are excessively downscaled in traditional investigations of lived language disorders. Theoretically, they introduce a practice perspective which helps augment the framework for the analysis of lived language disorders. Indeed, narrative accounts are challenging

clinical psychology's one-faced descriptions of individuals who have impairments. One distinct academic narration worth mentioning again is the account of Robillard (1996). Because of the author's EMCA proficiency, Robillard's own account of concisely demonstrates the step-by-step, non-democratic, interactional order (Abrams & Deniz, 2015) that his disability and impaired communication affords. Its social consequence results in a bitter lifeworld for him as an individual with impairment (the above section is adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 52–62).

#### 4.4 An adaptation and mitigation stance

The object of study in integrational linguistics is limited to the investigation of the relationship between the individual and their communication and meaning-making practices. Certainly, materials and culture matter to the integrationist. However, the central concern to integrational linguistics is the radical indeterminacy of language, which is raised by individuals involved in situated meaning-making. Therefore, individuals' meaning-making is regarded as the key analytical concern. This key concern links integrational linguistics closely to narrative medicine in health-related studies, such as the study of language disorders. More generally, integrational linguistics is concerned with mythological beliefs about language as an object of study, which is inherent to the sciences of language (Harris, 1981, 1996, 1998, 2009b).

Importantly, the notion of “integrational” grounds meaning-making in *someone's experience* as a person, rather than formally in social interaction in material settings. Therefore, meaning-making practices, in an integrational sense, are not simply meaning-making practices. Rather, the individual activity of meaning-making is labeled “contextualization,” since this refers to an individual agency. Notwithstanding strong theoretical alliances between EMCA, discursive psychology, the distributed language view, agential realism, and integrational linguistics, persuasively, the ontology of integrational linguistics and traditional language psychology position these closer to one another than the other approaches when regarding meaning. However, I deem a marriage between integrational linguistics and EMCA possible in a worldly manner due to two benefits. The inclination towards theorizing language and communication in integrational linguistic research can inform EMCA research about experiential and integrational aspects of language and communication. Mutual understanding and social order are bedrock concepts underlying EMCA: “ (...) the behavior of voluntary agents is to result in social conformity and order, the agents' interpretations must be shared. Consequently, mutual understanding is a prerequisite for the achievement of social order” (Taylor, 1992, p. 213). This prerequisite is



unquestioned in EMCA but highly problematized in integrational linguistics, not as a question of whether participants do understand each other but oriented towards how the individual participants integrate themselves following their individual enterprise of understanding (cf. contextualization, Harris, 2009a, 2009b). On the other hand, the weighty empirical tradition of EMCA research in publicly displayed understanding can enrich the integrational approach with tools for hands-on analysis and a notion of mitigating the integrational stance on data: No data are innocent, not to EMCA researchers, nor to integrational linguists or to anyone else. The idea of the analyst as (sole) agentive “conceptualizer of meaning,” coined by Duncker (2018), is novel but needs further exploration in order to be accepted by the EMCA camp (and general scientific standards). Therefore, this analytical suggestion for a combined approach is a midway proposition: a mitigation stance. Rather, it is a diffraction of the two approaches framing the investigation of this study’s person-centered analytical perspective targeting this significant aspect of lifeworld.

Person-centeredness is preferred as key notion in this study’s approach to atypical interaction — as opposed to a pure integrationist analyst-centered perspective depending heavily on the data interpreter as an informant — since the study is not about the analyst but about the problems of individuals with brain injury and aphasia. Contrastingly, this study does not fully support a pure EMCA participant’s perspective — which is relying reluctantly on CA’s idea of a next-turn proof-procedure analyzing the data — since the present study does not target the logistics around the individuals who have impairments. Rather, the aim of the present study is to consider the individual perspective from within the social ensemble (Duncker, 2017, p. 148; Zhou, 2020, p. 208). The strategy chosen in the analysis is to single out the interactions of the individuals who have impairments and specifically analyze how they are responded to by the co-participants, in order to consider further institutional ramification of practices.

#### 4.5 The program of a joint integrational EMCA approach

This research framework is limited to investigating the consequences of brain injury in interaction with health professionals in everyday life. Therefore, the preliminary boundaries of my framework are the tenets given in Fig. 4.4 on the next page, building further on the initial research questions in Chapter 1.8.

**Fig. 4.4. The program of an integrational EMCA approach**

- *To consider the consequences of ABI in everyday practices*
- *To describe communications as participation abilities, drawing on a joint framework: contextualization from integrational linguistics and the conventions of EMCA*
- *To describe communications through an empirical study of communication difficulties, combining the approach of integrational linguistics and EMCA*
- *To provide transparency of the theoretical-methodological-analytical framework to enhance the integrational EMCA approach*

These questions are investigated through the cross-disciplinary approach framed above, which is outlined and positioned in the overlap of ethnography, anthropological medicine, communication research and language psychology in a broader perspective than this study's distinct combination of integrational linguistics and EMCA. It is important that the English words "how-abled" (Raudaskoski, 2013) versus the term "disabled" frame the approach for this investigation of linguistic impairment and ABI, the resources for mutual understanding, and inclusion and exclusion practices. In short, a person-centered view on communication-as-practice is drawn within an already established field for the purpose of developing a methodological resource available for further empirical and theoretical investigation.

Essentially, this new approach providing a clearer statement of the relationship between language, persons and meaning is needed in order to properly link persons dealing with impairments and their communicational practices (versus language-idea-based relations between displays of linguistic and extra-linguistic signs), whether produced in cognitive tests, everyday interaction or in rehabilitation and occupational therapies. Quite possibly, more attention towards the individual in health-related matters can improve society's understanding of language and communication disorders, promoting a person-centered approach to QOL. This is of great social importance to individuals living with diagnoses such as brain injury, and language disorders in general, since these groups of individuals often are challenged in understanding. A person-centered approach may help facilitate professional practitioners' understanding of the perspective of the individual who has impairments

and, accordingly, increase inclusion and improve treatment by minimizing interactional exclusion (this section is adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 63).

## 4.6 Empirical data

The case study was created during my employment as a research assistant at Aalborg University, where a research team from Mattering: Centre for Discourse and Practice at the Institute of Psychology and Communication initiated an institutional collaborative field study at a care home for individuals with ABI. I participated from the beginning of designing the field study, and my main supervisor, Research Leader Pirkko Raudaskoski, was already engaged as research contact at the study site.

The primary strategy was to enter the site and follow local routines, recording everyday encounters through a non-theoretical lens, but by practicing “unmotivated looking,” following the strategy of ethnomethodology. In this process, practices of social inclusion and exclusion soon caught our attention. The aim of applying this particular strategy was to record and trace the local social practices. I observed and engaged as a participant along with Professor Raudaskoski in the training of communicational skills at the local culture and competence center lead by local professionals, mostly pedagogues and occupational therapists. A series of informal meetings with the administrative leaders helped us understand the challenges and intended practices that we observed and recorded at this site.

The data I use for my analysis are part of this video ethnography study on routines of inclusion/exclusion practices that I carried out with Professor Raudaskoski and Associate Professor Krummheuer in 2012–2013. My attention was directed towards critical moments in encounters; how phatic moments turn into trouble-talk, elaborate participation, and resignation from dialogues in natural conversation in everyday practices at a care home for individuals with severe ABI. Data for my case study were collected using ethnography, including field notes and video recordings. This process included notetaking, audio recordings, interviews, and participant video observation (Jordan & Henderson, 1995; Raudaskoski, 2010b; ten Have, 2004, pp. 126–132). Combined, this collection forms the “core data” and supportive evidence (ten Have, 2004).

For interpretive purposes, the empirical dimension of this study has two main kinds of data with the purpose of scaffolding the analyst’s contextualization and interpretation the primary data:

- (a) Researcher and participant video observation and ethnographical notes.

Ethnographic notes from recording sessions and notes taken during the process of initial elaboration of the video data; the “cannibalization of the data” (Jordan & Henderson, 1995), and notes from the thematic mapping and

identification of focal themes in the primary data are supplementing the elaboration of the dataset at a pre-analytical stage; data mapping and theme identification is scaffolded with the use of the software application Transana, which can provide an overview over initial findings and points of interest for further fine-grained analysis.

(b) A number of supportive data sources.

The supportive sources of data included documents from: informal interviews, press news, meetings, courses, workshops, talks, conferences, comparative visits, assessment evaluations of the site, inquiry of building plans, local policies, local decision-making, staff plans, activity plans, clinical remarks, drawings and photos made by me, projects from the site, research agendas, reports, and political level decision-making.

The base of video data is the primary source; researcher participant video observation was conducted using video ethnography with co-present researchers as participants in the videos. In the fall of 2012, Professor Raudaskoski, Associate Professor Krummheuer and I began a series of ethnographic video visits to a residential care facility primarily for individuals with Phase 4 status. This essentially means that rehabilitation as maintenance of restored functionality in physiotherapy may be offered, and social activities may be offered. Generally, municipalities in Denmark extend these forms of activities to individuals with Phase 4 status, though the distribution of offers differentiate from municipality to municipality since this practice is decentralized and each municipality is responsible for its rehabilitation plans.

The data I use as primary base for this study includes three visits distributed over the course of three months from the initial period of the newly-established care home residency, where all practices were new routines to all of the participants whether residents, professional health practitioners or participant researchers. Three days of visits took place in and around the conference room and one visit takes place at an excursion to a local shopping mall (see Fig. 4.8). I participated in additional recording of activities around the care home facility, physiotherapy, common areas and in selected private residencies over the course of a year throughout 2012–2013 (see Appendix 4-1), but I deselected these recordings for this study, since they are inconsistent in time intervals and therefore present a less coherent string of events. However, the initial biweekly visits from the pilot project constitute the most important recordings in my perception, because they form a string of revisited themes and practices under construction, and because their unique focus is on the establishment of the project and the emergent relation between researcher and participants. As a result, this relation afforded the inclusion of ABI individuals as professional practitioners in a shared role as researchers with the participant


researchers. During visits, the primary data were recorded with individuals with aphasia and severe ABI and co-present staff.

Since I was part of a project group, video recording was influenced by criteria set by the project group with the overall project aiming at an empirical investigation of inclusion and exclusion. The plan was to observe routines and participate in everyday life situations together with individuals with ABI in biweekly activities in occupational therapy. For this part of the study, Professor Raudaskoski and I primarily recorded scheduled activities in the conference room (Fig. 4.5) using a multi-camera setup (Fig. 4.6).

**Fig. 4.5. Conference room**



**Fig. 4.6. Setup of cameras in the conference room**




In the conference room, we recorded with a steady camera (Panasonic) placed on a tripod in the lower right corner of the room. Additionally, one stationary GoPro camera was placed on an elevated table at the lower end of the table, and one portable GoPro was mobile and worn attached to the forehead of the cameraperson, which initially was me. Occasionally, the mobile GoPro was shared with the participants and the other co-present researcher, Professor Raudaskoski. By using three video cameras, we wanted to cover as much as possible of the various participants' communicative resources (cf. Raudaskoski, 2013). All cameras were visible to all of the participants at all times. The recordings from the stationary camera have been used as supportive in the analysis only and the GoPros serve as primary data sources. The images from the GoPros are wide-angle, fine quality resolution. Noted, the sound is a bit low because of a plastic cover we left on while recording to wear and protect the cameras. Fortunately, I had access to high-quality noise-reduction headphones to revise the audio with. A parallel pilot was conducted downstairs in the physiotherapy area by the other project partner, Assistant Professor Krummheuer. I have not investigated this data and focused on the conference room.

The flexibility of the mobile GoPro offered a unique recording opportunity to grasp what went on between sessions, both inside and outside of the conference site where gatherings were held. Namely, the kitchen site (Fig. 4.7) outside the conference room turned out to be an interesting place with informal activities. The site also posed different challenges to individuals with ABI using a wheelchair, which is why a focal point is depicted from the kitchen site, from which trouble emerged following the design around the table and the sink. The material from the kitchen site were recorded with a mobile GoPro camera attached to the research assistant; no separate series of figures of the recording angles are provided beyond a still representation of the main mobile camera angle used in the analyzed excerpts (Fig. 4.8).

**Fig.4.7. The focal point of the kitchen site**



**Fig. 4.8. Main mobile recording angle at the kitchen site**



The scheduled meetings were divided in sessions of two–three hours, starting with approximately one hour, followed by one and a half hours, and a closing session of less than one hour with sharing of the recording experience with and without co-present individuals who have ABI and professional practitioners (as sessions were closing, people went in and out at this point). The mobile GoPro camera served on a field trip to a local shopping mall (Fig. 4.9) that Professor Raudaskoski and I recorded as part of the series of biweekly meetings. During the field trip, we also moved around with the GoPro. As we moved around, I had the camera attached to my chest, allowing us to record from various angles. It turned out to be of crucial importance to the analysis that I wore the mobile camera while buying our food for lunch, since a tiny event from this situation turned out to largely impact conversation during lunch with severe consequences of exclusion of one of the participants with ABI, as we shall see in the analysis. We sat down for lunch and recorded the lunch session.



**Fig. 4.9. Recording angle and setting during lunch at the shopping mall**



Importantly, the pedagogical principle of the center is social inclusion (cf. ICF framework), which is envisioned as the enhancement of the residents' possibilities to be part of social situations. The aim of the project was to investigate how inclusion as a popular concept in care was practiced in the center, and the kinds of exclusions that could be distinguished. The complexity of accomplishments of embodied participation in material settings, however, called for a practice theoretical framing of my study, where I had to expand the methodology study to include practice studies and nexus analysis in order to make sense of the data. Participatory fieldwork means that recordings are carried out by the researchers themselves while engaging in the everyday activities in the center, involving notetaking, talk, conducting interviews and making video recordings (cf. Demuth, 2018; Jordan & Henderson, 1995; Raudaskoski, 2015; ten Have, 2004). Combined, the primary form the "core data" and secondary data form the "supportive evidence" (ten Have, 2004).

In sum, the dataset captures the lived experience of individuals who have impairments due to ABI in their everyday life in a selection of contextualized situations. Following Demuth (2018, p. 5), the capture is demonstrated with a principled collection of materials "verticalizing" the research material by

documenting the different parallel levels of the social interaction recorded: the combination of protocols, photos, audio and video recordings. In parallel, “horizontalizing” the research material is achieved by documenting the temporal course of the material by forming timelines and organizing data with the qualitative analysis software program Transana, discussed further in Chapter 5.5.2 (also, see Appendix 4-1). Overall, a horizontal overview of the material was achieved by contextualizing the recordings and supportive materials, discussed in Chapters 5.5.2–5.5.5 (the above sections draw on Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 101–102; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019).

## 4.7 Ethics

When we collected data in 2012–2013, we informed the participants about the purpose of the project (see Appendix 4-2). We explained that the purpose of the inclusion/exclusion focus was to get a closer look at social interaction and difficulty in social relations with brain injury in a care home. The ethical strategy included informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (see Appendix 4-3). Consent was given by all participants and/or their legal guardians, and legal bystanders validated consent given by those individuals that were legally deauthorized.

No restrictions were placed on participation in this study. The video data come from a biweekly occupational therapy meeting that took place in the Competence and Culture Center (the conference room). In addition, a conference was held at the center in 2012 to review the recordings and discuss the research with the center’s personnel, residents, and other researchers. Recordings were also reviewed with residents who appeared in the recordings.

At the time of the study, approval from an ethics committee was not a requirement. The study was conducted according to Aalborg University’s research ethics guidelines and the Danish data protection regulations recommendations for vulnerable research subjects. The project is registered with Aalborg University’s legal office (2019-899/10-0012) and follows the national code of ethical research conduct and its guidelines for protecting the identity of the participants and storage of data. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) targets the slightest unclarity in definition of roles and relations, also retrospectively. Research integrity is crucial to the effect of GDPR in academic work.



## 5 Analytical framework

### 5.1 Background

Multiple perspectives exist on language and communication disorders. Current approaches include three main approaches, which Legg and Penn list in the following order (2013, p. 18):

- The interactional approach (drawing on sociolinguistic tradition and social interaction studies discussed in Chapters 1, 2, 5 and 6 of this thesis and in Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019))
- The insider approach (drawing on subjective, personal illness experiences and biographies, discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis and elaborated in Chapter 4 of Klemmensen, 2018)
- The QOL approach (drawing on studies in real-life consequences of functional disorders and gains in rehabilitation processes aligned with the WHO frame (discussed in Chapters 3–5 of Klemmensen, 2018 and throughout this thesis).

A shift from the social to the individual, and the development towards a societal framework approach to language and communication disorders, can be traced in the above. Most recent, the QOL approach draws on a multifaceted paradigm of disability, ability and QOL, which includes contextual nuances (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). The WHO definition of QOL is grounded in the individual's perception of opportunities in life (WHO, 1995, p. 164). This interprets in disability studies as “maximizing opportunities to participate fully in social, cultural, and economic life” (Warren & Manderson, 2013, p. 1). This broad concept of QOL downgrades clinical facts and instrumentation to capture subjective assessment. Instead, it foregrounds a functional view which differentiates abledness. Importantly, QOL seemingly makes ethics, social justice, and equity relevant topics, since the rights of people to enhance their capabilities is highlighted, as well as a demand for assessing the resources available to enhance these capabilities. In line with this view, social justice and the individual's access to resources also becomes a highly relevant topic.

Main findings are that uncertainty, vulnerability and isolation characterize the lives of the individuals with impairments and, therefore, their low life quality measurement (Legg & Penn, 2013). Interestingly, similar notions of uncertainty,

vulnerability and social isolation are central in the findings of Glintborg (2015, 2018), who has studied the psychosocial consequences in individuals' lives post-stroke in a Danish context.

Denmark is well-known for its welfare society as well as for excellent access to health and social care and for its patient safety policies. However, surprisingly, individuals with impairment in Denmark indicate low QOL.<sup>xxi</sup> Individuals' QOL with lived language and communication disorders are reported as low, regardless of access to care services, national socioeconomic status and the rehabilitation provided. In sum, access to and accessing of health and social care may be available, but barriers to access (both formal and informal) and the need for individuals and families to organize care across sectors can impede the use of such services. Likewise, notions of loneliness and feelings of "not being normal" are retrieved as dominant in the Danish study (Glintborg, 2015). Interestingly, the ideal ethical discourse from the ICF model is reflected in the recommendations for change retrieved from the real-world, pragmatic discourse studies. This indicates a paradigmatic shift from the focus on clinical facts as measurements of QOL to a more nuanced focus on the individual and individual's rights (Wallace et al., 2017). This study further supports the call for enhancing a QOL focus in language and communication disorders, though QOL is not scope the main of the thesis. This study's focus is practice-based, and "lived disorders" refers to activities evolving around social, everyday lives of individuals with language and communication disorders (Klemmensen, 2018; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). This approach links to the QOL macro-framing, where social opportunities, participation, finding meaning in, and enjoyment of social and cultural activities are evaluated. The rights of people with impairments are relevant as they form part of the assessment of everyday participation capabilities (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015). The QOL approach is, therefore, to be considered secondary, a "macro-framing" of this study's approach (paragraph adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 70–72).

Traditionally, one of the overall features of scientific understanding of language and communication disorders has been inherently underscoring language as the object of study. The measurable assessment of correct and incorrect linguistic performance has long been the order of the day in clinical tests (Nielsen et al., 2019). However, all linguistic performance may not be measurable — or even captured — by linguistic assessment tests. In the eyes of critics, language — as the bearer of meaning — has been given excessive attention (Barad, 2003, p. 802; Harris, 1998). Researchers of approaches that favors empirical scrutiny have raised strong critiques of the cognitive language model, which EMCA studies have refuted, demonstrating discrepancies between clinical results of individuals who have impairment and results acquired from

social interaction studies (Clinical linguistics and phonetics, 2016; Dickerson et al., 2005; Leudar & Costall, 2011; Rasmussen, 2013).

This study focuses specifically on two aspects of language and communication disorders: (a) the status of an individual who has impairments in dialogues and (b) the impact of manifest misalignments in interaction between this individual who has a diagnosis of language and communication disorders and their peer professionals who do not have diagnoses of language and communication disorders. These are two main themes forming the red thread in the analytical part of this thesis (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). It is important to study the problems of individuals with language and communication disorders in interaction in order to protect the rights of persons who have impairments in function and disability, as outlined in ICF (WHO, 2001, 2013) and underpinning QOL guidelines (WHO, 2016). However, as discussed in Chapter 1.5 of this thesis and in Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019, p. 1), “ICF lacks the importance of local interplay of participation,” since the purpose of it to give guidelines professional practitioners on assessment of the body that has impairments and the individual who has impairments (function and disability) in society (participation in life situations) but not in communication. So, there is an inert gap between overall ICF intentions and the possibility of society to protect of individuals who have impairments in everyday practice by using the ICF (Rasmussen, 2016). My hope is to shed new light on what goes on the everyday practice, idealized in policy texts, through empirical scrutiny. Based on the findings in the analyses, I suggest possible steps towards improving the protection of rights of individuals who have impairments (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019).

The study of the consequences of language and communication disorders in everyday practices is often grounded in the management of communication and participation (abilities). Notwithstanding the focus on participation as individual ability to participate in life situations, the aspects of function and disability in social interaction is criticized for being overlooked (Krummheuer et al., 2016, p. 722). For the individual who has impairments, the consequences of local processes are crucial to the lived experience of disability (Robillard, 1999).

Studies show that the management of communication with individuals with language and communication disorders is marked by interactional misalignment (Andersen et al., 2018; Heinemann, 2009), and that misalignment can lead to trouble-talk in local encounters — emerging from how it is formulated, received and responded to (Goodwin, 1983; Jefferson, 1988; Kupferberg & Green, 2005; Schegloff et al., 1977). Furthermore, trouble-talk has a tendency to result in the exclusion of individuals with language and communication impairment (Andersen et al., 2018; Heinemann, 2009; Klemmensen, 2018; Rasmussen, 2013). Crucially, it is shown that

social exclusion is a result of interaction: a disabling process of communication. This is done by analyzing the social categorization of individuals with disability using EMCA tools.

In encounters between health professionals and individuals who have impairments, power relations are given from an asymmetrical point of departure. Notwithstanding good intentions, individuals who have impairments are, therefore, likely to be underestimated and excluded from participating in encounters of social interaction on equal terms (Klemmensen, 2018; Rasmussen, 2013). This adheres partially to the disabling process results that health workers are responsible for in their response management (Andersen et al., 2018; Klemmensen, 2020; Rasmussen, 2013). Because of this given asymmetry, I carefully term individuals with language and communication disorders as “individuals who have impairments,” — not as “impaired,” not as just “citizens,” nor as “patients” — underpinning a person-centered approach to QOL (WHO, 2016). The term “citizens” also includes individuals who have disabilities, as the aim of citizenship is to highlight members of society as fully fledged members, rather than as “patients” or “lesser beings.” In encounters between professional practitioners and individuals who have severe impairments, the category of “citizen” becomes intriguing, for example, considering persons who have severe brain injury and have legal guardians, or individuals with impairments who do not have national citizenship in the situated context where they are in need of care, such as immigrants.

Appreciative terming is managed in this thesis by stating that this is a (whole) person who also happens to have impairments. As this thesis emphasizes person-centeredness, it is in alignment with the WHO’s recommendations for conceptualizing healthcare terms in the most non-excluding way (WHO, 2016), centering on the individual by avoiding medicalizing terms for categorizing individuals as “patient” or “client” altogether. Notwithstanding the difference in choice of terming, both a person-centered and a patient-centered perspective are located in a humanities-based paradigm. This means that agreements are focused on conviction and integrity underpinning other-orientation and the voice of the case-subject’s lifeworld (cf. Sarangi, 2007b, p. 48). The research thus targets the analysis of the communication with an agenda of uncovering the primacy of experience of the individual who has impairments through their talk and activity, and not the professionals’ experience of it, but the professionals’ perception of and response to their talk and activity.

Encounters in rehabilitation due to ABI are reported experienced as negative, following the national survey (Sundhedsstyrelsen, 2017) discussed in Chapter 1.5.1 of this thesis, leaving the individual who has impairments with a feeling of being left out, not merely because of the language impairment following a stroke, but also in

encounters with professionals. An almost inert misalignment between individuals who have impairments and individuals who do not have impairments is reproduced in encounters following the description of Robillard (1996, 1999) and many accounts from individuals with communicational atypicality (Grandin, 2006, 2008; Leudar & Costall, 2011; Tammet, 2006). Drawing on Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, integrationism offers an alternative conceptualization of linguistic and communicative identity that problematizes any linguistic assumptions or methods predicated on norms or typicality/atypicality of linguistic communication. Hence, with an integrational conceptualization of linguistic and communicative identity, this study introduces a demythologized view of communication as it unfolds, regardless of the formatting (atypicality). The question of communicational formatting demonstrated to be a potential divergent point between integrationism and EMCA.

By implementing an integrational linguistic perspective, the concepts of language and communication are demythologized at a philosophical level. Individuals communicating are engaged in this world in complex ways. On this ground, language and communication (disorders) could be revisited as phenomena. As discussed in Chapter 4, this study's methodology is a diffractive strategy of combining an integrational linguistic approach to language and communication underpinning its practice theoretical aspects, including the methodology of EMCA. The ontological similarities and incompatibilities of this combination have been discussed. In the analytical part, however, the discussion of compatibility and divergence continues to identify further potential points of contact and departure, since these cannot be located in theoretical and methodological assumptions alone. As discussed further in Chapter 5, despite the presence of ontological divergences, in order to operate on an interdisciplinary ground, the transcript practice, the presuppositions and the methodology of EMCA are integrated complementarily in the analytical framework since they afford data retrieval and enrich the analysis and its discussions instrumentally. Importantly, lay strategies for obtaining knowledge on communication and language are contrasted with expert linguists' strategies.

The recent practice turn (Reckwitz, 2002) has focus on everyday emergent practices. A theoretical lens emphasizes the emergent nature of everyday, organizational social life and routines in which meanings, bodies, minds, things, knowledge, discourses, structures, agency, identities and other entities or processes are accomplished and momentarily fixed. Academically, the practice turn gains terrain because it is so useful. Practices can be mapped and described in order to assess, improve, or change practice procedures (Clarke, 2005; Nicolini, 2012; Scollon & Scollon, 2004). The practices practiced are what define the practice approach as well as integrationism and EMCA. Only the ontology of language and communication differs, which will be demonstrated in the analytical part. Scollon and Scollon offer a



unique tool to grasp the object of practice studies independent of whichever area is studied in the various fields within practice studies. The first step in their approach (nexus analysis) introduces a frame and methodology to navigate, identify and map practices (Scollon & Scollon, 2001, 2004, 2007). Placing the study far from a traditional applied linguistics, the adopted approach differs uniquely from the objects studied in traditional linguistics and interaction studies in the tradition of ethnomethodology — which deals with language, such as talk and utterances, and which apply and operate analytical concepts, such as local context.

As discussed throughout Chapter 3, the conceptualization of an analytical perspective drawing on the integrational linguistic concept of contextualization differs from traditional conceptualizations of context. As discussed in Chapter 2.1, traditionally, the functions of language were studied within ethnography. Context was regarded a result of ethnographic fieldwork's practice-based, and thus embedded, understanding of a community's rituals and habits (Malinowski, 1923). This was further elaborated as a co-situated concept in Jakobson's communication model (1987). Later, context was explored as extra-situational, providing understanding of what went on in the situation (Cicourel, 1992), as part of a "communicative technology" (cf. D'hondt et al., 2009, p. 6). This notion was further elaborated as "contextualization" by Gumperz, regarded as a socially-oriented concept that included linguistic notions of inference and cues (Gumperz, 1982). Notably, Gumperz's notion is different from the integrational notion of contextualization. In the integrational linguistic conception, contextualization is unique because the individual is conceptualized as individual within the social, but not as socially situated contextually: " (...) even though two people are co-present in the same spatiotemporally conditioned situation, they are not, strictly speaking, 'co-situated'. They do not experience the same by being in the same situation together (...) . Each of us contextualizes individually" (Duncker, 2018, p. 15).

The observations made in this thesis' video ethnographic component show that, recurrently, divergent discourses of language and communication disorders compete in interaction (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015). Matters concerning the management of dialogues and communication with individuals who have language and communication disorders are complex ones, regardless of the settings. Joint activities of social inclusion/exclusion are coordinated by multiparty actors of various categories and roles in interaction, in a traditional EMCA perspective. However, when diffracted with an integrational notion of contextualization and person-centeredness, a deeper analysis of what goes on is reached, because the person's perspective is more in focus, foregrounding their (observable) experiences and resulting in a less pathological social perspective.

## 5.2 A new lifeworld approach to ABI

This study is directed towards questions about understanding the lifeworld (Goodwin, 2000, p. 1508), of persons with physiological and cognitive damages, and the affective challenges that everyday life offers. This pre-introduction to the analysis offers a theoretically-founded, preliminary, analytical establishment of an integrational EMCA participant perspective. The uniquely person-centered approach that underpins traditional language psychology lays the theoretical base of this analysis, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. At the outset, the notion of participants' lifeworld constituted by EMCA and by integrational linguistics, simply, is not the same due to the integrational linguistic distinction of first- and second-order phenomena (Duncker, 2018; Harris, unpublished; Hutton, 2017; Love, 1990; Taylor, 1992). Since the person-centered view of language and communication is central to Harris' semiotics (1996, 1998), then persons cannot be isolated from their language. Since persons are the ones who undertake the enterprise of contextualizing, this invites a new analytical approach to the study of situated meaning-making. This new approach adds to current explorations of language and communication disorders caused by ABI.

The notion of lifeworld turns the spotlight towards the individual in my conceptualization. An experiential awareness is advocated by the WHO's conceptual framework for the ICF model (WHO, 2001, 2020). There is a call, however, both in professional and everyday discourse, to enhance the understanding of the situation of the individual and their story (Charon, 2001; Glinborg, 2015; Grandin, 2006, 2008; Leudar & Costall, 2011). Individuals who have brain injury have proved difficult for others to understand, and this condition is challenging for the individuals, their family and lay persons in general (Glinborg, 2015; Goodwin, 2003; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski, 2013; Wilkinson, 2011).

As mainstream theories and research on brain injury primarily focus on psychological and neurological issues of the brain itself, there is a lack of scientific knowledge of the social/communicative/interactional impact of impairments. Investigating dialogical intersubjectivity by enhancing the individual's experience of interaction and meaning-making is necessary (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). Individuals who have brain injury have limited abilities one way or another, challenging their participation in bodily and verbal communication when these abilities may be restricted or damaged. This communicative prerequisite may affect interaction with professional practitioners and researchers in the field (Raudaskoski, 2013). Accordingly, individuals who have brain injury may seem unaccountable as meaning-makers and, therefore, they are likely to be excluded from societal everyday life (Andersen et al., 2018; Rasmussen, 2013).

In approaching the question of lifeworld, I elaborate on Merleau-Ponty's wholeness of experience, discussed in Chapter 3.2. In my trying to grip the experiential perspective, observationally, of an individual who has severe physical and cognitive impairments due to ABI, I draw on Goode's (1994b) ethnomethodological approach to understanding the world and others. In line with Goode, I direct my analytical attention primarily towards one single individual (cf. Goode, 1994b, p. 100). As discussed by Goode, each individual exhibits a specific configuration of perceptual and cognitive skills and deficiencies; the uniqueness of a one-person focus affords proximity with that person, even if this person is very different from me, so this also applies to individuals with impairments. On the characterization of individuals with impairments, Goode notes two other important things. First, elaborating further on the uniqueness, Goode emphasizes that each is "smart in their own way" (Goode, 1994b, p. 16). Second, drawing on Merleau-Ponty, notes that, since we are in the world together and share it, individuals with impairments — even though they present a different human manifestation due to altered biomechanical prerequisites (physical and cognitive impairments) which makes them differ from ordinary bodies in function — still share the world (Goode, 1994b, p. 102). Importantly, individuals who have impairments have "a possible world" (Björne, 2007), and it is this *world* that I seek to approach, using video ethnography and participant observation, not just the logistics of interactions.

The communicative world described is a world previously unknown and inaccessible to Goode, a world without the resources of words. Goode emphasizes that communication is informed by bodily forms of expressivity and intersubjectivity in cases of severe brain injury with formal language disability. In the absence of words, communication is foregrounded (Goode, 1994b):

Within the lifeworld, understanding or intersubjectivity is inclusive of communication; that is communication is one kind of intersubjectivity between people. Communication is inclusive of language, language being one form of communication. Understanding the world begins without the resources of language and is strongly influenced by uniquely bodily forms of expressivity and communication. These forms of communication are anterior to, and the grounds from which, language emerges for most of us (p. 99).

From two different cases (one case from an institutional setting and the other from a home setting, both derived from observation), Goode describes the lifeworld of two young individuals who have serious physical and cognitive impairments. Through Goode's attempt at understanding their perspective, an experiential perspective following classical principles of ethnomethodology is framed. Using video recorded

material and field notes, Goode considers the practical outcomes of practices and “motility,” a concept referred to a number of times (Goode, 1994b, p. 100). The concept of *motility* covers both mobility and the display of understanding, since Goode notes that, instead of asking whether understanding occurs (intersubjectively), ask how it is possible to fail understanding, sharing a world together (Goode, 1994b, p. 102).

My attempt is to investigate practices of inclusion and exclusion focusing on *how-ability* (Raudaskoski, 2013, 2020) while probing the integrational linguistic person-centered concept of contextualization in an analysis. In line with a critical social ontology in disability studies, the notion of how-ability centers on the communicative abilities of individuals who have impairments (Hughes, 2007; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019).

### 5.3 Inclusion/exclusion and participation

The social interaction qualities assessed and characterized in the standards of the ICF center on the enhancement of possibilities of individuals with impairments to participate in social life. In conjunction, social inclusion is secured through the implementation the ICF standards. The ICF is closely interrelated with the assessment of individuals’ QOL. In Denmark, these standards are included at the political level, for instance, in local governments’ policies. In this study, inclusion/exclusion are regarded as intricately linked to the notion of participation and the individual’s ability to participate. Straightforwardly, the possibility or impossibility to participate in situations is crucial for individuals to perceive themselves as included.

*Participation* “refers to actions demonstrating forms of involvement performed by parties within evolving structures of talk” (Goodwin & Goodwin, 2004, p. 222). Goodwin (1979, 1995) drew attention to the significance of investigating interaction as relational, demonstrating how it is being shaped by the other participants, also during contribution from a participant, whether the participant has impairments or not. Inclusion and exclusion are inseparable and binary concepts in a practiced perspective. The practiced complexity of social inclusion and social exclusion targeting participation and participants’ practices involving impairments can be investigated as entanglements in an extended analysis that includes bodies and materiality, multimodality and the connection between activities over time as demonstrated by Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019).

Furthermore, the diffraction of theories and methodologies resulting in a close investigation of ontological aspects of language and communication disorders is inevitable but necessary to advance the study of the complexity of inclusion/exclusion. There exists no unfolded program of how to approach subtle

influences of past and present in the complexity of emergent social practice (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019, p. 4). In many ways, a profound interest in investigating the ontology and epistemology of language and communication (disorders) has been guiding for the present research process. In sum, this study investigates the boundaries of an integrational, first-person analytical perspective derived from principles of integrationism underpinning accounts of the lived experience of ABI, and by analyzing data derived from an observational study with a combination of integrationism and EMCA. In my relating an applied version of integrational concepts to the study of language and communication disorders, core concepts from integrational linguistics are discussed; a range of other integrational concepts proved less applicable, thus categorized as peripheral and have been left out. Notwithstanding the choice of selection and deselection of concepts, the discussion of integrational concepts is recurring in the discussion of all parts of this study.

#### 5.4 Study focus

At the time of recording (2012), almost exclusively all theories and research on brain injury focused on psychological and neurological issues of the brain itself. There was relatively little research-based understanding of the social, communicative, and interactional consequences of brain injury for everyday life, even if there was some research into the possibilities of self-presentation (cf. Hydén & Antelius, 2011). This study refocuses on the psychosocial consequences in interaction for the individual, scrutinizing the social consequences of their impairment. This small change of focus aligns the analysis with the ICF model's QOL conceptualization of inclusion practices as it focuses on the individual's experience with language disorders. The local ecology of the situation entails the circumstantial factors in configuration with biomechanical and macrosocial factors governing the way in which the communication unfolds when using a person-centered approach to the data. Starting from a person-centered approach, a phenomenological stance is taken. Contrastingly, studies in atypical interaction describe and analyze language disorders and disability starting from the social constitution of the impairment rather than the individual experience of it. Possibly, findings derived with other abled-focused perspectives result in divergent conclusions. However, this person-centered approach singles out the contextualized praxeological configuration of one person.

In the project, we chose to follow what went on at the everyday level of lived practice to search for indicators of which practices were inclusive and which practices led to exclusion from participation. For this reason, the residents were followed in

their everyday (institutional) environment. We had open-ended access to define the research through an institutional collaboration and were not commissioned by the board of the care center. However, we discussed the initial ideas with the pedagogical leader and their manager, and held a workshop at the center to share the ideas and observations during the pilot phase; here, staff, residents and administration were invited and a number of researchers partook (cf. Nielsen, 2015). We reviewed parts of the material with the occupational therapists and the participant residents during the pilot. We followed the general research ethical protocols from EMCA, acquiring undersigned consent forms from all the participants or their legal guardians (in case of severe brain injury), and the participants were informed that they can at any stage revoke their permission to use the data. The form made it possible to give a detailed permission to use the anonymized data in research and teaching with reference to the initial project. As the researchers were participating in the occupational therapy situations as interested parties, instead of trying to be undisturbing observants, they were moving about freely in the same way as the other participants were. Nothing was done to hide that research took place. In other words, objectivity was regarded as closeness, not as distance (Clarke, 2005). This is why the researchers always are co-participants in the situations analyzed below.

#### 5.4.1 Trajectories of inclusion and exclusion

This study maps trajectories of inclusion and exclusion in specific participatory practices involving a focus on one specific case participant. Participatory practices were observed, analyzed, and assessed as an embedded matter of social interaction. Practices were conceptualized in a participant perspective (Nielsen, 2015, p. 261). The analysis follows specific circumstantial traits and patterns in order to account for and discuss their consequences.

This study demonstrates traceable communicative routines. The excerpts have common themes in infrastructure, either verbally or communicatively. To construct situational frames, vocabulary from praxeological studies, as well as integrational terms, are applied to demonstrate how the case participant is constructed and deconstructed as abled versus disabled. This is done to describe local practices of inclusion versus exclusion and cultural discrepancies.

#### 5.4.2 Communicative patterns of inclusion and exclusion

I sought to approach and grasp the relational connections between this individual and others in specific settings and to analyze these entanglements. The project focused on

the communicative patterns of inclusion and exclusion, especially on how the expected and actual troubles are oriented to and were attempted to be solved. The traceability of such complex “trajectories” (Nicolini, 2012; Scollon & Scollon, 2004) recurring in and across situations was a focus in this investigation.

- What kind of answers may be sought in the complex configuration of trajectories?
- How is it possible to account for such complexity, and for the consequences of entangled complexity?

To answer these questions, traceability has been foregrounded in the organization of the dataset. The practice framing of the analysis leads towards the idea of situational analysis (Clarke, 2005), which takes its point of departure in complexity and various entanglements of practices practiced in a specific setting with specified participants. Situational analysis is not applied explicitly in this account but serves as an associated founding idea.

The local ecology of the situation entails the circumstantial factors in configuration with biomechanical and macrosocial factors governing the way in which the communication unfolds when using a person-centered approach to the data. Starting from a person-centered approach, a phenomenological stance is taken. Contrastingly, studies in atypical interaction describe and analyze language disorders and disability starting from the social constitution of the impairment rather than the individual experience of it. Possibly, findings derived with other abled-focused perspectives result in divergent conclusions. However, this person-centered approach singles out the contextualized praxeological configuration of one person (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 101–102).

## 5.5 Principles of personhood and human rights

In assessing how individuals with impairments are defined, the consequences of practices necessarily have been scrutinized. Questions of ethics of social practices rely on the conceptualization of an analytical person’s social rights perspective in alignment with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ([CRPD] UN, 2006) foregrounding that:

It takes to a new height the movement from viewing persons with disabilities as “objects” of charity, medical treatment and social protection towards viewing persons with disabilities as “subjects” with rights, who are capable of claiming those rights and making decisions for their lives based on their free

and informed consent as well as being active members of society (...) The Convention is intended as a human rights instrument with an explicit, social development dimension. It adopts a broad categorization of persons with disabilities and reaffirms that all persons with all types of disabilities must enjoy all human rights and fundamental freedoms (UN, 2020).

In Nielsen (2015), the human rights perspective is conceptualized with reference to another source that is in agreement with the CRPD, namely, the philosophy of Zinkernagel (1992), who coined a set of logic relations which apply to all descriptions of situations involving human participants. The logic relation between language-situation-person's rights is crucial to individuals with impairments because it foregrounds political rights that apply to all humans regardless of their social status. In Nielsen (2015), the rights perspective is applied to investigate the standards recommended by the WHO for individuals with impairments, the ICF. The analysis benefits from this approach and insights from Danish philosopher Zinkernagel. Purposefully, Zinkernagel's logic relations scaffold adequate coherency in the scientific description of participants, afforded by a set of logic relations uncovered between "things that cannot be denied" (Perregaard, 2016; Prætorius, 2000, p. 36; Ruus, 1995, p. 4; Zinkernagel, 1992, p. 135). I draw on the idea of Zinkernagel's logic relations in this study's conceptualization of a participant's perspective, primarily the logic relations uncovered between body-person and between person-situation (Zinkernagel, 1992, p. 135), since they presuppose the constitution of a human right for every person to describe themselves as themselves, ratifying persons' first-order experiences (Prætorius, 2000, 2010; Zinkernagel, 1992).

In my dataset, the participant redundantly insists on ratifying their perspective in several of the excerpts, including through persistent participation. However, they discard themselves from participating after the therapists' elaborative orientation towards them as non-ratified participant; not responding to their first-order perspective reports as means for continuing social participation. This analysis is reinforced by excerpts from the recordings.

An anecdotal report of my researcher experience of similar claims would provide less transparency and, thus, impact less since it would demonstrate more subjectivity. However, my field notes and video data support the observation that the individual persistently tries to participate while being recurrently discarded for relevancy-inappropriate contributions. In sum, the logic relations of language-situation-persons' rights are crucial for assessing the status of individuals who have impairments in interaction, because they foreground the accentuation of persons' rights (Zinkernagel, 1992, p. 135) that apply to all humans regardless of their social status and physical and cognitive ability (this paragraph is adapted from Nielsen, 2015, pp. 273–274).



### 5.5.1 Accounts of lived experience with disability and language and communication disorders

In the beginning of the research phase, I turned to written accounts of severe disability to gain insight into the lived experience of disability conditions. Initially, the examination of written accounts began within a different area of study. The study began with language and communication disorders in the area of autism and was directed more towards language and communication disorders in ABI further along in the process. Therefore, reading first-person testimonials began with accounts from Tammet (2006) and Grandin (2006, 2008), both diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome (autism spectrum disease).<sup>xxii</sup> Both Tammet and Grandin tell about prevention from participation due to their alternative perception of rules in social encounters. During the initial period of investigation, the acquaintance with Costall and Leudar's anthology *Against Theory of Mind* (2011) marked a turn in the project development. A growing academic challenging of clinical methodology as being the proper scientific conceptualization and approach to the study of language and communication disorders frames this approach (Leudar & Costall, 2011).<sup>xxiii</sup> Similar development in aphasia research refuted the clinical approach by conducting observational studies in the relational tradition after the Goodwins (1979, 1995, 2003b, 2017).

#### 5.5.1 The case of Robillard — a social order account

Robillard's testimonial (1996, 1999), which I elaborate further on in the following, demonstrates reflection on a first-person perspective versus a strictly empirical EMCA perspective. The example of Robillard reviewed in the introduction of this thesis opened my eyes to a methodological issue: how to grasp the participants' perspective empirically without losing sight of their experience. Certainly, Robillard accounts for a discrepancy between observation and understanding the experiential aspect, the lived aspect, and the phenomenology of lived impairment. As introduced, Robillard's participation depended on the care team's understanding of his wishes, desires, and needs. As already highlighted, he reported a great deal of anger due to the limited ability to participate in social encounters.

Robillard's description of social life from an insider perspective centers on their prevention from participation with bodily and vocal impairments; it emphasizes injustice and social exclusion as consequences for the individual, who is prevented by their own body to fulfill sequential expectations. Robillard reports that their condition not only prevents them from participating and accomplishing desired actions. In a series of examples, Robillard closely describes how they are unable to participate in social interaction in a normative way, which leads to their exclusion from it, and to fulfill expectations. Simply, Robillard claims to be systematically excluded by well-meaning (neurotypical) co-participants, even his wife and everyone in the care team in everyday life, because of the disability condition. Exclusions include prevention from participating in everyday conversation and deciding about the handling of their own body in everyday routines of moving around with the carers.

Noticeably, this account builds on the expectation of normative moves to be performed by Robillard or others orienting to him, expectedly in normative manners. However, social order, Robillard notes, breaks down all the time. As demonstrated, the roots of his anger — recurrent experiences of disruption performed either by carers or trusted individuals — constitute an invaluable insight into the lived experience of language and communication disorders and disability.

Seemingly, Robillard's expectations and knowledge of symmetrical systems causes him trouble and anger, primarily, as he remembers his participation ability prior to the history of disease. Rather, Robillard disproves a pre-given symmetry in communication, an intersubjectivity: If the order existed, why would the interlocutors not orient to the individual as prevented from responding to it? With this notion, Robillard questions how concrete, then, is the supposed order by ethnomethodology, really?

## 5.6 An idiographic single-case study

This idiographic analysis centers on the social conditions of one individual with Phase 4 status. The data excerpts are from an individual at this permanent care facility, a male in his 40s with ABI after trauma 20 years prior. Clinically, this individual has aphasia, sensory disturbances in one side of the body, partial paralysis, and experiences spasticity; in consequence, a wheelchair is needed to move around. Cognitively, the individual has memory deficiency and is considered cognitively challenged. Apart from these clinical details, the identity and the place lived are protected and anonymized. Hereafter, this individual is referred to as “Søren” for acquaintance purposes. Informed consent was given and restated for this study, including consent from legal guardians.

In the analysis, we follow how Søren skillfully fits his critical participation in the ongoing interaction and how he builds engagement on previous contributions during meetings. We follow Søren over the course through excerpts that illustrate his habitual *modus operandi* or social behavior with the care personal and social encounters (Klemmensen, 2018; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). In line with Hughes (2007), the focus is on the residents’ social abilities, rather than on their physical or cognitive disabilities (cf. Raudaskoski, 2013).

No restrictions were placed on the participation in this study. In the analysis, a collection of the case participant’s contributions and responses in social settings are traced in video recordings, forming a trajectory of incidents. Two examples serve as the core data (this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 100–101).

### 5.6.1 Video recording and technology

I based the investigation primarily on the video data. The aim was to investigate how multimodal video analysis of longer stretches of interaction (Goodwin, 2013, 2018) could be done with a shared EMCA and applied integrational linguistics perspective empirically and evaluate the impact of such twofold contribution theoretically. Furthermore, I wanted to discuss the new perspective and its (singular) analytical efficiency (a new participant’s analytical perspective; cf. Klemmensen, 2018).

Video recordings were made with bi-weekly intervals over the first three months and followed up by several visits where the site and participants were investigated further. The recordings were configurations from several cameras (i.e., still, wearable, GoPro, and steady cameras), which produced multiangle recordings. GoPro cameras were attached to the researchers’ chests or heads, and the still cameras, steady-cams

and GoPro cameras were distributed in the room to access a variety of angles. GoPro cameras form the transcripts presented as data references in this analysis.

### 5.6.2 Initial data elaboration

This analysis draws on my archive of clip collections accumulated in the video ethnographic program Transana. This software serves to manage data and for initiating the horizontal video analysis (Demuth, 2018, p.5). Transana is embedded with tools for organizing recordings in libraries. Automatically, the marking of the material included is listed by recording date, if applied in the original file management as it was in the case of our data collection (cf. temporality). Clip tools are used for coding the material. Quick Clips and Standard Clips are the basic analytical units which are applied to organize collections. The structure of collections serves as a qualitative methodology in the sense that keywords, snapshots, and clips can be organized in certain ways that help form a theoretical understanding of the data. Further technicalities will not be discussed in this thesis; importantly, the software helps the analyst transform raw video data into theory. I have been engaged with these specific videos since 2012.

The recordings have been elaborated by selection and coding, mainly using the tool clip collections. Several video clips were stored in an archive with thematic headlines, which organized the data and formed an analytical basis. This adds to the development of analysis as it invites the analyst to continue thematic noticing (Laurier, 2014a). The compilation of clips from the main video source give an overview of relevant themes. These are elaborated by adding notes and transcripts, which generate comparative noticing. The clips are organized under themes and by keywords and are embedded with the analyst's notes on conflicts, expression of emotion, memory, etc. As a video analytical tool, Transana enables handling large amounts of data, quick navigation and gives an extensive overview of the trajectories of content that is made available by the coding tools (this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 103).

In the process of navigating the data, for instance, collections of wishes were linked to complaints after they were scrutinized. Further on, again, these were interpreted as criticisms when analytically approached, linked to larger discursive circumferences which were at work in the situations they derived from; finally, exemplary excerpts were selected for close analysis.

Fig. 5.1. Clip collection database with Transana

Database: ●

- Libraries
  - 0609
  - 0609\_consent
  - 0609\_ringridning
  - 2009\_newspaper reading
    - Det passer ikke\_kap 8\_2015
    - Newspaper\_not true
      - Det passer ikke
    - 2809
      - Har du en abe?
      - Har du en have/abe
      - Shopping Beer
- Kollektioner
  - Ekspres udklip
  - Kritik af stedet
  - Test kollektion
  - Wishes
    - kritiserer stedet for faglig uvidenhed om hans sit
    - Det passer ikke
    - I thought it was a beer
    - It is a beer
    - Man kan godt købe påskeliljer til den tid også
    - I also thought it was a beer
    - Have/abe
    - Ringridning WELL/OH
    - Spasticitet forklaring
    - Tired unrested condition
    - Full spasticity
- Nøgleord

Primary data: Three recording days in one month focusing on Søren's interactions in institutional context (06.09, 20.09, 28.09 2012)

Example of recording embedded with initial raw transcript and ethnographic field notes

Clip collections for thematic analyses

Example of clip collection with transcripts under the theme collection "Wishes" and keywords

An initial glimpse of the data organization was rather rhizomatic, meaning that one observation lead to a new investigation until a collection of exemplary excerpts formed the final empirical material. In Fig. 12, the archive shows the initial categorization of data extracts before there was a selection of occasions chosen for close analysis. The choices made in the following process linked to the overall study frame, which arose from unmotivated looking for practices of inclusion and exclusion.

Consequently, the final selection of excerpts depended on whether an initial display of interest to participate in the dialogue resulted in interactional consequences of resignation or silence, marked by extensive pauses and topic change hereafter. Because of a rich data collection, the characterization of the participant's initiation of a wish to participate statement was easily identified as the initiation of stuttering the conversational token ("eh- eh- eh- eh-"), produced a number of times and often over several turns (see Nielsen, 2015 for an elaboration and demonstration of this).

### 5.6.3 Selection of excerpts for analysis

Importantly, as noted by Antaki et al. (2003), despite ongoing discussion within the field, discourse analysts rarely distinguish where theory starts and when method ends. I will, however, attempt to track the process from the selection of excerpts to the final production of excerpts presented in the analysis. Two examples are drawn from the data archive. The interactional consequences and the processuality of the social activities are traced in the videos and followed in new participant recordings. As a result, a collection of one case participant's contributions and responses in social settings are traced in video recordings forming a trajectory of incidents (see Appendix 4-1 for an overview of the data and an illustration of the selection of excerpts for analysis). However, the extent of elaboration of the video material and the transcripts used for analysis differ at progressive stages of the study, which can be tracked through the background publications (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). As elaborated further in the following section on video analysis, the initial stage of data elaboration (Nielsen, 2015) is simple in the sense that it is based on untainted acquaintance with the data, and analyses were based on the first raw Jefferson-inspired transcriptions made (see Appendix 5-1). The mid-stage (Klemmensen, 2018) benefits from a more detailed data investigation, a Mondada-inspired transcription practice, input from pragmatic conferences and data sessions at workshops and uses elaboration and organization of the data with the video analysis program Transana (see Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis). The final stage (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019) draws from the expert analytical experience of

my supervisor and their Goodwin-inspired transcription practice with adjustments to previous versions of the same extracts, which reveal new insights, and it benefits from additional data sessions that allow profundity in the interpretation of the data (See Appendix 5-2; this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 103–104).

#### 5.6.4 Video analyst's paradox

Video analysis is a professional practice, like other interpretive practices, which has its own logics-in-use (Sarangi, 2007a, p. 569). These excerpts, thus, represent a research process where the excerpts have been processed through the course of numerous phases. Together, the activities of detailed inspections of the material, participation in data sessions, presentations in research communities and discussions with researchers have generated my perception of the material (Laurier, 2014a). The excerpts are, thus, beyond the process of transcription and embedded with the expert's knowledge. Furthermore, my understanding is afforded by this process, which has drawn my attention to noticing distinct aspects of the working environment of the data. These are now foregrounded, whereas others are given less attention, in accordance with my research motivation and ambition.

An interdisciplinary strategy for accomplishing coherency is necessary to account for and communicate the practices at work (Nicolini, 2012, p. 213). Points both relevant and irrelevant to this final analysis have been noted during the recording and later, during research activity. Notes relevant to localizing the nexus of practice have been selected, elaborated, and used for gathering further knowledge on the investigation of the practices at work in the excerpts. Notes were taken during and after the recording episodes, added during the review of the recorded material in Transana when clips were selected and added in collections, and added during new selection phases in data sessions and after conference presentations. In format, the excerpts themselves represent a process of resemiotization (Iedema, 2003; Laurier, 2014a), since the excerpt formatting combines the recordings and the accumulated notes, transcripts, discussions, and their reformatting to make up the present data. The excerpts are, thus, embedded within a resemiotization process. Furthermore, the cycles of discourses circulating the data have been researched both during and after the initial selection of the excerpts.

The transcription of the excerpts was done by me and assessed by peer researchers. The technique for peer assessment was showing anonymized video excerpts and presenting transcribed sequences of the videos using simple Jeffersonian transcription conventions (Sacks et al., 1974, pp. 731–733). These were later supplemented with multimodal annotations authored by Goodwin (2018, pp. 19–20; Goodwin et al.,

2012), and Mondada (2014, 2016). Orthographic supplements have been added to communicate the multimodal details in a more fine-tuned way, which came to my attention as a result of the process of noticing with video analysis (see Appendix 5-3 for a list of transcription notations; Jordan & Henderson, 1995; Laurier, 2014a; this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 104–105).

### 5.6.5 Pictorial data representation

In this analysis, the video excerpts were presented by multimodal micro-transcription and by images of interactants. Visualizations were based on screenshots which had been anonymized. Finally, screenshots of the material setting were presented. Pictorial material was included to scaffold the step-by-step, visually-inspired analysis (Laurier, 2014b; Mondada, 2016), and to give the reader a sense of time and space frames. This also allowed for an analysis conducted sideways, instead of from above, and to follow the trajectories of practices (this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 105).





## 6 Analysis

This chapter is based on ideas and text from Klemmensen (2018), drawing on the reported observations and analysis, which are further substantiated. To a large extent, migrated text adapted from Chapter 6 of Klemmensen (2018, pp. 95–147) constitutes the backbone of this chapter. Supplementary ideas from Nielsen (2015) provide insight into the analysis.

### 6.1 Probing the integrational EMCA analytical perspective

In this section, integrational linguistics and EMCA are combined, underpinning practice theory in a joint framework, to afford the incorporation of an integrational perspective in an EMCA-oriented analysis. The overall aim is to add an integrational linguistics' ontological twist underpinning practice theory to the existing EMCA methodologies of processual meaning-making. As discussed throughout this thesis, integrational linguistics has little presence as an applied science; therefore, this investigation is a first step towards an analysis of language and communication disorders informed by integrational linguistics. The analysis of this chapter is presented along with video ethnographic data. Frames of practices are unfolded in order to establish a base on which to discuss their social consequences. An abductive element of the analytical strategy is given attention and scrutinized. Building upon the discussion from previous chapters, the pros and cons of combining the analytical concepts are discussed and elucidated with excerpts from the dataset.

Since very little empirical, applied, integrational linguistics tradition exists in language disorders (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2011, 2015), I call for an interdisciplinary approach to investigate human interaction as practices by shifting focus to an integrational perspective, which foregrounds emergent, inherently indeterminate multimodality. This analysis is inspired by analytical traditions in bordering fields, predominantly ethnomethodology, but with an integrational ontology. Two currents serve as the main inspirations to investigate situated inclusion and exclusion: interaction studies in aphasia and, more generally, studies of social activity and multimodality. Here, the traditions of the inspirational sources are unfolded further.

First, this analysis is inspired by interaction studies. Specifically, data-driven approaches to individuals with aphasia's participatory opportunities in interaction. Studies have focused on the co-construction of turns, on accomplishing meaning

together and on gesturing as semiotic resource (Goodwin, 2000, 2003b, 2013; Wilkinson, 2011, 2015). Analysts of aphasic discourse in interaction have developed a threefold understanding of this type of communication (Goodwin, 2003b; Legg & Penn, 2013; Perkins, 2003; Wallace et al., 2017; Wilkinson, 2011):

1. Characterize aphasia as an atypical form of interaction (cf. Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013).
2. Focus on the organization of repair in interaction (cf. Perkins, 2003).
3. Develop supportive communicative strategies for peers in interaction (cf. Wilkinson, 2011).

Second, this analysis is inspired by general studies in social activity. In recent years, this course of study has evolved. Namely, the visual turn in multimodality has moved interaction studies away from logocentrism (McIlvenny, 1995; Mondada, 2016, p. 336) and towards action. In sum, a shift of priority from talk, in traditional EMCA, to embodiment (Nevile, 2015) and materiality (Raudaskoski, 1999) marks multimodality. Cumulative CA notions on embodiment and materiality have enhanced the emphasis on the role of materiality in interaction, which has embedded this tradition with a range of new areas to study, including:

- The use of objects in social activity (Nevile et al., 2014; Raudaskoski, 1999);
- The spatiality of social activity (Goodwin, 2000; Mondada, 2014; Scollon & Scollon, 2004);
- The temporality of social activity (Middleton & Brown, 2005; Mondada, 2014); and
- The haptic organization of social activity (Cekaite, 2016; Goodwin, 2017).

These are noteworthy inspirations for this investigation. Thus, EMCA underpins multimodality: The analysis is sequentially organized, and the next-turn proof-procedure analytically accounts for the intersubjective reception of action (Mondada, 2016, p. 360; this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 95–97)

## 6.2 Resemiotization

The notion of *resemiotization*, coined by Iedema (2003), is a third analytical inspiration. It serves the investigative purpose of tracing activities and their consequences across iterative frames of social activities. Basically, Iedema's resemiotization is about "historizing meaning" (Iedema, 2003, p. 40). This affords a more fine-tuned analysis of larger frames of processuality (i.e., socio-material

meaning-making over time and across situations). Furthermore, it aids in tracing two layers of progress and the transformation of meaning:

- First, it traces the course of social action found in local talk (Iedema, 2003).
- Second, it tracks the transformation of meaning from local talks into documents, following institutional and cultural habits and their consequential generation of categories (Mehan, 1993).

For instance, it shows that Mehan’s work (1993) demonstrates how a teacher’s perception of a child’s behavior transforms into a clinical diagnosis through a process of exosomatic translations. In sum, Iedema investigates local interactions and shows how they may transform into ritualized ways of thinking and acting over time (Iedema, 2003, p. 42).

Resemiotization is based on the common linguistic idea of decoding, encoding and recoding signs, which account for the transformation of meaning. In contrast, meaning, as an integrational linguistic concept, is strictly experiential and grounded in individual contextualization (Harris, 2009a, p. 71), as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Yet, I find resemitization promising as a way to analytically trace the development of action. In this analysis, resemitization is applied within an integrational linguistic-inspired analytical approach (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 97). Hence, “From an integrationist perspective, signs take semiological priority over stories. Nevertheless, particular stories, once established, can provide contexts within which the constituent signs may be interpreted” (Harris, 2006, p. 52). So, an integrational notion of resemitization can draw on contextualization and it may be used to embed the individual’s processual meaning-making into a social context.

### 6.2.1 A broader understanding of language disorders

More generally, this study’s analytical approach contributes to a broader understanding of *lived* language disorders, such as aphasia, building upon the above inspirations. However, while EMCA, multimodality and Iedema’s resemitization focus on the scenario of social activity, this thesis draws on the integrational linguistic approach to meaning. In this approach, meaning is conceptualized as radically indeterminate, as it is centered in a person’s historical body and what one experiences in interaction, explicitly or implicitly, and, in many ways, it is aligned with practice theory (Orman, 2017; Schatzki, 2013; Scollon & Scollon, 2004, 2007). As well, EMCA researchers are interested in accomplishment of meaning, but solely through social activity: they are more interested in analyzing how people do things together

in practice, whereas the integrational approach adds a more person-centered perspective, emphasizing the triadic relation between the analyst and observed interactants' meaning-making (see Fig. 4 of Chapter 4.1). Meaning that I use EMCA tools to map interaction between observed interactants, while my analysis is embedded with the analyst's report of how persons may actually experience the interaction (cf. "reported observation," Duncker, 2018, p. 146).

In order to pay more attention to interactional consequences with aphasia and ABI in institutional life and rehabilitation, by giving a voice to the voiceless, informing clinical practice and policymaking, this analysis aims at profiling the experience of participants who have impairments. Convincingly, these incentives translate into the three steps of Scollon and Scollon's (2004) suggestion for nexus analysis. Their *Practical fieldguide* includes navigating, engaging and possibly changing practices (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, pp. 152–178). These guidelines fit my consideration that aphasia and ABI are under studied as social issues (Parr, 2008; Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 153; Wilkinson et al., 2020).

## 6.2.2 Social marginalization of atypical populations

Crucially, Parr (2008, p. 20) discusses the taboo in Western societies that is social marginalization. Investigating the social exclusion of individuals with chronic illness and disability, Parr discusses that chronic illness and disability are unappreciated by "not only social theorists, but by the state, family, colleagues, insurers (...)" (Parr, 2008, p. 21) for their indefiniteness and flux qualities. In other words, language deficiency and brain injury are difficult social themes where disabling processes demonstrate to feature in interlocutors responding to individuals who have impairments (Rasmussen, 2013). The analytical approach of EMCA to atypical interaction considers how things are accomplished jointly (Wilkinson et al., 2020). However, EMCA insufficiently covers how things are experienced by the participants who have impairments who could then be said to be further *marginalized analytically* (Glintborg & Birkemose, 2018). The desired outcome from this study is to emphasize these themes explicitly by expanding the EMCA analytical approach and by engaging in relevant discussions on the topic of social marginalization through adding an experiential perspective to the EMCA perspective. Together with a line of other researchers, I aim at informing QOL studies (Saldert et al., 2015; Wallace et al., 2017). Introducing an integrational person-centered perspective with suggestions for practitioners of how to understand inclusion/exclusion in interaction alternatively through an altered ontology of language and communication, I suggest how to minimize social exclusion through a novel open-mindedness derived from the analysis (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 98–99).

### 6.3 Theorizing human action

The exploration of practices at different levels is characterized by shifting theoretical lenses (Nicolini, 2009, p. 1391). Basically, this maneuver of changing the analytical perspective with the acts of zooming in and out allows the analyst to consider complementary sides of phenomena. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the integrational linguistic perspective addresses the three integrational factors that govern all communication (Harris, 1998, p. 29): the biomechanical, the macrosocial and the circumstantial factors are considered entangled. This entanglement perspective invites the opportunity to explore analysis at different levels.

In this view, a person-centered perspective is conceptualized as the entanglement of individual, social, and situational configurations: physiology; materiality; psychology; human action; linguistic actions; extra-linguistic actions; and multimodality, combined, frame this interaction analysis. Relevant local displays or ecological details may be foregrounded, or they may be considered part of a wider circumference linked to the broader conception of an action invoked in local encounters (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 171), depending on what is being done and oriented to circumstantially.

In similar fashion, Goodwin conceptualizes a broad concept of human action as constituted by the ability to work co-operatively (Goodwin, 2018, p. 3). Human action is considered a product of cultural practice. Significantly, humans act together by interacting, literally building upon one another's actions. This co-working-in-action functions by the decomposition and reuse of materials, whether semiotic or physical materials, which accumulate and constitute the exchange of knowledge that is produced when humans act together. Goodwin applies the notion of lamination to grasp "the different kinds of structure that participants draw upon to build action in concert with each other" (2013, p. 12).

In short, practices are regarded co-constituted through the process of social activity, where we constantly "inhabit each other's actions" (Goodwin, 2013, p. 8; 2018, p. 11). In this view, moral and social responsibility are topicalized in human cooperative action, emphasizing the cooperative aspect of social action (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 99–100).

In contrast, in Harris' terms, the individuality of linguistic experience has priority (Harris, 1998, p. 125), also in considering joint-activity and reciprocity:

Communication between two people is always a form of reciprocal adjustment. (...) Sometimes it may be satisfactory to both parties.

Sometimes it may be satisfactory to one but not the other. Sometimes it may be satisfactory to neither. There are no guarantees in advance. It is this open-endedness that integrationists recognize as a fundamental property of the communication process (Harris, 1998, p. 145).

The analyst, then, cannot consider interaction a cooperative activity as such. Rather, the analyst tries to “recover” how communication was experienced from the participants, because they each possess it individually. However, the access to the participants’ experiences can be found in explicit public mutual monitoring, since:

‘What was said’ and ‘what was meant’ are variables constantly subject to monitoring by the participants themselves. (...) The signs that occur in first-order communication are those that the participants construe as occurring, and what is signified is what the participants construe as having been signified. (...) They have no other basis for establishing these facts than their own communicational proficiency — that is to say their own experience in whatever forms of integration are involved (Harris, 1998, p. 145).

This means that the integrational analysis considers interactions from an individualist perspective rather than a jointly constructed one, since “satisfying” the immediate needs of individual participants are not necessarily considered “fulfilled.” Fundamentally, this gives priority to the integrational analysis in considering the communication process open-ended as prerequisite, and “sometimes” less cooperative than in Goodwin’s conceptualization (Harris, 1998, p. 145).

#### 6.4 Analyzing practices and their consequences

The manifest complexity of open-ended practices is investigated through video analysis (Jordan & Henderson, 1995, p. 79). The iterative stream of actions being co-elaborated demonstrate a therapeutic idea of the properties of human social proficiency, while the individualist stance of integrationism considers mutuality an open-ended, iterative process of adjustment. This analysis contributes to the understanding of the social consequences of aphasia and ABI, with a significant account for an individual’s integrational proficiency by singling out their perspective.

First, the video ethnographic study is introduced. Then, a macrosocial discourse analysis zooms out (Nicolini, 2009), integrating discourse orders and organizational discursivity before the situated analysis. Next, situated actions in local interaction are

investigated by zooming in (Nicolini, 2009) to capture phenomena emerging from the flow of situated indeterminacy, contrasted with the provisional accomplishment of determinacy in social interaction. In this analytical probing, this processuality is investigated as entangled rather than as counter positions.

#### 6.4.1 Video ethnographic study

A series of encounters involving the case resident, occupational therapists and participant researchers were recorded with video recording (30 hours) and fieldwork over a period of one year in 2012–2013. This analysis focuses on three recording days in the beginning of the project period (see Appendix 4-1). Probing the combination of the integrational linguistic concept of contextualization with EMCA's sequential analysis, this analysis targets trouble-talk: how the case participant's "atypical" participation is perceived as trouble-talk; and how it is formulated, received and responded to (Goodwin, 1983; Jefferson, 1988; Kupferberg & Green, 2005; Schegloff et al., 1977). With reference to trouble-talk in encounters between the case resident and occupational therapists, the trouble spots can be identified when the case resident takes atypical initiatives and/or addresses criticisms, which may be heard by the occupational therapist as complaints about institutional life (Heinemann, 2009). Such perceived initiatives and/or criticisms are responded to by the occupational therapists from their gatekeeping position.<sup>xxiv</sup> In drawing attention to instances of manifest misalignments in the data, practices of inclusion/exclusion are seen as emergent in the interaction itself, which can have further institutional ramifications (adapted from Klemmensen, 2020). However, first, a few notes on the organization of the analysis and a brief introduction to the routine of institutional life.



#### 6.4.2 Zooming out: becoming a patient with aphasia and ABI

The outline for a person-centered approach underpins practice studies taking its point of departure in the methodological practice-oriented framing of zooming in and zooming out (Nicolini, 2009). The zooming in part combines the approaches of integrational linguistics and EMCA methodologically. Zooming in traces significant trajectories across excerpts from the dataset, whereas zooming out describes larger frames of practices contextualizing the broader video ethnographic materials.

In order to consider the importance of social consequences of aphasia and ABI, social framing tools from nexus analysis were introduced. A fine-tuned analysis of the local constructions of aphasia and ABI recurring in the data involves the inclusion of wider circumferences of action, timescales and cycles of discourse in order to locate the nexus of practice (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, pp. 148–154; 2007, p. 615). Therefore, this idiographic analysis used large-scale zooming out. Zooming out means “trailing practices and their connections” (Nicolini, 2012, p. 228). In this study, zooming out was applied in three movements conceptualizing:

1. The typical process of becoming a resident in a permanent care home;
2. The study site and significant aspects of its ecology; and
3. The inclusion policies of this place.

To follow connections, the zooming out starts at the point of acquiring a stroke or a trauma. Then, the process towards becoming categorized as Phase 4 at a residential care facility is described. Circumferencing medical history and discourses at the site of engagement gives meaning to the investigation of particular actions (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 171). Furthermore, significant circumferences serve as analytical resources to assess a case participant’s integrational proficiency. Therefore, several theoretical lenses were applied in this analysis (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 105–106).

#### 6.4.3 First circumference: becoming a resident at a permanent care home

Ending medical treatment without full recovery and becoming an individual with ABI in Phase 4 is a result of a series of transitions from medical care to daily care (see Chapter 1.2). This was true for our case participant in the care facility.

Since rehabilitation of individuals with ABI in Denmark has been decentralized, services can vary vastly across the country. At the study site, policymaking suggests

following the inclusion paradigm where individuals are socially included regardless of their physical or cognitive impairments. Unfortunately, individuals with ABI are more than likely to be excluded from societal everyday life regardless of inclusion policies, studies demonstrate (Rasmussen, 2016, p. 849). This has proved detectable in this single-case analysis as well (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 106–107).

#### 6.4.4 Second circumference: the nexus of practice

This analytical section describes the site of the recordings. Significant details and policies of the place are taken into consideration when approaching local interactions and understanding local practices. The study site is a residential care facility for individuals who are diagnosed with moderate to severe brain injury. It offers residence for individuals with ABI in private rooms; specifically, 22 apartments for individuals with ABI in Phase 4 and two rehabilitation apartments. Several technological, pedagogical, and training facilities are available on site. Each individual is rated in three categories to determine whether they need moderate, extensive, or massive support.

A plan is developed, based on the initial rating, explicitly accommodating the need for care. Rehabilitation activities are offered as part of everyday life at the center, as well as 24-hour care and support, in accordance with the Danish Service Law §85.<sup>xxv</sup> As such, activities with social, physical, and cognitive characters are ensured by law. A daily training program is offered to maintain the acquired stabilization, and individuals frequently participate in various activities at the center.

The ecology of this setting is that its practices are enacted between care personnel, who are at work, and individuals with impairments, who are at home. This discrepancy of individuals coordinating actions at home and at work gives rise to interpretive considerations (Nielsen, 2015, p. 272). The individual's permanent occupation of the site, versus the care personnel's occupation scheduled in intervals, has led to a principled policy that prioritizes and favors the individual's rights since they are living there — their habits and individual routines have priority. This decision is part of the ecology of the place. Other important aspects are the furniture; buildings; individuals living there; care personnel; family; peers; and research teams and clinicians frequenting the place.

Additionally, the center offers music therapy and is part of a living lab collaboration with Aalborg University and University College Northern Jutland. A living lab is a cooperation between the workplace, e.g. a residential care facility, and local institutions to drive user-centered innovation in cooperation between private and public sectors. Research is carried out with the intention of improving QOL for the

staff and residents, and with the aim of generating on-site knowledge within various fields about, for instance, practices evolving around living with ABI. Finally, this care facility is enhancing healthcare technology by engaging local companies in the development of such technologies. In particular, this site is a collaboration between a real estate owner, municipality, university, and several other project partners (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 107–108).

#### 6.4.5 Third circumference: policies and inclusion

In Denmark, inclusion is a main area of interest at institutions for persons with cognitive and physical impairments. Inclusion is understood as processual, which aims at securing adequate and equal opportunity to engage in social situations regardless of impairments. This ideological approach to inclusion is in accordance with the ICF model; however, local practices of inclusion are subject to scrutiny.

Since rehabilitation has been decentralized, local governments outline a policy of inclusion practice in specialized care offers. The municipality's policy serves as pedagogical principle at the center. As a result, the board decides the required procedures to follow; however, several other procedures are predetermined by law. For instance, individual pedagogical plans must be created no later than three months after arrival in order to control the quality of the services offered at the center. This control is carried out in accordance with Service Law §141.<sup>xxvi</sup>

Generally, assessments are carried out on the standard of the services offered. However, out of the 24 individuals in the center, only one was interviewed during quality assessment around the period of the recordings. There are no details in the reports on the methods applied for interviewing individuals with aphasia and ABI.

This is critical. Research into the social inclusion of individuals categorized as Phase 4 is sparse. There are no national assessment criteria or guidelines for best practices of social inclusion of individuals with impairments: they are locally constituted. Although a national advisory board is in the process of developing such standards, for now, the assurance of inclusion is the responsibility of the local board of the ABI center.

In an organizational perspective, a good deal of decision management takes place without national guidelines. Inclusion is sought to be accomplished through local leadership, including the coordination of interests between the employed professionals and through the development of a local training program for professionals. The employees include different groups of professionals (i.e. timetable managers; cooks; cleaning personnel; health professionals; and care teams);

additionally, other groups frequently enter the center, including professional peers; relatives of individuals; press; and stakeholders.

As mentioned, several researchers, research projects, and areas of study are connected to the center through the Living Lab. Over time, many students, especially in medialogy, communication and musical therapy, have studied routines and practices at the center. Overall, the professional, pedagogical, technological, aesthetic, and physiological aspects of ABI have been observed and scrutinized in many respects and contribute to dialogues on practiced inclusion (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 108–109).

#### 6.4.6 Zooming in: the lived practice of ABI and aphasia

Slicing the case participant's life, an EMCA-inspired interaction analysis demonstrated a slice of the social practices (Nicolini, 2012, p. 218) that the case participant lived in their environment. In order to capture this perspective in an interaction analysis and formulate a person-centered approach, the personal perspective in interaction had to be accounted for. The course of the situated analysis is as follows. According to interaction analysts, trouble and repair in interaction reveal unspoken rules as they permit inquiry into other points of view (Jordan & Henderson, 1995, p. 69). Therefore, this study sought to uncover the lifeworld of the case participant by orienting to corrective practices and repair in interaction, since this was where I could locate "a form of reciprocal adjustment" (Harris, 1998, p. 145). Two critical issues of correction between the resident and the therapists in interaction were analyzed in this illustrative analysis. Modestly, this does not demonstrate a complete unfolded version of an integrational EMCA perspective, but rather a probing since this has never been attempted before. Trouble and repair issues are examined in a fine-grained description, interactional consequences are scrutinized, and the findings from an EMCA perspective are discussed first, and then comparative findings from an integrational perspective are discussed (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 109).

#### 6.4.7 Trouble spots in the interaction

The phenomenon of repair has been richly studied in aphasia from an EMCA perspective. Repair is a broad term, generally concerned with the nature of turn-taking in interaction targeting the social organization of language disorders. Repair is regarded as a dynamic concept which brings the conversation forward (Schegloff et al., 1977). However, few studies exist on the procedures of correction in aphasia that provide a fine-tuned description of the distinct feature of interaction between therapists and individuals with aphasia (Klippi, 2015), error-talk and error-fixing (Simmons-Mackie & Damico, 2008, p. 5). Thus, the term "correction" is applied to target investigations of the psychosocial side of aphasia. Excessive correction in aphasia has proven to lead to emotional distress (Wilkinson et al., 1998). Repair is distinguished from correction by its analytical broadness (Schegloff et al., 1977), as opposed to the concept of correction that refers to professional practice in speech therapy (Simmons-Mackie & Damico, 2008). Correction relates to assessment of competence within speech and language pathology. For instance, the way in which words are retrieved, how they are enacted through gesturing and how conversation is

scaffolded (Clarke & Bloch, 2013). This analysis, however, employs a different aspect of correction: the correction of knowledge, not correction of competence.

Two specific incidents of knowledge correction, distributed over two days of recording, have been chosen for this qualitative analysis. In the first incident, rich in organizational structure, the participant claimed to have beer in their glass when it actually contained elderflower juice. A joint activity of inspecting the case participant's beverage resulted in a series of aggravated corrections by the therapists, resulting in the exclusion of the case participant from the dialogue. In the second incident, three complaints recur in three different interlinked sequences. In the second and third sequences, the case participant is complaining that the personnel at the ABI center are ignorant, similarly resulting in his exclusion from the dialogue. These incidents are rich in resemiotizations.

Interestingly, the case participant's complaint was located in a series of actions relevant to the ecology of this action. By ecology, I draw on the integrational notion of contextualization, which is person-bound rather than sequentially-bound. This sequence empirically demonstrates contextualization at work. Using EMCA and practice theory tools, the case participant's complaint was traced backwards from this local incident to a situation occurring one hour earlier, when a therapist complained about the architects who built the ABI center. Then, the complaint is traced forward to the recording two weeks later, where, in a third sequence, the case participant was finally allowed to state their complaint. This is accomplished as a joint activity while reviewing the video from the first day of recording, which dealt with individuals complaining about the architecture of the center at several points.

Demonstrably, all three complaints were entangled with the case participant's initiatives causing trouble-talk (and how this trouble-talk is formulated, received and responded to) (Goodwin, 1983; Jefferson, 1988; Kupferberg & Green, 2005; Schegloff et al., 1977). Trouble spots are identified by the case resident taking initiatives and/or addressing criticisms, which may be perceived by the occupational therapist as complaints about institutional life (Heinemann, 2009). As discussed by Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019), these trouble spots can be connected to an occasion in the past. This is shown by the case participant's publicly available contextualizations of complaining in local interactions with the occupational therapist, in which the first incident was enacted bodily in orchestration with the therapist who was criticizing the architecture and the architects. Then, a new version of a criticism was verbalized by the case participant but disregarded as a complaint in the second sequence. Finally, a third version of a criticism was brought forward in joint verbal and embodied orchestration between the research assistant and the case participant, resulting in his complaint being accepted in the third sequence.

The processual nature of these contextualizations are described in the analysis and characterized with the concept of resemiotization (Iedema, 2003). As discussed in Chapter 3, I understand and apply this concept experientially and individually, not structurally. Following an integrational linguistics perspective, meaning is processual. Hence, it can never be encapsulated in language, but resides in action, whether jointly or individually performed, and whether implicitly or explicitly perceived. In an integrational linguistics perspective, meaning-making can be enacted momentarily, but meaning is never fixed because it does not exist as a linguistic construct due to the ontological integrational linguistics principle of radical indeterminacy.

Moreover, this analysis shows that correction of knowledge and correction of language are two different issues. The activities in the two issues of correction of knowledge treat the case participant not only as communicatively impaired; more importantly, and less fortunately, Søren is oriented to as cognitively impaired. However, this can be explained as a part of a professional corrective practice (Simmons-Mackie & Damico, 2008; Wilkinson et al., 1998). Yet, this study's aim is not to assess the professionals, but to investigate practices as they unfold in order to open a dialogue on the psychosocial consequences of practices of exclusion and inclusion in interaction in health and social care settings. In these incidents, exclusion is clearly accomplished by a joint series of aggravated corrections performed by the therapists' disengagement and their disaffiliation with the case participant's initial contribution. In sum, the practices in the two knowledge correction incidents result in exclusion of an individual with impairment. Possibly, inclusion could have been afforded with an alternative perception of practice. An alternative perception of practice contributes to the employment of new communication strategies and ultimately supports changes of practice (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 109–112).

## 6.5 Fine-grained analysis of excerpts

The interactional course of consequences for one individual who has impairments and the processuality of social activity are traced in a series of encounters ranging from informal talk between sessions, to roundtable talk and communication training, and lunch talk. I have followed one specific individual across the recorded material and situations. As I participated myself in the recordings, I had spent several hours with the participant in various contexts and, therefore, felt I had a sense for the individual, their social personality, and ways of communicating themselves.

Importantly, I came to know the participant through sharing time, space and thoughts, so felt I shared a world with them (cf. Goode, 1994b) regardless of the fact that they had severe brain injury and could not recall me from time to time. However, I remembered them and grew to understand their perspective progressively. When we would talk, they would tell me things, also personal things. Occasionally, we would touch each other informally (e.g., when inspecting the camera attached to me, holding my hand, etc.). Also, I would move around with the participant and a caretaker, for instance, when the individual prepared tea for the first information meeting about the research project involving three other residents and training occupational therapists. I also accompanied this participant when they went to buy food at an excursion to a shopping mall with another resident, two therapists and a fellow researcher. I perceived this participant as friendly, gallant and interested in the research project. Every time we came to visit and record, they would ask about the research project. During the second visit recording, we reviewed video from the first time, together with the individual, one other resident and one of the therapists. Here, we discussed what benefits the research could have upon encountering spots in the recordings that had led to trouble, for instance, a kitchen table that was in the way for the wheel chair so that the individual could not reach the kettle for boiling water for the tea. I will now demonstrate and discuss how the practices of inclusion/exclusion that I have identified are emergent in the interaction itself, which can have further institutional ramifications (adapted from Klemmensen, 2020).

Two examples are drawn from the dataset to demonstrate and discuss the combined integrational EMCA analytical approach. The selection of excerpts for analysis demonstrates initial display of interest to participate in the dialogue from the case participant. The excerpts demonstrate how their initiatives resulted in their withdrawal from participating in interaction, or silence marked by extensive pauses and topic changes performed by the co-participants categorizing the individual as a non-ratified participant. Because of a rich dataset, the case participant's initiation of a wish to participate statement was easily identified: they repeatedly initiated talk



with stuttering the conversational token (“eh- eh- eh- eh-”), produced a number of times and often over several turns

However, the extent of elaboration of the video material and the transcripts used for analysis differed at progressive stages of the study, which can be tracked through the background publications (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019) from raw to multimodal transcripts. In this analysis, the video excerpts are presented by multimodal micro-transcription focusing on the coordination of activity and by pictures of interactants. The visualizations are based on anonymized screenshots derived from the recordings. Finally, drawings and screenshots of the material setting are included. Pictorial material is included to scaffold the step-by-step, visually-inspired analysis (Laurier, 2014b; Mondada, 2016), and to give the reader a sense of time and space in frames. This also allows conducting the analysis sideways, instead of from above, and to follow the trajectories of practices visually.

Since, I want to probe an integrational linguistic perspective in an EMCA-based analysis, I am interested in looking beyond the local sequence to consider how the case participant integrates themselves. Interestingly, they invent “new material” from resources available in the local environment, mainly to create new topics, but also to participate in ongoing activity. I want to visualize and account for their creative ways of communicating by recycling material and transforming it into something new: actions and quests, in frames of how of the case participant manages talk while having stuttering trouble due to aphasia. Despite the condition of aphasia and the presence of extensive turns of talk, this individual proves effective in talk-taking initiatives and telling stories — also complaints — until they are dismissed by co-participant therapists who talk, moderate and regulate the individual from their gatekeeping position, resulting in this person’s resignation from participating.

### 6.5.1 Initiatives and responses: shopping mall

The following excerpt, “This Here Is a Beer,” is an interaction between the case participant that I will call Søren, and two therapists, and was overheard by a second resident and two researchers. It is valuable to note how the participant’s disability is constructed through the course of this interaction. ABI is not made noticeably relevant on the surface, yet the recurring social activities are bound to the implicit local construction of ABI. This becomes clear when we consider how the case participant is responded to by the therapists and researchers during this initiated discussion. Therefore, the focal line of the transcript is Turn 7, where the therapists respond to Søren as a non-ratified recipient.<sup>xxvii</sup>

We are on an excursion at a local shopping mall and have just sat down at the tables to have lunch. Two residents and two assistants are sitting at one table while two researchers, who wear GoPro cameras on their chests, are sitting at another table next to them. A discussion about the content of Søren’s glass arises. Just before this, one of the assistants, an occupational therapist, had been saying that it is Friday and that it is acceptable for Søren to have a beer. Meanwhile, the other assistant, a pedagogue, was away picking up the food ordered for Søren and herself at the counter.

After tasting it, Søren initially states, as we can see in the excerpt in Fig. 6.1 on the next page, that he has received a beer. The pedagogue responds with immediate orientation towards Søren in Turn 4, exclaiming, “Er det en ØL?” [*Is it a BEER?*]; the surprise is emphasized by intonation in the pronunciation of BEER. The participant re-states a variation of his prior turn, “ja- det” [*yes- it*], maintaining that it is a beer.

01 S: ((points to large glass right in front of him))  
 02 S: eh- eh- eh- eh=Ben[te det der det er [altså] en øl  
       er- er- er- er=Ben[te this here that is a beer  
 03 B: [mm  
 04 B: Er det en ØL  
       Is it a BEER  
 05 S: ja- det  
       yes- it [noise]  
 06 P: ((looks towards Bente))  
 07→P: aj det er fordi jeg troede det var en øl  
       no it is because I thought it was a beer

The occupational therapist is increasingly turning the left side of their body and head towards the other therapist beside them, not looking at all at Søren. All the while, the occupational therapist is paying attention to the dialogue between Søren and the pedagogue. In Line 7, the other therapist comments to the pedagogue, not to Søren, “aj det er fordi jeg troede det var en øl” [*no, it is because I thought it was a beer*]. This could be regarded as other-initiated repair, as it repairs the previous contribution (“Is it a BEER?”), which is a response to his statement. This is done, in my perception, however, as a double repair, since it scaffolds talk not attending to the co-presence of Søren by directing to the therapist (“no, it is because [...]”) and not addressing Søren, who is also co-present and the initiator of the sequence. In Turn 8, the pedagogue reaches out for the glass and smells the contents (see Fig. 6.2 on page 140).

**Fig. 6.1. Data excerpt: Søren states that he has a beer, which cascades a series of inspections co-operated between the professionals and Søren (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 113)**

Participants:

S: Søren, our case participant  
 B: Bente, pedagogue  
 P: Pia, occupational therapist  
 PR: Pirkko, research leader  
 C: Charlotte, research assistant

GOPRO016 32:00-32:47

01 S: ((points to large glass right in front of him))  
 02 S: *eh- eh- eh- eh=Ben[te det der det er [altså] en øl*  
*er- er- er- er=Ben[te this here that is a beer*  
 03 B: [mm  
 04 B: *Er det en ØL*  
*Is it a BEER*  
 05 S: *ja- det*  
*yes- it [noise]*  
 06 P: ((looks towards Bente))  
 07→P: *aj det er fordi jeg troede det var en øl*  
*no it is because I thought it was a beer*  
 08 B: [((reaches out for the glass. #Smells the content))  
 P: [((scratches herself by the mouth and looks over to Bente  
*who is sitting with the glass))*  
 fig #fig. 1  
 09 B: *Ne:j Søren*  
*No: Søren*  
 10 B: ((nods))  
 11 B: *det lugter af hyldeblomst*  
*it smells like elderflower*  
 12 S: *NÅ:hh- nã det- det- er-*  
*OH:hh- well that- that- is-*  
 13 B: *Det er så:n noget hyldeblomst*  
*B: It's a sort of elderflower*  
 14 S: hm er  
 15 B: *æble=hyldeblomst*  
*apple=elderflower*  
 16 [noise]  
 17 B: ((takes the glass and looks down into it Smells again the  
 surface of the glass from side to side))  
 18 S: *nã- så- der=kan=man=(se)*  
*well- there=you=(go)*  
 19 B: *aj det dufter altså af hyldeblomst*  
*oh well but it does smell of elderflower*  
 20 B: ((takes the glass and reaches it over to Pia who is  
 seated next to Bente))  
 21 B: *prøv og duft*  
*try and smell*

22 B: ((reaches out and holds the glass under Pia's nose))  
 23 P: ((smells the glass))  
 24 P: jo- jo  
 well- well  
 25 P: ((looks down))  
 26 P: nej det er ikke øl  
 no it is not beer  
 27 B: ((puts the glass back at the table))  
 28 B: Det *dufter* ikke af øl  
 It doesn't smell of beer  
 29 P: så ville der også have været bobler i  
 then there would also have been bubbles in it  
 30 S: Det- ja  
 It- yes  
 31 P: ellers er det verdens mest dovne øl  
 otherwise it is the most flat beer in the world  
 32 PR: [HAHAHAHA  
 C: [HAHAHAHA  
 33 S: det=*dufter*=da=af=øl  
 but=it=does=smell=like=beer  
 34 S: ((raises the glass and reaches it over towards Pia across  
 the table))  
 35 S: jamen det=*bobler*=også her  
 but it=also=bubbles here  
 36 B: [aj så ville der være så:n skum henne i kanten=*hvis det var*  
 [well then there would have been kinda foam in the side=  
 if it were  
 S: [Nå  
 [Well  
 37 S: ((COUGH))  
 38 S: ja= ja  
 yeah= yeah

(Fig. 6.1. Data excerpt. Continued)

In Turn 9, the pedagogue explicitly reveals the case participant's understanding as problematic (Schegloff, 2001, p. 1947) through the statement, "Nej Søren" [*No Søren*]. The statement is initialized by "no," demonstrating further affiliation with the occupational therapist by repetition of her previous turn. In Turn 11, the pedagogue indexes that "det lugter af hyldeblomst" [*it smells like elderflower*]. Then, elaborates her inspection and, finally, a new category is produced in Turn 15 as a justification, "æble=hyldeblomst" [*apple=elderflower*]. The inspection is supported with stepwise actions performed by the therapist. First, by taking the glass, second, by looking down into it and, third, by smelling the surface of the glass again, this time from side to side.

**Fig. 6.2.**  
**The pedagogue inspects the glass by smelling it (#fig. 1, above)**  
(adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 115)



Søren's response to this is compliance, in Line 18. The sequence could have ended here, yet, the therapist proceeds inspecting the beverage, so the response to Søren's compliance is a continuation of inspections. Then, notice that the other therapist joins in and shows strong alignment through offering a new justification in Turn 29, "så ville der også have været bobler" [*then there would also have been bubbles in it*]. The case participant, again, halfway complies with a cut off, "det-ja" [*it-yes*], in Turn 30. The researchers affiliate with the therapist's designed joke in Line 31 (that it is the world's flattest beer if it has no bubbles) with an adjacent laugh in overlap in Turn 32. Notice, then, that the case participant re-enters the dialogue and reverses to respond to the therapists with a counteraction, which he produces by stating "beer"). Hereby, Søren aligns with the rules of the game, where accounts for "men=det=lugter=da=af=øl" [*but=it=does=smell=like=beer*] and perceptions of the fluid are made relevant. Thus, Søren intelligibly engages in the inspection gaming. In multimodality, food inspection and food assessment are considered formatted as other joint activities (Mondada, 2009). The participant picks up this format and re-enters the dialogue by building on the recurring actions from the therapists (Goodwin, 2018).

This cooperative action is accounted for by the fact that the series is performed and formatted jointly between the two therapists and the participant.

Søren embodies his verbal contribution by raising the glass and reaching it (back) over towards the other therapist across the table so that she can see for herself as he adds a further justification, in his accounting for the claim that he has, in fact, a beer: “*jamen=det=bobler=også=her*” [*but=it=also=bubbles=here*]. Notice that the therapist’s counter-response leads Søren to give up the dialogue in Turn 37. Finally, he resigns in Turn 38 with “yeah, yeah.” In consequence, the increasing determinacy of the beer results in Søren’s resignation from the expert indexers, leaving his intentioned motifs unexplored. Therefore, on the surface, the trouble source in this extract is the misdescription of an object (the beer). This is accounted for with the beverage undergoing a variety of (extraordinary) assessments. Underneath the surface, however, something else seems to be at stake (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 112–116).

### 6.5.2 Experiential correction

This part of the analysis investigates the participant’s perspective more closely by extending the context in scrutiny of the focal Turn 7. In Turn 2, Søren is pointing to the glass right in front of him as he, in that moment, makes his experience available. This sharing produces a series of circulated knowledge gatherings around the lunch table. In Line 7, the other therapist employs an account for her attention, which is hard to interpret from this extract in isolation. Her comment to the pedagogue, “no, it is because I thought it was a beer” in Line 7, needs linkage to a previous action. The occupational therapist was recorded talking about beer 10 minutes prior to this incident. First, the occupational therapist commented to another resident present that it was Friday and, therefore, apt time for a beer. This talk was recorded while both Søren and the other therapist were absent. The pedagogue brought the glass to the table five minutes later, prior to the excerpt, and left to help the case participant. Then, Søren arrived in his wheelchair and was seated at the table. The pedagogue soon left the table again to pick up the food while the participant remained at the table. A dialogue was started by the occupational therapist. For the first time and in Søren’s presence, it was stated that this was a beer, when the occupational therapist commented that it was great idea to have a beer on a Friday. Her statement was, however, repaired by Søren and by the research assistant who accounted that it in fact was not beer in the glass. This all occurred while the pedagogue was absent.

The response initiated by the other therapist in Line 7, in this view, interprets as a resemiotization of her own understanding, which explains her discarding of the beer

statement. Importantly, the occupational therapist verbally responds to the participant's initiative ("no, it is because I thought it was a beer") in Line 7, but solely looks towards and targets the pedagogue, not the participant, while accounting for her own previous mistaking of the contents of the glass. Crucially, the occupational therapist is talking over the participant's head. This tracing backward explains the way in which the beer is collaboratively constructed between the recipients in several reconfigurations. Yet, in the studied excerpt, Søren's statement that it is a beer is constructed as a trouble source, which needs correction and further meaning calibration. The series of corrections from Line 6 and forward account for this joint interpretation between the therapists.

This excerpt demonstrates how the course of the unfolding interaction is driven by a typical series of corrections, which are made relevant by the therapists, and which the therapists now hold Søren accountable for. Notice that all of Søren's inspections and assessments hereafter are disregarded by the therapists. The error of the beer is sought fixed during a long series of inspections of the beverage, correcting his misascription of beer to elderflower juice. This is done by positioning their inspections as objective (it is not a beer), and conversely by constructing his criteria as subjective (it is a beer). Though Søren, just before this excerpt, corrected the therapist's assessment of the beer, this action was never reassessed. Objective knowledge is orchestrated for fixing the participant's troublemaking by corrective inspections performed by the therapists.

As discussed by Heinemann (2009, p. 2438), the exclusion of participants affords the construction of them as third parties through not attending to them despite their co-presence. However, the therapists do not use third-person pronouns for the case participant in this example. Rather, their construction of Søren as third party — and their exclusion of him — is embodied through gesturing and gaze, rather than through verbal means (Mondada, 2016): the therapist's visible bodily orientation and gaze directed towards the pedagogue (Line 6) demonstrates that the participant is responded to as a non-ratified recipient. Notably, Søren has no one to support him in this sequence. This aligns with Parr's claim (2008, p. 20), that the significance of disabledness often produces an orientation from persons who do not have disability, towards individuals who have impairments as being socially incompetent. Interactionally, this is demonstrated by the therapists' counter-inspections in response to Søren's participatory initiative between Turns 33–38.

As competence, correctly produced knowledge pertains only to the therapists, resulting in a strong asymmetry which does not appear to be inclusive. In contrast, this example exposes professionals engaged in aggravated correction procedures, which affords the construction of the case participant as incompetent and cognitively impaired because of his lack of distinguishing beer from elderflower juice by referring

to the foam property of “real” beer. Crucially, the outcome is the case participant’s withdrawal from the conversation: they are responded to as unaccountable; in consequence, they withdraw in Turns 37 and 38 with a cough and a “yeah, yeah” (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 116–118).

### 6.5.1 Criticisms about the place


In the following part, it is anticipated that the case participant’s criticisms risk not being heard because they are disregarded interactionally. Demonstrably, Søren’s complaint builds on a previous action, located in a series of actions relevant to his contextualization. Therefore, it is traced backwards to this initial action occurring one hour earlier, where the therapist was complaining about the architects who designed the kitchen (see Fig. 6.3).

The following examples have been transcribed using a model inspired by Mondada’s multimodal transcription model (2014), since they are shorter than in the previous example. The timing of gestures is relevant to this example, necessitating the transcription format being applied here. Gestures are transcribed in turns of talk, enabling an even more fine-tuned inspection.

The case participant partook in this session where the occupational therapist criticizes the kitchen design as an architect’s failure; hence, the place (metonymized) is stated for the first time in the recordings. We are in the kitchen next to the conference room. The therapist and the research assistant support Søren in tea preparation. Meanwhile, the occupational therapist explains the pros and cons of the architecture regarding the kitchen design to the research assistant (see Fig. 6.4).



**Fig. 6.3. The scenes: The kitchen and the conference room next door (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 119)**



The initiative for the discussion is taken by the occupational therapist. She supports her verbal criticism by gesturing and pointing towards the surface of the tall kitchen table, demonstrating its hindrance to interaction for individuals with disabilities. Notice the cooperative orchestration of this action (see Figs. 6.5 and 6.6).

In Line 1, the therapist accounts for the relevance of the ergonomic problem of the kitchen design to the research assistant with a gesture while initiating critical talk, “vi har lidt udfordringer med” [*we have some challenges with*]. At the same time, the case participant embodies alignment with her. This is done by Søren first facing his wheelchair towards her as she gesticulates, and then by rolling back and grasping the edge of the table that she just pointed to as he initiates enacting its insufficiency from Line 1 until Line 13. In Line 3, the therapist blames the kitchen design and, in Lines 6 and 7, the therapist blames the architects for this design failure, “det er sådan lidt en arkitektfejl kunne man godt mene på et senhjerneskadecenter ikke” [*it is sort of an architect’s failure, one could suppose, since we are at a rehabilitation center, right*]. The case participant responds to this by reaching for the kettle, turning his body towards the occupational therapist (see Fig. 6.4). The research assistant verbally

affiliates with the blaming in Line 8, “ja ja det må man da nok sige” [*yes, yes, this is obvious*]. The discussion between the therapist and the research assistant unfolds a coordinated talk of criticism of the architects who decided the kitchen design, which the case participant simultaneously enacts while attempting to preparing tea, for instance, supported by the lid dropping in Line 9.

**Fig. 6.4. Data excerpt: The therapist states the first criticism of “the place” — an architect’s failure (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 120)**

Participants:  
R: our case participant  
OT: the occupational therapist  
RA: the research assistant

GoPro13 11.10-11.50

01 OT: +vi har lidt \*udfordringer# [med  
we have some challenges [with  
ot: \*gesticulates with hands, arms in sideways  
movement aligning table surface in the air--->  
fig #fig. 2  
r : +approaches wheelchair, rolls back and grasps edge of kitchen table

02 RA: [ja selvfølgelig  
[yes of course

03 OT: det er ikke alle (steder i) køkkenerne\* der er [indrettet til det  
it is not everywhere in the kitchens that is [designed for it  
--->\*

04 RA: [-ja  
[-yes

05 RA: nej# det er de da ikke \*særlig +godt [-det  
No they aren't not very good [-it

fig #fig.3  
r : --->+  
ot: \*turns to R and turns back to RA

06 OT: [-det er sådan lidt en  
+arkitektfejl [-it is sort of an architect's  
failure  
r: +reaches kettle

07 [kunne man godt mene på et senhjerneskadecenter -ikke  
[one could suppose since we are at a rehabilitation center -right

08 RA: [ja ja det må man da nok +sige eh -ja  
[yes this is obvious well -yes  
r: +points at kettle while gazing at OT  
ot: \*approaches R


09 OT: ja:+  
Ye:s  
r : +touches kettle and takes kettle from dock and attempts at  
opening the lid

10 R: ((noise)) (xxx)sikkerhed en vandkoger  
((xxx)security a water boiler

11 OT: -ja så er du på rette vej\*+  
-yes now you are going the right direction  
ot: \*steps towards R with arms open to help and  
grasps kettle and holds it+  
r : +lid opens and drops onto the table\*  
ot: \*makes  
noise with porcelain in the sink


12 R : -ja+  
-yes  
r : +mumbles

**Fig. 6.5. Challenges with the kitchen's design are enacted by the therapist's hand gesture (#fig. 2, above) (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 121)**



In the excerpt, the therapist co-enacts with the case participant, assisting Søren to reach and pick up items unreachable to him. Søren points towards the kettle in Line 9, as if enacting that the kettle is unreachable, indicating that its position afforded by the table design is a trouble source. The therapist simultaneously orients towards Søren with a “ja” [yes].

**Fig. 6.6. The problematic architecture is co-enacted by Søren and his grasping the table edge and reaching out for the kettle (#fig. 3, above)  
(adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 122)**



When Søren attempts at opening the lid, the occupational therapist scaffolds the action by verbally praising his effort in Line 11, “ja så er du på rette vej” [*yes, now you are going in the right direction*]. She helps the participant grasp the kettle and hold it, yet, the lid drops on the table and makes noise. Together they close this co-enacted, coordinated sequence of joint criticism. The tea prepared in this sequence is for the meeting that we are about to attend in the next excerpt. There, the place is taken up again as a building and then criticized by the case participant. This excerpt centers on a ratified criticism with initiative taken by the therapist. Later, it serves as a semiotic resource, where the case participant states the complaint that they have been met with ignorance at the ABI center (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 118–122).

### 6.5.2 The place resemiotized: “I have been met with ignorance”

I now wish to draw the reader’s attention to the case participant resemiotizing the physical surroundings from the example above in the following excerpt. The place is brought up as a point of departure for Søren’s criticism of its professionals. Prior to the excerpt, a roundtable conversation about the ABI center and the professional capacities unfolded. The case participant orients his contribution towards this talk. Notice how Søren intelligibly builds upon two things: First, the previous criticism of the place as he occasions it verbally; and second, the conversation about professional capacity. In sum, the case participant reuses actions from past events as he performs a resemiotization of the place as a building as an entry for initiating his response to the professionals’ praising. Hereby, the case participant ends up discarding the professionals’ praise with a subjective criticism. Again, the aim of this part of the interaction analysis is to focus the investigation on how the case participant is met when taking a critical initiative.

We are in the conference room, and it is the first day that we are recording at the center. In the conference room, the research team is introducing the project and we are several participants sitting at the table. Among the participants are residents, researchers, care personnel and two occupational therapy students. In this excerpt, the case participant initiates critical talk. Again, in this example, the case participant’s shared experience is responded to and constructed as insignificant. This becomes clear when we notice how the case participant is met in this shared experience by the therapist, who disregards him as complainant (see Fig. 6.7).

Søren spends a long time stating his case, stuttering due to his aphasic condition. Yet, over four turns, he states his experience of the place in one coherent stream of talk, only interrupted by tokens typical for individuals with aphasia (i.e., er, and, etc.); “øh jeg studsede noget over da jeg flyttede hertil at at at man har lavet det her enorme sted øh øh og så og så øh og så har jeg mødt uvidende totalt uvidenhed om min situation” [*er, I wondered when I moved here that that that this enormous place has been built er er and then and then er, and then I have met ignorant complete ignorance er about my situation*]. Søren closely links the institution, “det her enorme sted” [*this enormous place*], in Line 18 with the fact that he has “mødt uvidende total uvidenhed” [*met ignorant complete ignorance*] about his situation in Line 19. By pointing at the therapist at the end of the table while producing the word “uvidenhed” [*ignorance*] in Turn 19, the case participant links the building and its personnel. The meaning ascribed to the building is thus reconfigured and augmented from the surroundings to include the personification of the center (i.e., the therapist who is held accountable). This action is built in accordance with Goodwin’s principled demonstration of

cooperative action and the recurring reuse of past actions in human interaction (Goodwin, 2018, p. 4). The participant, Søren, combines elements from the professionals' praising of the center's capacity and the ratified co-enacted criticism analyzed above.

**Fig. 6.7. Data excerpt: Second criticism of “the place” — the participant complains about ignorance (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 124)**

Participants:  
 S: Søren, our case participant  
 R2: another resident  
 OT: the occupational therapist  
 cam: GoPro-camera attached to the research assistant's head

GoPro010013 03:29-04:16

17 S: ø:h\$ øh jeg studsede noget=over=da=jeg flyttede hertil at- at\$ at=man  
 e:h eh I wondered=when=I moved here that- that- that  
 cam: \$focus on papers at table and refocuses on speaker  
 cam: towards other listening participants and returns to speaker \$turns

18 har lavet det her eno:rme sted=øh øh og=så=og=så-  
 this eno:rmous place has been built=eh eh and=then=and=then-  
 r2: >>nods

19 øh og så har je-=mø:dt uvidende +totalt=uvidende  
 eh and then I=have me:t ignorant complete=ignorance  
 s: +points towards OT

20 ot: >>looking towards S with right hand at her cheek  
 øh +o:m min situation ++ mm- øh  
 eh a:bout my situation mm- eh  
 s: +points at OT ++rests hands  
 s:

21 : (2.0)  
 22 S: hvad kan det skyldes  
 what might be the cause of this

23 OT: hva- hva- jeg er i tvivl om  
 wha- wha- I 'm uncertain  
 ot: >>looking down at the table hand at her cheek, raises head a bit

24 \*hvad det er du mener (name)  
 what it is you mean  
 ot: \*moves hand in circles around her chin  
 25 \*med uvidende  
 by ignorance  
 ot: \*hand at her chin

26 S: men altså  
 but well  
 27 OT: men-  
 but-

28 S: men altså-  
 but well-

29 OT: men ellers skal vi tage\* den senere \*\*hvis det er  
 but else we can discuss this later on if it is  
 ot: \*throws left hand with fingers spread in the  
 air in circulation  
 ot: \*\*hand back at her chin looking  
 towards S

30 S: eh ja+ lad os det  
 well yes let's do that  
 s: +nods

31 OT: ja altså den vil jeg gerne tage med dig senere ja ja  
 yes well this I would like to discuss with you later on yes yes  
 32 det kan vi godt hvis det er okay  
 we can do that if that is okay

33 S: ja+ ja

The situation is tense at this point. Notice how this is underlined by the movement of the GoPro camera, which is attached to the researcher's head. The camera movement in Turn 17 results in a significant pan back and forth in an attempt to pick up the other participants' reactions. After this, an interactional sequence unfolds over the next two turns, with mutual repairs or incomplete initiatives between the case participant and the therapist (Lines 26–28). All the while, the rest of the participants in the room are silently holding their breath (field notes, Sept. 6, 2012). This observation is analytically supported by a significant pause of two seconds following the completion of the case participant's initiative (Line 21), exemplifying the experience of the tension of the atmosphere.

Since there is no response from the others present, the case participant continues to elaborate their troubles and turns it into an answerable statement, targeting the occupational therapist pointed out (Line 22), "hvad kan det skyldes" [*what might be the cause of this*]. Now, notice how the delicacy of this action (Heinemann & Traverso, 2009, p. 2381) is responded to by the complaint recipient, the therapist. Bodily, the therapist orients to another resident in Turn 19, seeking support and demonstrating that this trouble will result in disaffiliation. The therapist then looks down at the table with her hand on her cheek and raises her head slightly (Line 23). The orientation towards other recipients shows disaffiliation with the case participant (Schegloff, cited in Heinemann, 2009, p. 2436). Finally, the therapist verbally and bodily targets the case participant's complaint straightforwardly. This next account orients to the case participant as if he were responsible for transgression, "jeg ved ikke hvad du mener" [*I don't know what you mean*]. This is pronounced while the therapist simultaneously is moving her hand around her chin in circles, demonstrating the disaffiliation with indexed uncertainty. By this response, the therapist is verbally indicating that his answerable, indeed, is an unanswerable. In her choice of words, she reuses his phrasing. The significant part of the therapist's account addresses the case participant lacking meaning-making, "I don't know what you mean," ends "med uvidenhed" ([*by ignorance*] Line 25). This constructs the case participant as non-ratified complainant as the therapist demonstrates that she did, in fact, understand the complaint by the inclusion of the words "with ignorance."

The case participant, who has aphasia, finds it hard to respond to this blaming of transgression. Notice how the inappropriateness of the case participant's initiative is responded to by the therapist orienting to Søren's sense-making, his knowledge of communication, as the real trouble source. Noticeably, the therapist forces the case participant to enact his difficulties in communicating on a verbal level in the following, since the case participant is abandoned and unsupported with production difficulty for several turns as he is attempting at producing a new contribution to the discussion (Turns 26; 28; and 30). By leaving the case participant hanging, and by

building on one of his attempts of reentering with a “men” [*but*], finally, the therapist takes over the turn and swiftly produces two chained turns, suggesting that they discuss this more appropriately later on (Line 29): “men ellers skal vi tage den senere hvis det er” [*but, else we can discuss this later on if it is*]. Here, the therapist verbally disregards the complaint by formulating a response which explicitly targets the inappropriateness of the case participant’s complaint.

No one at the table engages in exploring what the case participant actually meant. This joint rejection from overhearers of the complaint is, therefore, supported by their silence. Rejecting a complaint is highly regulative. Even if the therapist’s offer to discuss it later is a partial acceptance, she disaffiliates bodily and verbally with the case participant. In conclusion, the therapist excludes the case participant in this excerpt with a course of responses to his complaint by applying two procedures. First, in the way that she disregards him, and, second, in how she purposefully leaves him hanging while he, obviously, is having production difficulties. The therapist’s multimodal and verbal disengagement with the case participant’s formulation is afforded by her recurring disaffiliation, by her long gaze down the table, and by her clear bodily orientation towards the other recipients in the closing. This further shows the other co-participants that their engagement is irrelevant. The therapist asserts the case participant’s compliance to this even before he does, in the closing with two times of “ja ja” [*yes yes*] (Line 31). The case participant repeats this assertion with “yes yes” twice more, mirroring her. This turn-taking is retrievable in CA literature (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Yet, of interest in the analysis is this individual’s perspective; this way of closing a discussion is found in several incidents between the case participant and the therapist, marking his resignation. The therapist suggests a closing, to which the case participant asserts with a “yes yes.” In the above beer example, Søren withdraws with the variation “yeah yeah,” which typically marks his withdrawal from the dialogue (Nielsen, 2015, p. 268; adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 122–126).



### 6.5.3 Analysis across situations

The story of the metonymized place, however, does not end here. This section compares the case participant's resemiotizations of the place.<sup>xxviii</sup> The next figure (Fig. 20) demonstrates the case participant's integrational proficiency in getting his message across. Looking iteratively across situations, the case participant applies creative strategies for conveying criticisms that he is building upon the semiotic resources available in the situation, which are applied in his own publicly available contextualizations.

**Fig. 6.8. Data excerpt: Third criticism of “the place” — Søren and the research assistant discuss the problems experienced while making tea with the other participants (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 124).**

```
Participants:
S: Søren, our case participant
RA: the research assistant
OT: The occupational therapist


GoPro020014 10:02-10:49

35  S:  hm+ @og- det kan man jo så undre sig over på sådan et sted
      hm and- it makes you wonder at a place like this
      s:  +gesticulates hand open
      RA: >>arms crossed
      RA: @raises arm and opens hand gazing at OT--->
36  RA:  og man ku jo ikke vide det hvis man ikke havde været med=ude og lave
      the@@
      and you couldn't have known this if you had not accompanied the tea-
      making
      RA: --->@
      RA: @hand raised and index-finger at left chin
37  S:  nej nej øh+ hvorfor hvorfor har planlæggerne=arkitekterne så så
      no no eh why why have the planners=architects then then
      s:  +raises hand gesticulating
38  S:  ikke taget handicappede med på råd@
      not consulted the handicapped
      RA: @removes hand from cheek opens
      fingers in air pointing towards OT
39  RA:  mmm ja de::t er meget mærkeligt+
      mmm yeah tha::t is very strange
      s:  +raises left hand and hits forehead
40  S:  =det synes jeg altså#
      I really think so
      fig #fig. 4
41  S:  det er hovedløst
      it is headless
```

In the following, this is demonstrated by tracking the architecture made relevant and by analyzing its resemiotization (see Fig. 6.8, above). A third incident of criticism of the architecture arises. A new entry is made by bringing up the architecture in a response to a criticism on the recording being revisited, “og det kan man jo så undre sig over på sådan et sted” [*and it makes you wonder at a place like this*], Søren

comments. Towards the end of the extract (see Line 40), he completes the criticism by enacting it with a gesture, demonstrated in Fig. 6.9.

**Fig. 6.9. Søren enacts the headlessness of the architects for not consulting persons with disabilities by hitting himself on the forehead (#fig. 4, above)  
(adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 127)**



This initiative is immediately elaborated by the research assistant, “og man ku jo ikke vide det hvis man ikke havde været med ude og lave the” [*and you couldn't have known this if you had not accompanied the tea making*]. Notice that the case participant simultaneously points at the therapist (Line 38), as if she again represented the building (the place), while he is blaming the architects, verbally resemiotizing once again, “øh hvorfor hvorfor har planlæggerne arkitekterne så så ikke taget handicapped med på råd” [*why why have the planners architects then then not consulted the handicapped*]. In this final excerpt, the place is resemiotized and elaborated by the case participant (see Fig. 6.9 above). Søren hits himself on the forehead and states, “det er hovedløst” [*it is headless*]. His contribution is not disregarded in this case.

In sum, the video recordings of the resemiotizations in the three incidents can be regarded interlinked because they have (a) been registered, (b) been examined, and (c) been demonstrated to serve distinct interactional purposes. The connections between situations are further elaborated in Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019). The meaning of the architecture and the place is processually rendered in each excerpt. It is interlinked as it demonstrably is elaborated by the participants in

collaboration. They seem to know what they are talking about though this may be invisible to the analyst who solely is using EMCA tools. However, drawing on Fig. 4, which is grounded in the relation between the actual persons in the situation and the external analyst (see Chapter 4.1), it demonstrates that the analyst's interpretation is part of the data (Harris, 2013), following the principle of complementarity also discussed in Chapter 4.1. I participated in the interaction myself. Analytically, I account for this "sense" that the participants know what they are talking about, as I can observe that the case participant circulates around the meaning of the place in the analyzed extracts. I am uncertain whether I would have discovered this connection, if I had not been a participant myself.

First, the architecture is presented and discussed between the therapist and the research assistant with the case participant overhearing (Turns 1–9). Meanwhile, this is indexed by the case participant through enactment of the troubles the architecture causes. This physically overlaps with their talk in Turn 8, where the case participant is pointing and calling the attention of the therapist. The therapist approaches him, and together they demonstrate the inefficiency. Finally, the lid from the kettle drops.

Second, it later transforms into the episode where the case participant is first speaker in the excerpt in the conference room, criticizing professional ignorance. Notice that the case participant builds upon the occasioning of the architecture of the place and makes it a relevant entry for criticism. The case participant states, "this enormous place has been built," but then goes on to incorporate his own situation, building on a complaint, "and then I have met ignorant, complete ignorance," possibly pointing to the professional ignorance he has experienced at this place.

Interestingly, this story travelled on. Two weeks later, the team reviewed the data recorded with the two residents and an occupational therapist who were present during the first recording. A dialogue was initiated between a resident and the research assistant, inspired by the recording being watched by the participants. In the recording, the research assistant is telling a story about the tea kitchen incident from excerpt one, pointing to the fact that the kitchen is not designed for individuals with disabilities. The case participant's intelligibility in complaining and criticizing the place when the camera is on is remarkable. This next semiotization of the place is made with strong affiliation from the research assistant. First, it is accomplished as a joint activity among the participants while reviewing the video from the first day of recording which, at several points deals, with complaints about the architecture of the center. Second, it is accomplished multimodally with the case participant gazing directly into the camera (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 126–129).

#### 6.5.4 Experiential knowledge

It is remarkable that the case participant engages to the extent that is registered in the data. For Søren, it is a challenge to sustain a dialogue due to the condition of aphasia and cognitive impairment due to trauma (my field notes, September 6, 2012). However, the cost of not participating (i.e., silent compliance) can be worse identity-wise (Nielsen, 2015). Demonstrably, all three themes of the place are intertwined verbally. Furthermore, they show how the case participant communicates cooperatively and in a highly advanced way by orienting to the camera and informing this analysis, with or without the affiliation from the surroundings. Søren makes his lifeworld researchable by making his contextualizations in local interactions publicly available. In short, taking a person-centered analytical approach can make viewpoints available. These would be otherwise unnoticeable to strictly sequential EMCA analysts because of their limited perspective and their preference for studying sequences in isolation (Duncker, 2018, p. 146). Although there is some interest in ethnography (Arminen, 2000), mainstream CA emphasizes linguistic action and prefers to analyze collections rather than longer sequences. On the other hand, longitudinal studies can reveal connectivity to a larger extent through persons' engagements that can be followed.

The findings from a complementary incident of exclusion from this dataset supports the above analyses and suggest ways to overcome unfortunate exclusion practices. Nielsen (2015) discussed an exclusion incident with this case participant. Comparably, the co-construction of a past event with the case participant marked a critical situation, which led to resignation as a consequence of the therapist's disagreement with his experiential memory. This example is discussed in Nielsen (2015) and, like the above examples, demonstrates disagreement on knowledge entitlement. The topic in Nielsen's discussion is exploring what the case participant is actually trying to do. The disagreement centers around whether a journalist who covered a story of an event at the center had referred to data from the event correctly, according to the case participant's recollection. Søren states that the journalist refers to several points incorrectly.

Interestingly, the discussion about the article's data between the case participant and the therapist never explores his experiential memory. Rather, an act of persuasion led by the therapist treats the event as a matter of unnegotiable facts, like the above beer example. Facts are assessed by the therapist, who decides that the case participant's memory is insufficient, again questioning the accountability as in the beer example.

Likewise, the case participant raises an issue and is targeted as the problem himself. The interactional result is resignation after the exertion of convincing the

participant that his memory is deficit. Interestingly and analogous to the beer assessment, at no point does the therapist approach the participant's actual memory to explore multiple descriptions of the event. Likewise, the activity of correcting the case participant's statements of his first-order perceptions of the beer in the glass or his criticisms of the place take up the whole attention of the therapist (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 129–130).

## 6.6 Findings

At crucial points, social insignificance (Parr, 2008, p. 20) guides the social orientation towards the case participant. Søren is held accountable for three things in the discussed data: (a) the beer inspection series demonstrates him being excluded for subjectiveness, which could also be referred to as deficiency in a normative perspective; (b) he is held accountable for not making sense when he is the one criticizing the place and, again, is excluded for his subjectiveness; and (c) he is made authoritatively unaccountable for his own experience in a moment of an emergent memory of an event, which has been resemiotized in a journalist's story in the newspaper informed by third parties. Again, Søren is excluded for his subjectiveness. Following this, participation is made unavailable to him because of his subjective contributions, which I suggest could have been met and tackled differently with a Wilkinsonian "let it pass" strategy (Nielsen, 2015; Wilkinson, 2011).

This triangulation of integrational linguistics and EMCA rethinks the analytical meaning of accountability since the integrational linguistic concept of contextualization situates context with the individual stating what participants consider relevant *to themselves* (Harris, 2009b, p. 71). This is demonstrated by twofold tracking the case participant's attempts and failures at engaging in dialogues and by tracing their criticisms. In consequence, clear discrepancies between inclusion policies and practices were found. This called for a refocusing on the complexity of discourses and timescales circulating sites of this local social action. However, this zooming out reassesses the first point in the interaction analysis. The norm is that therapists, family and peers perform corrective practices with individuals who have aphasia, as in the examples presented above (Wilkinson, 2011). However, consequences of such practices, at least in institutional settings, are not fulfilling the purpose of training, which is the strengthening of interactional participation.

The findings of this study are that, when supported by peers, integrational proficiency affords social and communicative stimulation. This was demonstrated in the third incident, the complaint about the architecture of the place, where the case participant is supported by the research assistant. Contrastingly, when participatory productiveness was not co-constituted and was hindered by the therapists, the consequences were crucial and resulted in discouragement, demonstrations of interactional and bodily exhaustion, and followed by resignation in the first two incidents (Nielsen, 2015; this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 131).

### 6.6.1 Approaching professional participation with “let it pass”

CA analyst Wilkinson specializes in interaction with individuals with aphasia and recommends that therapists and peers support individuals with impairments by setting interactional goals in order to change practices and enhance participation (Wilkinson, 2011, p. 37). Corrections are (by these standards) highly problematic. Wilkinson suggests the exact opposite as an example of best practice: suggesting that therapists and peers do not correct memory and facts (Wilkinson, 2011, p. 39); instead, apply a “let it pass” strategy (Wilkinson, 2011, p. 44).<sup>xxix</sup>

Applying interactional tools in therapy and peer communication with individuals who have aphasia invites possibilities of inclusion practices. In conflicts such as the examples above, Nielsen (2015) points to the possibility of approaching the case participant’s experiential memory differently on behalf of the therapist. Instead of correcting the case participant and treating their contributions as displays of deficiencies and impairments, the therapists could have chosen a let it pass strategy (Wilkinson, 2011, p. 44).

Treating the case participant’s contributions as irrelevant, rather than wrong, would possibly have changed the interactional order. The demonstrated recurring corrective practices could have been replaced with a focus on other-directedness. For instance, by repeating their wording and by asking questions, the therapists could have encouraged the participant to continue contributing. Furthermore, the therapists could have been more engaged with the case participant, rather than with themselves and their own understanding. This would have created a solid basis for obtaining other-directedness, and it would have addressed the relevance of the important fact that the case participant shared their experiences. Nielsen (2015, p. 271) discusses a series of possible approaches that the therapist could have operated (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 132). Following Wilkinson’s useful notion of letting it pass (2011), it is suggested that instead of aggravating trouble-talk, professional practitioners can choose to downgrade the force of apparent misalignments and minimize interactional exclusion, thus promoting a person-centered approach (adapted from Klemmensen, 2020).

### 6.6.2 Crucial consequences of not participating

The potential psychosocial consequences are not the only crucial outcomes. What may be conceptualized as biosocial consequences, meaning the physiological consequences of social activity, are important as well. The discussion of repair is central to CA and other interaction analysts. However, an integrational approach starts

out by considering a different perspective in the sequence. As demonstrated above, it is not aphasia nor communicative impairment that is the central case in the excerpt.

Zooming further in (Nicolini, 2009) on the encounter in the first excerpt (revisiting Fig. 6.1, see Chapter 6.5.1), the disagreement evolved around the assessment of a present object, the substance in the glass, which was circulated no less than twice around the table among its participants in a short, intense sequence. As discussed by Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019, p. 11), intensity can be identified in social practice beyond words with reference to gestures, following Wetherell (2012).<sup>xxx</sup> As discussed by Mondada (2016), “there is not principled priority of one type of resources over the others (e.g. language over embodiment).” (Mondada, 2016, p. 341). Gesturing is considered a resource as well as words. The case participant’s initiation of the sequence began with a gesture as it reads from the transcript, pointing to the glass in front of him (Fig. 6.1, Line 1). The therapist’s response to his gesturing with the glass reads as intensive by her drawing on several resources for social interaction: wording, embodiment, and gestures, following Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019). Mondada (2016) argues that “sequentiality is a less linear phenomenon than it appears just on the basis of talk; it relies on subtle ways of arranging and adjusting prior and next actions in real time, among differing, and yet coordinated, simultaneous multimodal conduct reflexively intertwined together.” (p. 346). Revisiting the transcript, the therapist raised her intonation (B; Fig. 6.1, Line 4) and drew the attention from the other therapist (P; Fig. 6.1, Line 6), who turned towards her while she scratched her mouth (Fig. 6.1, Lines 7–8) and stated that she was the one who initially had thought that it was a beer.

I will argue that the case participant may have initiated this disagreement for phatic purposes or for gaining an authentic response by provoking the therapist. My argument is based on the following observation. Interestingly, Søren did not turn to the therapist who first thought it was a beer but to the other therapist who just arrived from the counter, and he might have reasons for doing so. It created intensity the way that this occasioning is done, using storytelling as a resource, self-positioning as first storyteller to a newcomer (Jefferson, 1978; Middleton & Brown, 2005; Sacks, 1992), making dinner conversation (Mondada, 2009).

After trauma, such as the brain injury our case participant experienced, habitually acquired knowledge about the world and self is impaired. Considering that Søren depends on the therapists because he has impairment and is living at a permanent care facility, the course of actions unfolding from participation to resignation are a devastating development which will mark his well-being both psychosocially and biologically (field notes, September 6, 2012: his physical condition as reported to Pirkko and me; and field notes, October 5, 2012: his experience of moving into the care home as reported to Antonia and me).



Turning to Naur's hypothesis in *The Neural Embodiment of Mental Life by the Synapse-State Theory* (2008, pp. 136–156), his review of James' descriptions uncovers a mutual link between the physical brain and an individual's personality, which is managed through the development and rehabilitation of habit formation. This link is unexplored and overlooked within rehabilitation research. Habit formation requires constant cognitive and physical challenges in order to activate synaptic brain activity with the purpose of encouraging the brain to benefit from its plasticity features (James, 1950, pp. 104–127). So, resignation, in this view, is for the worst, since participation encourages plastic benefits and develops the brain at the synaptic level. Furthermore, resignation is the opposite of participation: (a) resignation activates synaptic brain activity and develops plasticity in another way, i.e. counteracting (other) rehabilitation efforts, and (b) resignation can encourage further disengagement by supporting a deficiency view, discouraging the individual in rehabilitation.

Therapy is intended to stimulate participation, not the opposite. However, in these extracts there is a tendency for therapy to lead to their disengagement (as interpreted by the therapists), and not promoting how to successfully engage in a range of situations/contexts, for instance, making their own choices for activities rather than being forcefully convinced to choose activities promoted by the therapist. In raising a case for promoting the practitioners wish to adjust institutional practices, societal view and policy, a paradigmatic shift is needed in what is being measured (and thus defining) in rehabilitative care (e.g. learning to navigate varied situations vs. successfully participating in the act of conversation-making). Thus, it can be crucial to investigate further the participant perspective of individuals with impairments.

We must not overlook that the case participant has a historical body of past and future communication routines with the therapeutic participants to draw on. In this light, disagreement could be a conscious strategy. This might be this participant's only way to provoke a real response in an extremely ordered and routine everyday life where he lives. Noticeably, several incidents are found in the dataset of similar manifest wishes to participate, demonstrating that the case participant is discarded. In the following section, correction is investigated and aligned with the beer example (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 132–133).

### 6.6.3 Relevancy of corrections

EMCA can elaborate and approach the fact that actions happen for specific reasons, demonstrating that actions are situated, sequentially conditioned, and responded to by interlocutors. However, drawing on Duncker's model (Fig. 4.3; see Chapter 4.2), the integrational twist of this analysis foregrounds that the condition lies not in the structure of the interaction but is conditioned on what interactants do and respond to due to personal contextualizations, which may be associated with past events and not even explicitly evoked. Thus, corrections may function independently from the concept of social sequentiality of EMCA. The analyst can start by asking what it is that actually makes it relevant to the therapists to initiate corrections of the case participant's contributions in the specific situation. In the first example, the case participant states there is a beer, perhaps by mistake, and initiates the discussion of the beer. In the last example, also discussed in Nielsen (2015), the case participant states that a journalist reported an event at the center incorrectly. Both examples lead the therapists to initiate a series of explicit corrections of the case participant's perception with the interactional result of explicit other-repair. Both examples end with the case participant's interactional withdrawal from the situation and interactional resignation.

In sum, the beer example, and the example where the case participant's memory of an event is corrected share several interactional similarities:

- The case participant takes an interactional initiative.
- The case participant is corrected and explicitly treated as cognitively impaired.
- The case participant withdraws from the dialogue, resulting in interactional resignation.

The therapists perform some kind of corrective behavior in these situations. The case participant's displays are treated as incorrect and, hence, non-ratified, sign-makings (i.e., "it is a beer;" "it bubbles;" "it has foam"). In the above examples, the therapists clearly state in the first excerpt, "it is not a beer," and, in the discussed example from Nielsen (2015), stating that a journalist actually did get a story down right, according to the therapist's "correct" perception (Nielsen, 2015, p. 267; adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 133–134). The analysis based on similarities, however, presupposes that the case participant's breaching holds the answer to the therapists' responses to his trouble-talk, conceptualizing a standard or normative way of social order that is not situated but abstract (cf. Harris, 2008b). On the other hand, the

integrational perspective focusing on the case participant's experience has little to offer without the scaffolding tools from EMCA illustrating how the case participant formulates talk that is received and responded to as trouble-talk (Goodwin, 1983; Jefferson, 1988; Kupferberg & Green, 2005; Schegloff et al., 1977). Furthermore, the trouble spots are identified when the case resident takes initiatives that are heard by the occupational therapist as critical and thus corrected, leading to her explicit *misalignment* with the case participant by treating him as *cognitively impaired*. Demonstrably, these perceived troubles are manifestly responded to by the occupational therapist, drawing on EMCA tools. Directing attention towards the manifest misalignments in the data extracts, inclusion/exclusion demonstrate to be constituted by the therapist's responsivity to the case participant's initiatives as gatekeeping — illustrating how exclusion is emergent in the interaction itself. This result is derived despite of divergence between EMCA and integrational linguistics on the question of what has initiated the participants' situated sign-making. Interactional consequences can be identified, regardless, using EMCA; however, how they are experienced needs further attention drawing on a person-centered perspective.

#### 6.6.4 Perspectives on repair

The rehabilitation paradigm in empirical interaction studies includes burgeons of significant findings from CA studies on language disorders (Goodwin, 2003; Rae & Ramey, 2015; Saldert et al., 2015; Wilkinson, 2011). For instance, within the paradigm of CA, ways of co-constructing turns, ways of providing correction of one's own talk and participant talk in conversations have been thoroughly investigated. In the classic studies, two primary ways of providing correction have been conceptualized.

Traditionally, a distinction is made between initiated and carried out repair (Kitzinger, 2013, p. 230). In the first case, the initial speaker's competence is supported by the proposition to self-correct by another participant, meaning that one does not generally correct another but allows for correction to be performed by the initial speaker. The initial speaker is the person who made the problematic contribution in the first place; therefore, this phenomenon has been traced and described as other-initiated repair (Schegloff, 1992, p. 1331; Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 364). Previous studies conclude that there is a preference for self-correction in adult conversations (Kitzinger, 2013; Schegloff et al., 1977). Furthermore, other-initiated repair categorizes as a more difficult mode of correction carried out.

In the second case, which is the reverse case, corrections are performed by the co-participants. Here, repair can be considered an aggravated way of correcting. The aggravation of the activity of other-correction is that it can presuppose a lack of confidence in the initial speaker. Moreover, suspicion of incompetence may be displayed. In this case, the second speaker may not trust the initial speaker's competence to perform a preferred self-correction. Here, correction could also presuppose that the initial speaker realizes their need for correction; that others did not understand their meaning. There are two main ways this can be signaled (Goodwin, 1983, p. 658): it can be stated either as a manifest signal of the need for correction, or it can be done by the second speaker. However, here, it is done by the co-participants.

The consequences of the two ways of repair can be crucial. Often, aggravated corrections lead to conflicts. Goodwin's (1983) significant study on aggravated corrections in children's conversations describes language norms in conflicts. Goodwin describes the situationally appropriate norms governing language usage from adult conversations, drawing on Schegloff et al. (1977), while singling out children's primary ways of commonly dealing with co-participants in conflicts. With this distinction between normative adult ways of correcting and children's atypical ways of correcting, Goodwin adds an interesting analytical perspective to the present data: children's atypical conversation patterns are filled with variants of repair different from adult conversations (Goodwin, 1983).

As discussed extensively by Schegloff (1992; Schegloff et al., 1977), adult conversations have a preference for self-corrections. This is not the case in children's conversations. Conversely, children often perform what Goodwin labels "unmodulated corrections," which categorize as aggravated repair. Goodwin analyzes how disagreement in children's conversations are accomplished by countermoves (Goodwin, 1983, p. 670; Jefferson, 1987) — corrections which oppose previous moves. Perkins (2003) describes patterns in another type of atypical conversation. In aphasic conversations, repair can often be distributed over several extensive turns. Children's conversations and adults with aphasia are not directly compatible since, obviously, these two populations have little in common biologically and socially. However, there are some common features in the organization of talk when the concept of speaker orientation is singled out (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 134–136).

### 6.6.5 Repair in the present data

The countermoves that Goodwin describes in children's disagreeing (1983, p. 670) and the countermoves that are found in this dataset are strikingly common. The countermoves performed by the case participant in the first and the second incident, as well as the complementary example, can be considered aggravated repair of the therapists' moves and vice versa. In a similar fashion that children accomplish disagreement in Goodwin's examples (1983), disagreement is accomplished here. My point is that self-correction does not have priority in any of the examples, whereas aggravated repair is present; the two seemingly uncommon groups share common interactional practices. Demonstrably, these organizational practices have consequences. Sometimes, the dis-preference for self-correction can have the consequence of positioning the other as incompetent. In this light, atypical interaction as a research program may accumulate strategies applied in diverse atypical populations (Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2020). Accordingly, similar interaction patterns may be retrievable from distinct contexts with other groups of people.

Contrastingly, it may also be argued that no such thing as atypical populations exist, following the highly individual integrational linguistic concept of integrational proficiency, but also the characterization of Goode (1994b). However, the wish to describe and evaluate how the application of a concept, such as atypical strategies, makes sense from a therapeutic perspective, the question remains whether its falsification reveals the mythological character of the language concept applied from an integrational linguistic perspective (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 136).

## 6.7 An integrational account

To an integrationist, the presupposed underlying understanding of language, communication and sign-making constitute the very reason for the practices carried out. Therefore, part of the analysis is reserved for uncovering enacted language views. Interestingly, every sign created seems to stand for something specific in the therapist's practices. Grounded in the case participant's experience, whether or not the substance in the glass is beer is not something which can be discussed nor negotiated. To the therapist, either it is beer, or it is not. The representation of the sign in the form of a referential word (i.e., beer) can only be stated as a matter of right or wrong.

The case participant's experience of beer (see Fig. 6.1, first incident, Turn 3) is not explored, but, rather, the referential sign-bearer (i.e., the object present) is assessed: a large glass with a liquid characterized as "apple=elderflower" by the therapist (Turn 15). In the journalist example, it is not made relevant to uncover the significance of Søren's initiative, nor are inquiries into the workings of his memory made, nor into what makes him raise this doubt about the journalist's reporting of the event. Simply, therapy is initiated, the case participant's memory is corrected, and the result is to stop him participating interactionally. Importantly, here, I account for the case participant's perspective and not for another scenic perspective, which could be that it would make sense for the therapist to account for her counterclaim in orientation towards trying to get it right — from her categorical orientation towards him as "non-native speaker" (Wong & Olsher, 2000, p. 114) without him self-categorizing as non-native — since the participant demonstrably argues his case (Turns 33–35), I draw the outline of his perspective.

From an outside perspective, the strategy may seem feasible. There might be an obvious reason for the therapists to engage in the corrective practices we see unfold. If we have a closer look at what is being corrected, it is not a linguistic unit due to the condition of aphasia. Individuals with aphasia do not necessarily mind linguistic correction, but they do mind corrections of their knowledge about circumstances in situations (Nielsen, 2015; Rasmussen, 2013). This non-compliance to corrective practices of knowledge about circumstances in situations causes the repair sessions in the above cases, not other references. Further, the lack of effort to understand what the case participant meant by their criticism of the ignorance they claim to have experienced at this place enacts an aggravated correction. In contrast, it is used to question Søren's accountability and to construct a discrepancy between lived social inclusion which, unfortunately, results in social exclusion and interactionally-framed unaccountability.

From an integrationist perspective, creativity and proficiency have priority regardless of the infinite variety of modes in which they may be displayed; the strategy of not attending to Søren's initiative is considered odd. Whether the outcome could have been a joke (his joke) or simply storytelling seems irrelevant. Importantly, the integrational perspective is occupied with demonstrating the analysis from the participants' perspective.

An excerpt from the dataset discussed by Raudaskoski (2013) demonstrates how a participant with severe ABI and aphasia is insisting over several turns and with explicit repair markers directed towards the therapist because the communication was of real importance to the participant who had severe impairment of speech. Apparently, the therapist helping sign a consent document for participation in research was stating a wrong web domain when co-constructing the speech from the participant. This is corrected convincingly. As a result, the participant manages to communicate their email address specific to the domain of Yahoo and not to Hotmail due to their insisting efforts (Raudaskoski, 2013, p. 118). The participant proves proficient in this example, as they do not settle for less: they insist until determinacy relevant to their intention is accomplished. They intelligibly apply corrective proficiency with very few syllables, but with strong interactional proficiency. Hence, their intention of making meaning is accomplished.

Yet, private contextualizations are not necessarily shared. The interjection tokens "oh" and "yeah" (Heritage, 1984) can mark that something new was understood but not spoken, indicating affiliation with the previous action. Yet, accountability in social interaction is a spurious concept (Harris, 2009a; Taylor & Cameron, 1987) since we do not share common contexts in an integrational linguistics person-centered view (Harris, 2009a, p. 71). What, then, could we draw from the case participant's redundant closings, for instance? Noticeably, when they withdraw from each analyzed excerpt, their final contribution is "yes yes," or "yeah yeah." Certainly, they are not explicit about what this means; however, the excerpts convincingly demonstrate these are used interactionally and not as affiliation markers. When this chained interjection occurs in each example, their participation is no longer sustained. The therapists do not make physical or cognitive impairment relevant verbally, but interactionally. Basically, in a wider perspective, in this case, this participant's closings are repairing that they ever participated, as they state their withdrawal from a series of turns which accumulatively have constructed them as insignificant or present-absent, as hinted above.

As discussed by Nielsen (2015, p. 275), the case participant intelligibly applies a socially acceptable departure from dialogues. By adding the analytical layer of "perspective-setting," the one individual is singled out, foregrounding the perspective of the case participant from within the social ensemble. In considering the case of

“suspect stories,” the possibility of operating perspective-setting analytically becomes evident:

(...) the same story (sequence of events) can be told in different ways, yielding different narratives, which organize the substance of the story so as to focus on different points and thus regard different aspects as important and relevant (...) perspectives will be identified not as much in the structure of micro-units (...) but rather in the global patterns of narrative macro-structure, e.g. in the allocation of space to different aspects of contents. These, partially different, narratives can be said to voice different kinds of background knowledge and different interests and concerns (Linell & Jönsson, 1991, p. 76).

It may seem counterintuitive, but this analogy of suspect stories can be used to promote the idea of analytically singling out the case participant and their moves. In addition, it affords considering the moves as discrepant rather than, necessarily, cooperative, and thus constitutive of trouble-talk — from the case participant’s perspective. From the analytical idea of perspective-setting “a story” (in integrational terms: *contextualization*) may be scrutinized in atypical interaction. Furthermore, the individual’s authoritative account may be followed across the next excerpts. However, the telling of contextualization is drawn by the researcher’s careful resemiotization of the video-based material and supportive documents, resulting in a processed analyst representation of the case participant’s observable contextualization that demonstrates a way of “preserving communicational traces” (cf. Duncker, 2018, p. 146). This path may be discussed and developed further in future work.

In this study, however, the transcriptions are considered objects of knowledge (Ayass, 2015) accumulated by collections and conducting longitudinal video ethnographic studies, which support the conclusions made in line with ordinary EMCA practice. By applying extra-sequential knowledge, the *macro-framing* of the individual’s specific moves is conceptualized. In this case, the “macro” concerns the interaction trajectory of one individual across recording days demonstrated by a series of excerpts (see Appendix 4-1). This is preferable to analyzing decontextualized extracts for inquiries into the general organization mechanisms of social action (cf. Linell & Jönsson, 1991; Segerdahl, 1998). Necessarily, a complementary analytical perspective is needed to zoom in on the individual. A perspective less strict than the well-known sequential analysis from the traditional EMCA program needs to be introduced in order to study more closely what individual people are doing in the social ensemble: An analysis viewing the person-centered perspective.



The application of categories in interaction analysis is currently scrutinized by alternatives to the CA concept of action (Enfield & Sidnell, 2017). I have pursued a different approach, which does not adopt the idea that language is at the center of social action (Enfield & Sidnell, 2017, p. ix; Goodwin, 2000). In contrast, I consider communication to be the center of the analysis, based on the integrational proficiencies available and enacted in the situation. Indeed, language use is no guarantee for stabilizing determinacy (Harris, 1998, pp. 81–83). In short, the communication strategies described in this analysis are not aligned with CA's analytical concepts; rather, these are applied for their visual properties for descriptive purposes. This is done by zooming in on the perspective of one individual in the interaction (i.e., the case participant Søren). Interestingly, the individual's perspective raises a novel assessment of inclusion/exclusion processes. Whereas inclusion/exclusion are considered as jointly constructed with CA's analytical concepts, the integrational perspective considers the case participant as the expert and, thus, considers *this* individual as excluded when the case participant is exposed to gatekeeping moves by *other* individuals, e.g. because of Søren's use of atypical resources for participating, scrutinizing the often implicit theoretical lens of EMCA.

I am aware of several abductive elements of this analysis. Yet, as Scollon and Scollon (2007, p. 618) note, with a large corpus of data, it is possible to investigate the black box of what is going on through observations of, for instance, similarly patterned consequences and individual interactional habits as demonstrated in this analysis. And, by abduction, assume the same mechanisms in function. When Peirce discussed abduction as scientific method in the lecture *Pragmatism and abduction* at Harvard in 1903 (Peirce, 1994), a clear distinction was made between perception and abduction relevant to the internal validation of the findings of this analysis. Abduction is thus applied concisely and purposefully in this analysis. In this case, abduction is related to the analyst's recovering of the experience of the case participant.<sup>xxxix</sup>

As stated in the zooming in part of this analysis, the aim was to provide an alternative perception of practice. The excerpts and their analyses are now being aligned with the reader's experiential knowledge, which determines how the impressions from my analysis are perceived and reacted to by different readers. Logically, the perceptions cannot be denied; however, abduction implies that they can be denied because it is possible to question or even reject their validity (Peirce, 1994, p. 169). Thus, when I make a triangulation between integrational linguistics and EMCA underpinning practice theory in a joint framework, the reader may question the validity of this new joint approach. Notwithstanding this, abduction is incorporated in the pragmatic maxim (Peirce, 1994, p. 176). Meaning, logically, that if this analysis is perceived as likely, then its hypothesis is automatically validated as an alternative perception of the practice presented, resolving the problem of

recovering the case participant's perspective. Possibly, this will afford a change of practice due to its perceptibility — its visibility — following Peirce (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 136–140). But if the analysis presents problems in interaction that are unnoticed, then it could impact future practices.

### 6.7.1 Aligning integrational linguistics with EMCA

Multifaceted developments of participant perspectives within bordering fields exist (for instance, in phenomenology and narrative medicine). According to integrational linguistics, the EMCA participant perspective is describing the participants only on the surface, which does not include the lifeworld side of descriptive practice (Taylor & Cameron, 1987, p. 114). Therefore, integrational linguistics advocates would argue that person-centeredness in EMCA is missing. Notwithstanding the divergences between EMCA and integrational linguistics, the two approaches share many common traits and can work complementarily if some integrational linguistics principles are compromised and data are allowed. At times, the approaches are even hard to distinguish from each other, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Drawing on the discussion throughout this thesis, it is my belief that, together, the two approaches can support a person-centered participant perspective. Additionally, a person-centered analysis had not yet been explored with integrational linguistics, making this contribution relevant. As well, it is excused by its pioneering; this thesis is to be considered a conceptual work in progress rather than a manual.

This study has explored how two approaches to meaning, one being private and individualistic (integrational linguistics), and the other being public and other-oriented (EMCA), can fruitfully be combined. To me, the analytical contributions of integrational linguistics and EMCA can be intertwined in the future. Foremost, theoretical and ontological disagreements mark their laminated divergence. Integrationists view all communication as uniquely contextualized by the participants. This points to a distinct integrational linguistics critique of CA's Achilles heel: the idea of presupposed normative accounts which generate analytical overgeneralization (Enfield & Sidnell, 2017, p. 9; Taylor & Cameron, 1987, p. 104; ten Have, 1990). To put it milder, CA tends to draw positivist-inclined conclusions, as if the data without the analyst's interpretation of it sufficed. The notion of atypical populations is a category (Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013) that the integrationist, for instance, would argue does not appropriate the individuality of language impairment. A generalized category discussed by Orman (2017) is dyslexia. This disorder might cause trouble in sign-reading while it very well can be unnoticeable in conversation. Therefore, Orman argues that, to the integrationist, dyslexia as a language disorder does not categorize

as a trouble in the language nor does it raise an issue of fluency, but it subscribes to a trouble with graphic reading. By the same token, aphasia caused by ABI does not categorize as a communication disorder and would need contextual reconsideration. However, in practice, diagnoses give access to treatment, and why this would not be a realistic scenario.

Yet, disagreements between integrational linguistics and EMCA can be assuaged by further analytical debate. Harris' integrational linguistics (1996, 1998) theoretically over-focuses on language and the linguistic, whereas EMCA researchers, at least when applied in the study of language disorders, focus on participation and action rather than language systems, which critics enhance (Taylor & Cameron, 1987). This is clearly demonstrated by Goodwin (2003a, 2013), who shows how a speaker with impairment uses the ability of co-present peers to speak by co-constructing and indexing meaning cooperatively, accomplished through varied prosody of a single interjection, "no" (Goodwin, 2013, p. 11). Likewise, this is demonstrated in the example above discussed by Raudaskoski (2013). Refutably, these analyses demonstrate the structured organization of action conceived by the EMCA program. However, they also presuppose a theory of signs, since the accomplishment is an agreement between participants both with and without impairments and afforded by both parties' linguistic knowledge, which must be quite different (cf. Goode, 1994b; Robillard, 1996, 1999). Why else, then, distinguish typical from atypical? The problem for integrational linguistic theorists is that they do not acknowledge the existence of any detachable linguistic faculty, which EMCA presupposes (Taylor & Cameron, 1987). Rather, theoretically, they orient towards a program of individual experientialism (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, p. 66).

This explains why I apply the notion of resemiotization to visualize the case participant's explicit contextualizations of metonymized place, enhancing that the act of resemiotization is considered an individualistic enterprise in this analysis. In sum, divergences between integrational linguistics and EMCA are downscaled, not overcome, through the dialogue of this analytical probing. Because of an inferior interest in linguistic and communicative norms, the impairment or non-impairment of the participants is of less relevance to the integrationist, since the individual experience has priority regardless of whether the individual has impairments or not.

Thus, the unique personal experience is placed at the heart of the analysis. Repeatedly, individual human proficiency is at the center of interest to the integrationist in order to promote QOL from a holistic perspective. A holistic QOL approach informs developers and implementers of QOL assessments with empirical insights into living with ABI and aphasia from studies of interaction and social inclusion/exclusion. This study is a step towards advancing formative evaluation tools in health and social care.

The new participant perspective of this study distinctly affords an empirically-based understanding of the individual, experiential side of ABI and aphasia, aiding policy development and evaluation: especially, informing QOL assessment of the psychosocial consequences of ABI and aphasia to follow the CRPD recommendations of social inclusion of the individual of this atypical population (UN, 2006, 2020) (QOL definition adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 2–4). Therefore, the integrational linguistics concept of proficiency is in no way normative. It is highly individual and creative (Harris, 2009b, pp. 80–81), and it is motored by experiential indeterminacy. As discussed in Chapter 4, first-order experiences are driven by linguistic suspense of indeterminacy (Orman, 2017; Pablé & Hutton, 2015, pp. 28–29, 59). Surprisingly, this is empirically demonstrated by the fact that the entire room holds its breath when the case participant initiates critical talk about ignorance at this place, marked by a significant pause and swift mobile camera movement, see Fig. 6.7. Who knows how it will unfold? (this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 140–142).

## 6.8 Conclusion

This person-centered approach focusing on the case participant’s habits in interaction portrays their integrational proficiency. Furthermore, this new analytical approach gives us access to a fine-tuned description of how individuals with impairments scaffold their social interaction by intelligibly drawing on basic interactional means rather than talk, extensive movement, facial expression, and haptics. In this view, this analytical perspective is a partnership between integrational linguistics and EMCA, afforded by the combination of the approaches underpinning practice theory and video ethnography.

As seen in the idiographic analysis, the excerpts presented do not demonstrate communication trouble occurs solely due to aphasia, but rather as interactional trouble, such as arguments, which can be ascribed to critical content of the communication. On this ground, the distinct contribution of this integrational linguistics-inspired analysis is to give attention to and demonstrate how integrational proficiency is accomplished. For this, however, the integrationist will need to draw on EMCA in order to gain transparency by visualizing data descriptions and by avoiding the use of anecdotes and speculations as *primary data*. These can serve as supportive data, but the contribution to language and communication disorder studies will need to consider including another type of primary data than the research analysts’ individual thoughts on the matter. These are included, obviously, in the

reinterpretation of data (Duncker, 2018). Therefore, I appreciate observation studies that engage with individuals with impairments who have difficulty making themselves understood by peers (Goodwin, 2003a, 2013; Wilkinson, 2011). Hopefully, this analysis equally contributes to the psychosocial understanding of language impairment by enhancing integrational proficiency (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 142).

## 6.9 Proficiency foregrounded

One of Harris' suggestions, that I deem relevant to the study of language and communication disorders, is the proposal to foreground the notion of proficiency. For instance, Harris suggests "communicational proficiency" as a more adequate term, a substitution for the notion of linguistic or communicational "competence," since they refer to general situational separatism. The notion of proficiency is the opposite; as a situational concept, it is not rule-based, nor code-based. Simply, it

depends on past experience; but there is no reason to believe that what will count as communicational proficiency can be precisely defined in advance of the situations that call for it. And if it cannot be defined in advance, then it cannot be legislated for, either by societies or by linguistic theorists (Harris, 2008b, p. 44).


The notion of proficiency demythologizes linguistic theory of "what goes on" experientially, not structurally. However, in many ways, the focus on proficiency is congruent with Goode's work on brain injury in *A World Without Words* (1994b), informed by ethnomethodology. On several nodes, integrationism and ethnomethodology seem to be in agreement. Notably, Harris was, to an extent, positive towards Garfinkel's work (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, p. 1). Goode's work (1994b) draws on Garfinkel's classical ethnomethodology, focusing on uniqueness and profound analysis of two single-cases, which Goode then compares (Goode, 1994b). Considering proficiency as the key to the individual's lifeworld, rather than considering structures, Harris and Goode are aligned. The main difference remains ontological. Foremost, the notion of indeterminacy is a point of divergence. While researchers of ethnomethodology understand phenomenology as an inert striving towards determinacy instances defined as points of intersubjectivity (conscience connectedness), the integrationist, as the ethnomethodologist, considers communication intersubjective, but not necessarily connected, because of a notion of radical indeterminacy. Determinacy is never fixed, not even momentarily, but always

moving. This “radical” view on language, and thus intersubjectivity, has analytical consequences. In its own right, an orthodox integrational stance would not favor empirical analysis; however, a Nordic integrationism could consider the possibility. Since my focus is on consequences of activity, I make no claim of studying language. I discuss responses to actions, not to linguistics. Some of the actions have linguistic elements, but this is secondary to my interest. Because of a lack of methodology for empirically studying activity within integrational linguistic traditions, I needed to combine integrationism with a methodology that could afford grasping this aspect.

We have seen a number of consequences demonstrated in the analysis through the participant’s observable resemiotizations of “the place” over several excerpts with the purpose of participating (surviving dialogically). First, the place is enacted as a physical trouble source in the kitchen (Fig. 6.4), and second, as a cue for criticism in the first conference room meeting (Fig. 6.7). Thirdly, it may be seen as an evaluative contribution in the second conference room meeting (Fig. 6.8). We have also seen a therapist gatekeeping and regulating activity when the participant’s initiatives (probably) were perceived as criticisms (Figs. 6.2 and 6.4). At least, Søren responded to as if they were criticisms. These consequences could not be demonstrated without empirical interaction analysis. Simply, my research would have been about me, not the case participant, if I drew the attention more towards my contextualization; thus, I have carefully tried not to expose this fallacy of integrationism. Indeed, I had to compromise integrational principles in order to even begin considering combining the approaches for an empirical analysis underpinning integrational linguistics. However, I deemed it necessary to advance the study of atypical interaction with the valuable integrational insight into human experience.

On the next page, Fig. 6.10 summarizes the initial outcome of the analytical part of this study, demonstrating the main problem as perceived by integrationists: the problem of accessing a first-person perspective. The problem is contrasted with the approach to first-person access in the bordering approaches applied. Fig. 6.10 is a visualization of agreements and divergences between integrational linguistics, ethnomethodology and EMCA.

**Fig. 6.10. Tenets for the study of human experience: integrational linguistics, ethnomethodology and EMCA**



*Note.* IL is an abbreviation for integrational linguistics; EM for ethnomethodology

My attempt is to show that little advance can be done on the basis of integrationism alone. In concert with EMCA, it has proved possible to consider interactional consequences from the case participant's perspective. The next chapter discusses the implications of agreements and divergences further.

## 7 Discussion of the integrational EMCA analytical perspective

### 7.1 The individual perspective from within the social ensemble

Traditionally, an applied integrational perspective cannot regard context as agential in its own right; a “renewer” of the structure of social interaction as it is conceptualized in traditions of CA and EMCA (Fleming, 1997, p. 197). Though context may not be considered an entity, as context is renewed by the participants through their participation, still the question of *whose* context it is, remains unanswered. Therefore, there is a tendency to consider contextualization a personalist concept in an integrational linguistic perspective (Hutton, 2019; Zhou, 2020). Importantly, this incentive foregrounds the core difference between the concept of lifeworld in a Harrisian semiology, and lifeworld as an empirical conceptualization derived from the EMCA tradition, which, contrastingly, is grounded in the situated, local order of interactional logistics. Yet, this does not mean that integrationism does not consider the impact of sociality; the question being *how* the individual is located in the social ensemble, analytically. Following the EMCA tradition, a sociality focus on social order — institutional and routinized ways of participating and understanding — explains the consequences for the individual in the social. For instance, Søren’s exclusions from dialogue (discussed in Chapter 6.5.1, drawing on Fig. 6.1, and similarly, in Chapter 6.5.3, drawing on Fig. 6.4) could be explained by his participatory framework using a pure EMCA perspective. Participating with actions that can be perceived as criticisms by the therapists, Søren makes himself available for exclusion in order to sustain the situation, which is constituted by a socially ordered relevancy of behaving properly at a meeting with guest participant researchers. This is gatekept by the therapist in both of these cases, regulating the participant’s actions and participation. However, if social order were not the focus of the analysis, but Søren’s individual perspective, the analysis could instead demonstrate how the case participant actually uses the presence of guest participant researchers as affording to seize a critical moment to give voice to his experienced problems.

This result of interpretation can be derived from my integrational analysis, since the characterizations I make of the participants’ actions, by using EMCA tools to trace their participation, scaffold their observable perspective in showing that something is important to them to communicate during these specific occasions, and aligning with




who are present in these situations. An EMCA analysis could arrive at similar conclusion, but with reservations about taking their individual perspective and enhancing instead how this was jointly constructed. Whether this is the participant's or the analyst's interpretation is unquestionable. It is unquestionably an abductive element of the integrational analysis, but, as discussed in Chapter 6.7, it does not categorize as unqualified guessing relying on abduction; rather, it includes a relational element and distances the analysis from occasionally perceived positivist claims. Since I cannot access the participant's interpretation any more than the EMCA analyst can, I make use of contextualization myself as an analytical resource. As discussed by Duncker:

(...) the analyst must endeavor to 'see', and hence show readers, what the participants might have 'seen' at any given point in time, not in the sense of claiming to be able to reconstruct the experience of particular historical individuals, but of laying out (parts of) the trail of events on which that experience could in principle have been based. The analysis must present to the end reader a picture of what it might have looked like from the perspective of individual agents on particular occasions. This picture, in turn, may serve as an interpretational basis for assessing their communicational strategies and assumptions (2018, p. 146).

However, my interpretation is derived from a (phenomenological) contextualization of *Søren* embedded with my extra-situational knowledge of *him* derived also from other situations, which help validate my interpretation (elaborating the video material and field notes), contributing to a sensitivity to *him* (Arminen, 2000). Yet, my contextualization may be insensitive to institutional practices because of my insufficient knowledge of the practitioner experts' taken-for-granted orientation towards residents based on their knowledge and professional reasoning, where I, at first sight, could have mistaken a routinized response for an exercise of institutional power. However, this was not the main scope of the analysis. Rather, I wanted to discharge the institutional context, their *environmental integration* (Harris, 2009a, p. 72) and focus on the participant's *interpersonal integration* (Harris, 2009a, p. 72) and "see" what consequences the interaction would have for participation through *Søren's* integrational proficiency. Furthermore, it demonstrates in my tracing of *Søren's* participation that, at several instances, I have noted down, he gazes directly into the camera a few seconds after making a claim (discussed in Chapters 6.5.5 and 6.5.6). In other instances, the case participant makes use of the co-presence of the camera by gazing into it while making claims (see Fig. 7.1, below). For instance, this happens at an occasion discussed in Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019, p. 9), where the case

participant counterclaims the research assistant's talk about ABI and spasticity by telling about and showing his experience of spasticity and its consequences. In the analyzed extract, Søren directs his gaze towards the camera while counterclaiming and the camera is placed with the research assistant. Similar examples are found in transcriptions from occasions deselected for analysis.

**Fig. 7.1. Søren gazing towards the camera while counterclaiming the research assistant (#fig., cf. Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019, p. 9)**



Importantly, Hutton's (2017) discussion of the integrational linguistic positioning on reflexivity sheds some light on the difference between the integrational approach and the pure EMCA approach. Mainly, the integrational notion of the language-makers' first-order experience, and their distinction from second-order concepts are the dividing point:

The self-awareness of lay members is of a different order to the reflexive perspective of the ethnomethodological analyst. (...) classical ethnomethodology is closer to evolutionary models of behavior than its phenomenological grounding would suggest. It is grounded in the second-order achievement of social order, as opposed to survival and reproductive success (Hutton, 2017, pp. 95–96).

Namely, Hutton (2017) argues that researchers using EMCA perspective alone do not make an explicit distinction between orders. Overall, this lack of reflection is the basis of the integrational claim. Critics argue that the integrational approach possesses a more phenomenologically-grounding perspective than the perspective operated in EMCA and CA studies. In integrational terms, EMCA and CA researchers lean towards a third-person perspective attending to the phenomenon of social order

without discussing this point of departure as non-first-person (Harris & Wolf, 2008; Perregaard, 2016; Taylor & Cameron, 1987; Zhou, 2020). For this critical reason, an integrational analytic perspective — the person-centered analytical (first-person) perspective — is conceptualized as an opposition to EMCA researchers' pure foregrounding of a members' methods perspective, as listed in Fig. 7.1 of Chapter 6.9.

My integrational EMCA perspective is located somewhere in between these positionings. First, I consider the ontological presuppositions of my approach and foreground the problem of orders in Chapters 3 and 4. Yet I apply a social analysis using EMCA tools in order to demonstrate the observed consequences of interaction traced through Søren's displayed enterprise of social participation. The difference, thus, lies in the explicit reflection of the implication of this, with the consequence of warranted interpretations. I claim that my interpretations of the result of the case participant's actions are more careful than they would be using a pure EMCA perspective, and that they explicitly pertain to my perception of their actions and not some claimed objective assessment. Even though the case participant's actions are made available through video recording, transcription, and pictorial material, I am still the single author of their interpretation. After participating in a data session with this extract, I made the decisions on what to include and what not to pay attention to. My interpretation may also be informed by researchers that I have studied the extracts with. But this is no different from my thoughts and understandings being informed by others in every aspect of life, in an integrational perspective. Whatever interpretation the reader of this thesis derives from the material presented is a different one from mine and, thus, their interpretation.

Furthermore, to the traditional (and Nordic) integrationist, the notion of *privacy of sign-making* is of importance, since it reads that “ (...) signs do not necessarily have any social dimension at all: there can be private signs, meaningful for one individual only” (Harris, 2009a, p. 76). Therefore, the integrational linguistic analysis differs in another crucial respect: the perception of time in analysis. Depending on what is being investigated, the integrationist is more interested in an experiential perspective of time: the individual and their qualitative, personal experience of time (i.e. *kairos* time; cf. “vivid present” by Schutz, 1962, discussed in Ayass, 2017). EMCA researchers are interested in *ongoing* participation, why they mark pauses, pace of talk to “reproduce the lived time of the interaction, as opposed to the mechanics of clocks” (i.e. *chronos* time; de Kok, 2008).

I claim that the experiential aspect of integrational linguistics allows a closer inspection of the individual in interaction. In Chapter 3.3.1, I illustrated the difference in analytical direction in Fig. 2 and demonstrated this in the above analysis targeting the connections between occasions. This time argument is important when turning to

analyzing interaction with participants who have impairments and, therefore, possess highly individual and alternative perception of their time experience. Their perception of relevance may differ from that of participants who do not have physical or cognitive impairments. This does not assume less competence, in an integrational perspective, but an alternative, personal timeliness. In sum, the integrational linguistic analysis may be directed both forward and backwards, following Fig. 2 of Chapter 3.3.1 (temporal integration, cf. Harris, 2009a, pp. 72–73), because it depends on experienced time, *kairos* time, and not on *chronos* time of the participants. In addition, time is bound to the analyst interpreter, since linguistic experience is reported “ (...) as interpreted by the analyst (...) For one thing, that ‘now’ is no longer ‘now,’ but a single point in time partially reconstructed from available historical sources. The original ‘now’ is long gone” (Duncker, 2018, p. 146). This means that several timescales are co-present, following the discussion in Chapter 4.1 of the integrational relation between participants, including the analyst’s relation to the analyzed subjects’ interaction, illustrated in Fig. 4. The notion of analysis as recontextualization (Damm, 2016), thus, encompasses that the analyst accounts for what was exclusively *perceived* as the participants’ actions.

My suggestion of a person-centered perspective relies on an altered ontology of language and communication, which aligns with integrational linguistics to some extent. To the integrationist, “(t)he self-awareness of lay members is of a different order to the reflexive perspective of the ethnomethodological analyst” (Hutton, 2017, p. 96). This is a key analytical difference between integrational linguistics and EMCA. By pointing to recontextualization as an analytical concept, the analyst avoids discussing the premises of contextualization and cotemporality any further, since they obviously also apply to the analyst’s temporal contextualizations as discussed by Harris (1998, p. 98; Duncker, 2011, 2018).

In contrast, a CA- or EMCA-based analysis is always applied in a forward rolling time perspective in accounting for the participants’ linguistic experience. This demonstrates empirically in interaction with language and communication disorders. For instance, in the reoccurrence of themes that are occasioned several turns later or in extensive turn length, for instance, these are often responded to with embedded repair (Schegloff, 1992) by interlocutors orienting to the delay of participants who have aphasia as having a motor problem, memory deficiency or simply a trait of cognitive disability (Perkins, 2003).

Since the integrational concept of contextualization is often applied in the verb form “to contextualize,” it allows the analyst to approach a person’s display of understandings as traces in the data and not as treated or monitored by the other participants. While the integrational approach has a tendency to overtly use extra-situational knowledge, EMCA studies attend to this type of knowledge tacitly.

However, (EM)CA researchers tend to include extra-situational knowledge, translating it into “setting specific knowledge,” (Arminen, 2000, p. 436). Thus, they are proofed by the next-turn proof-procedure of EMCA (Sacks et al., 1974), which frames CA’s participant perspective. However, there are multi-faceted developments of participants’ perspectives within bordering fields. For instance, narrative medicine (Charon, 2001) applies the narrative interview as a strategy to examine yet another participant perspective without attending to the question of time. The integrational concept of time, embedded in contextualization, demonstrates that an integrational participant perspective is more personal than the EMCA participant social-time perspective (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, chap. 3).

### 7.1.1 A lifeworld analytical perspective

According to integrational linguistic critics of EMCA, the EMCA participant perspective is describing the participants only on the surface, which does not include the lifeworld-related side (of descriptive practice) of being seen as a person — a new participant’s perspective (cf. Hutton, 2008, 2017, p. 96; Perregaard, 2016; Taylor, 1982; Taylor & Cameron, 1987; Zhou, 2014, 2020). Therefore, integrational linguistics advocates argue that a person-centered perspective in social studies’ EMCA program is missing (Fleming, 1995, 1997; Harris, 2008b; Hutton, 2008). Notwithstanding the divergences between EMCA and integrational linguistics (Klemmensen, 2018, chaps. 3 and 4), I dispute that the two approaches complement each other on a number of points, apparently previously unnoticed by integrational linguistics critics. Furthermore, the complementarity affords integrating the two to bring forward the tradition of integrational linguistics towards empirical analysis. It is my belief that, when brought together, the two approaches can outline a desired person-centered participant perspective and raise awareness of a warranted need for advancing, despite of ontological divergences. Yet, this is unexplored territory, since a person-centered analytical perspective in language and communication disorders remains unexplored, within integrational linguistics as well.

As demonstrated in Fig. 6.10 of Chapter 6.9, using only integrational linguistics, the extent to which other people’s activities can be studied is poor. In its own right, since contextualization is an exclusive individual concept, focusing on the inaccessible first-person perspective of others is a troublesome outset. Despite a belief in communication’s intersubjectivity, studying the activities of participants without being able to approach them nor to attempt accessing their experience at least resembles a tendency of theorism. While turning to empirical traditions, such as ethnomethodology, the possibility of data analysis is enriched by the perception that communication is considered as an intersubjective enterprise constituting social order

through ongoing negotiation of meaning as prerequisite. Therefore, ethnomethodology is placed in the middle of the triangle. However, CA is the richest in this respect, and positioned at the bottom baseline of the triangle because this methodology allows endless observation of material, trusting participants' display as analyzable, and making linguistic material accessible to a third-party (the analyst). However, as discussed throughout this thesis, many ontological fallacies exist within CA (Taylor & Cameron, 1987) that are not attended to.

In sum, an integrational EMCA analytical perspective probes a participant's perspective as a matter of agency linked to the activity of contextualizing, rather than focusing on the traditional descriptive practice of interaction mechanisms and logistics of the interaction, releasing integrational linguistics from its theorism tendency. EMCA tools, foremost, may be the starting point of the analysis as they represent a more stripped form of interaction analysis. The contextualized analysis embeds data interpretation with the analyst's ethnographic understanding of the data and, thus, forms the ending point or integrational framing of the analysis: a person-centered analytical practice that supports a deeper analysis. Arminen (2000) argues that EMCA analyses also do this. I agree that Rasmussen (2013) and Andersen et al. (2018) tend to go down this path. While mainstream EMCA studies, to the best of my knowledge, do not include personalist observation from their ethnography within atypical interaction studies. In the quest for capturing the history of interaction, of "what goes on for someone," the aim is for the analyst to uncover patterns of communicative behavior and of similarities to co-support claims that "samenesses" occur. Yet, my pattern tracking is based on my experience of similarity that is traced, not on objectivism, and using tools from CA to track their traces in the data but following my timescale, not the participants'. The trouble spots that I have pointed out are traced in the dataset, but they are my perceived repetitions of orders of doing things, which are preserved in traces that I refer to in standard scientific terms, such as recorded material, supportive evidence or simply, "dataset." In consequence, the analyst, primarily, has responsibility in communicating and conducting their actions morally and transparently. Communication is regarded purposeful to a higher degree and not just as "doing" this or that. However, Arminen (2008) warns that while a scientific approach, such as CA, may appear mechanical and "standardizing" phenomena, the opposite, a radical approach that Arminen labels *radical ethnomethodology*, tends to lose its phenomenon in technical skills used to bracket everyday resources and in using theories. Indeed, this is a fallacy. Yet, I believe that integrational linguistics makes it feasible to grasp the lifeworld phenomenon of atypical interaction in this case, since it is but one individual's perspective that this analysis foregrounds — not accounting for a whole "lived orderliness of society" (Arminen, 2008, p. 169), or the atypical population.

The integrational linguistic layer in this analysis turns inquiry into language and communication disorder matters into an ontological matter. Based on the assumption of an integrated system of language and communication, person-centeredness and a person's rights perspective replace the idea of social order accomplishments, constituting an often missing deep inquiry into language and communication and lived practices (Duncker, 2018, pp. 146–147): the analysis is not about me. It is about the case participant's activities reported by me. The above is mere ontological positioning. The analysis is about a person who has disability due to traumatic ABI and how they manage interaction. It is a glimpse into the lived practice of their individual functional and cognitive disability and the interactional consequences that they face in everyday life, constructing a lifeworld perspective using an integrational EMCA analytical perspective. This unique insight cannot be drawn from an ICF assessment, nor from interviews or standard CA analyses. Goode's (1994b) ethnomethodological approach comes closest to the integrational perspective, only Goode does not analyze video recordings but summarizes findings in narrative reports. I have chosen to analyze the video recordings using EMCA tools to provide transparency (Demuth, 2018) and for the purpose of allowing readers to make their own assessments.

## 7.2 Substantiating the combination of integrational linguistics and EMCA

The introduction of integrational linguistics in this study with an empirical dimension is open to criticism from within the field as well as from outside. Notwithstanding a great body of literature defending its position philosophically, obviously, a position that discards any idea of a language, of any coding, and, thus, of fixable meanings is open to criticism because "it cannot be legislated for, either by societies or by linguistic theorists" (Harris, 2008b p. 44) when compared to present general discourse within the language sciences. However, the language sciences are changing; in 2020, the tenets of integrational linguistics may seem less provocative or even radical (Linell, 2018; Steffensen, 2016; Zhou, 2020).

However, I agree that the integrational linguistic framework formulated by Harris is inappropriate in its present form and needs updating. First of all, it is highly problematic that Harris' writing seems to have lexical "allergy" against the social as if the notion of social would always point at social structures, rules, etc. Rather, it could also just apply to the fact that we are human beings that take into consideration the other human beings when with them. There are several other issues that will be elaborated on below.

Within bordering directions close to integrational linguistics (e.g. the distributed language theory, eco-linguistics, situated languaging and dialogism, whose thoughts are much in line with integrational linguistics), advances have been made towards interdisciplinarity. Over the years, these directions have augmented their volume of publications, created several international networks, and gained from many directions. Yet, hardliner integrational linguists seek no dialogue (Săftoiu & Pablé, 2018; Pablé, 2019; Weigand, 2018), and rely only on Harris' words. The so-called "soft-liners" (Weigand, 2018), who are in agreement with Harris' words but who allow empirical experimentation, are more open to dialogue. This applies to the Nordic integrationism that I have referred to.

I am inspired by integrational linguistics' core concepts, but I do not follow the orthodox ideas of integrational linguistics as a solution to answer all questions and meet all integrational linguistics standards regarding language and communication. My position is inspired and informed by integrational linguistics, but I am not striving to become dogmatic. My affiliation is primarily with Nordic integrationism that has arisen within the past decade (Klemmensen, 2018, p. 98; cf. Duncker, 2011, 2017, 2018; Duncker & Perregaard, 2017; Nielsen, 2011; Perregaard, 2016, 2017; Thibault, 2017b, 2018). As a divergent point between these two directions in contemporary integrationism, the Nordic version discards, precisely, the orthodox integrational linguistics position on non-use of data and empirical analysis. With the Nordic stance on integrational linguistics, I point to a novel opportunity of dialogue with this suggestion of an interdisciplinary approach. I do not consider it ontologically problematic to combine integrational linguistics with, for instance, principles from ethnomethodology and CA, as have my predecessors (Fleming, 1995, 1997; Harris, 2008b; Taylor, 1982, 1986, 1992; Taylor & Cameron, 1987), as long as divergences are critically discussed (not hidden) and, to some extent, positioned for *descriptive purposes*, not for mere debating. My positioning is discussed elaboratively in Klemmensen (2018).

This thesis' person-centered perspective is based on an analytical suggestion that moves from a CA-oriented interaction analysis, is then enriched with contextualization from supportive evidence and elaboration and, finally, a layer of basic principles from integrational linguistics. Tuning in to the integrational linguistics layer, Duncker's integrational stance (2011, 2018) on the analytical meaning of "observable units" or "data," criticizes the lack of reflection of "how the terms such as 'empirical,' 'evidence,' and 'data' are construed" (Duncker, 2011, p. 533). This also applies to video analysis, following Demuth (2018), who calls for similar scrutiny. Furthermore, Duncker and Demuth's urge for the analyst to take responsibility and explicitly claim that the result of analysis is their interpretation of



the data — not the data itself, since this is an illusion (Duncker, 2018; Demuth, 2018) as discussed in Chapter 4.3.

What differentiates, then, the integrational linguistics perspective from the EMCA perspective? Foremost, the consideration of units of observance is problematic. When the person-centered perspective is applied, then the observer does not observe linguistic units nor multimodal units in isolation. The macrosocial, biomechanical and circumstantial factors of the communicational infrastructure that together shape the phenomenon under observation and, thus, as a whole, this intersection, this nexus of practice, becomes the platform for the analysis — not a single recording of words or gestures. The case of distinguishing the object of observance is often referred to as a matter of complementarity (Barad, 2007), following Bohr (1985).<sup>xxxii</sup> In sum, this combination of integrational linguistics and EMCA is truly diffractive, and divergent principles have been carefully discussed and realigned.

### 7.2.1 Traditional tools for analysis in integrational linguistics: criticism

It is problematic that integrational linguistics offers very few analytical tools, at least from Harris' hand, demonstrated in Fig. 7.1 of Chapter 6.9. Notwithstanding this, implicit discussion of the principle of complementarity has high priority when criticizing other approaches on an integrational basis, including the integrational criticism of the presuppositions of the EMCA program (Fleming, 1995, 1997; Taylor & Cameron, 1987).

The framework of EMCA relies on Harold Garfinkel's original idea of the pre-existence of an ever emergent, but orderly, mechanism which manages individuals' affairs with one another: a constitutive social order (Garfinkel, 1967). Members' methods are examined within EMCA, and local orders and their constitutive properties are described as a central area of interest. The general idea is to uncover how members achieve mutual understanding, and how they display their actions intelligibly (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984; Rawls, 2008). Within EMCA, shared understanding and mutual orientation towards general rules are presupposed and linked to the core concept of *order*: "Garfinkel argues that what makes an action recognizable to others as an action of a particular sort are constitutive aspects of the orderliness of an action — sequential and reflexive order — that constitutes the action as a recognizable action — for this group of identified actors — engaged in just this practice together" (Rawls, 2008, p. 19). However, language and human activities are considered radically indeterminate in an integrational view. This focus on indeterminacy within integrational linguistics is opposed to the presupposed orders

searched for within the EMCA program (Hutton, 2017; Taylor & Cameron, 1987; Zhou, 2014). Currently, the EMCA program is heavily criticized by Hong Kong-based integrationists (Hutton, 2017; Zhou, 2020) for the analytical framing of EMCA. For instance, EMCA is compared to “a machine model of human behavior” (Zhou, 2014, p. 1) aligned with other contemporary approaches besides integrational linguistics. Therefore, Hutton criticizes EMCA’s analytical strategies and classifies it as “evolutionary” rather than “phenomenological” (Hutton, 2017):

Participants experience the first-order reality of the categories and the explanatory power of their reflexive accounts, what might be termed ‘lived essentialism’, while the external observer perceives, in ‘disenchanted’ Weberian fashion, an ultimately contentless, although ineluctable, drive for social order (Orbuch, 1997). This suggests that classical ethnomethodology is closer to evolutionary models of behavior than its phenomenological grounding would suggest. It is grounded in the second-order achievement of social order, as opposed to survival and reproductive success (pp. 95–96).

In similar fashion, since the 1980s, integrationists have excessively criticized EMCA for its search for regularities and structures of social action rather than intersubjectivity (Taylor, 1992; Taylor & Cameron, 1987, p. 161). Notwithstanding a heavy tradition of criticism of all other ontologies than the integrational linguistics ontology in the orthodox Harrisian tradition, this study attempts to unfold an applied integrationism. I insist that a person-centered approach is operational. It is methodologically inspired by EMCA in the sense that, for instance, the notion of *members methods* is incorporated analytically, as well as the application of other CA-inspired vocabulary. However, the concepts of contextualization and cotemporality are the basis of the personalist approach that I favor in accordance with Zhou’s suggestion of a more humane linguistics (Zhou, 2014, 2020).

As discussed, there are several overlaps between EMCA and integrational linguistics. Importantly, orthodox integrationists consider EMCA studies segregational in ontology, since they are criticized for merely replacing the system of “language” with a search for a system of “talk” (Fleming, 1995, 1997; Taylor & Cameron, 1987). I, however, believe that contemporary EMCA studies, notwithstanding an interest in revealing the overall organization of talk and multimodal interaction, are so fine-grained in their ontological considerations that a new attempt at harmonization is relevant and operational. Accordingly, the integrationist critique that, for instance, EMCA frames a presupposed system which is explored, no longer holds. A nuance is left out in this critique, since it is the traceable consequences of talk and multimodality in interaction, not the system

organizing it, which are investigated. From these data, findings are drawn, not from the organizational system. Because of the historical divergence between integrational linguistics and EMCA, there are inert ontological divergences between the two in a joint approach underpinning practice theory. These are, however, sought resolved by the above positioning.

The integrational linguistics concept of radical indeterminacy promotes the observation that radical transitions inherently occur both in linguistic form and in the perceived meaning of actions (Orman, 2017). Orman argues that “Without the determinacy provided by linguistics, the desired methodology and epistemological framework of sociolinguistic ethnography, qua positivist-empirical investigation into language, collapses.” (Orman, 2017, p. 101). However, EMCA and integrational linguistics agree on the entanglement of emergence and indeterminacy. However, these are not necessarily shared in any way and may as well occur implicitly. At first, it seems problematic that Orman applies the vocabulary of linguistics to criticize linguistics — as did Harris. In consequence, outside integrational linguistics, very few take integrational linguistics seriously. Simply, an ontological discussion would soften up the correlational differences. Contrastingly, the correlation between EMCA and integrational linguistics underpinning a practice theory framing allows favoring the approach to human activity as inherently indeterminate, as formulated within the theoretical framework of integrational linguistics, and it frees the analyst from positivist inclination and explanatory burden. I, therefore, argue that it may be done as a result of a fine-tuned analysis of divergences, the purpose being the development of tools for analysis. By introducing integrational linguistics in a joint framework underpinning practice theory, the rules and units from EMCA are downgraded and the role of temporality upgraded (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 80–83).

### 7.2.2 Analyzable indeterminacy underpinning practice theory

Similarly, to the integrational linguistic view on communication as an inherent mode of emergent human activity, practice theorist Schatzki’s inclination towards Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s ideas allows for closely describing the indeterminacy in social events (Schatzki, 2013; cf. Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). This descriptive emergence of events and actions state an analyzable research object: the traceability of the human mode of being, becoming and transitioning from one event to another (Schatzki, 2002), which is in accordance with the purpose of this study and its vision. In addition, it refutes Orman’s argument (2017) of the impossibility of using other data than introspection and the analyst’s private speculations. Practice theory promotes studies in practices, as does the EMCA program. By introducing a

practice theoretical ontology of indeterminacy, as promoted by Schatzki, the problem of inclination towards a theoretical basis of determinacy in orthodox linguistics, which underlies segregational approaches, is also solved (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 83–84).

### 7.2.3 Paradigmatic prerequisites

Paradigmatically, EMCA draws strongly on a reformulation of sociology, while integrational linguistics underpinning practice theory draws on a common ground philosophy of language and communication, which do not presuppose and highlight orientation towards “orderliness” to the same extent as EMCA. These historical bodies of the different approaches produce diverse observations. However, these may be applied complementarily to turn the spotlight in empirical studies and grasp correlated emergent practices in interaction, enriching the analysis. Indeed, the linguistic vocabulary applied throughout Harris’ own writings and the writings of fellow integrationists may even be said to complicate the assessment of valuable ideas about a dynamic perspective on language, communication and understanding. By discarding linguistic vocabulary, it may help disseminating a person-centered approach. To continue the above criticism of Orman’s orthodox stance, Harris writes that “signs” are never neutral to communication (Harris, 2009b, p. 87). In the first place, why at all phrase persons’ experiential meaning in communication as “signs”? Furthermore, Harris speaks against orthodox linguistics and structuralism as a central theme (Harris, 1996, 1998). In my view, the dynamic aspects of Harris’ descriptions of communication are of much greater interest than their critical side remarks, which, unfortunately, are often foregrounded. Therefore, the attempt in this study is to “cleanse” integrationism from linguistic terms and linguistic vocabulary, and reduce the area of interest to a person-centered approach concerning persons, relevant understanding and actions, and consolidate these as the point of departure for developing a dynamic analytical perspective on understanding communication. In this view, linguistic terms and linguistic morass are avoided. Accordingly, this stance is completely at my expense (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 84).

### 7.2.4 Envisioned integrational EMCA perspective

The paradigmatic differences between CA and integrational linguistics are a trouble source, drawing on Fleming (1995, 1997). However, in my vision of an applied integrationism, it is not an inconceivable task to discuss nor to sort out language philosophically and ontologically. Actual persons’ affairs with each other anchor the

making of meaning as they go about contextualizing. The display of understandings may be considered traces of ongoing explicit contextualization. An analytical challenge arises with the notion of contextualization, but also endless new analytical possibilities, when focus in the analysis has changed from the readable transcript to the persons communicating. We need not document all a person contains but may deal with their displays in an alternative fashion when turning the spotlight away from “rule-governed” social interaction and towards the concept of a person communicating what they contextualize as relevant. Following fellow integrationists advocating an applied integrationism, I am not convinced that social interaction is as rule-governed as supposed. Traditionally, I believe that creativity, as we have seen in the analysis, plays a much larger, but unnoticed, part in everyday life (Duncker, 2018; Goodwin & Cekaite, 2018; Nielsen, 2011; Pablé & Hutton, 2015, pp. 71–72; Zhou, 2020; adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 84–85).

## 8 Discussion of the empirical part

### 8.1 Interpretive contributions of integrational EMCA

The empirical part of this thesis centered on field work carried out by the research group. The idiographic analysis of the social consequences of the case participant with Phase 4 status used a single-case qualitative analysis targeting *the case participant* of special interest, tracking *the case participant* across parts of the dataset. Through participatory fieldwork, we had first-person experience ourselves with the participants and the recording of the video data, which helped contextualize the contributions made. Only episodes when we were sure that we could offer a new perspective on the course of the interaction were selected and inspected for close analysis. As stated in Chapter 4, we contributed ourselves to the development of the interaction, so no claim is made that the professional practitioners had intentional agendas at any point in the analyses. We followed the complexity of social encounters with individuals who had impairments to investigate their participation and consider which problematic aspects we could direct attention towards in order to consider their roles in social relations, and hereby research discourse in impaired interaction, as such. For instance, the data demonstrated that especially the professional practitioners' attention was directed towards categorizing the participation of individuals who had impairments as requiring their corrections and initiation of therapy. However, this strategy did not prove affordable in all cases, since it discarded the ability of the individual who had impairments to make relevant contributions, even to phatic conversation, as discussed in Chapter 6.

In order to study the subtle and complex ways in which social exclusion is practiced, a search was made in the ordered, transcribed and examined extracts from the project's data archive, categorized after whether the case participant with impairments was met in their wish to participate in roundtable interaction. Especially as the situation was an attempt to "activate" them in occupational therapy (the site was called "The Culture and Competence Centre"). A review of their habitual ways of linguistically making an entry in conversation by a long characteristic stuttering sequence accompanied by a raised hand helped isolate extracts where they explicitly displayed a wish to participate. How exclusion was consequently categorized depended on whether they would resign from the dialogue without compliance; often, withdrawal would occur after a long series of embedded repair work (Jefferson, 1987) performed by one of the co-present care workers. The empirical findings are further

discussed in the three publications that form the background of this thesis, as stated in the preface: Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; and Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019.

The analytical interest in dissonant trouble-talk focused on how the case participant is misaligned with the institutional representatives, therapists and their “orders,” and, not in the least, why. To investigate this empirically, collections of correction, repairs and the therapist’s use of their gatekeeping position were scrutinized using EMCA-based tools to demonstrate the trajectories of practices that unfolded.

Overall, the empirical study’s frame had a twofold purpose. First, it encapsulated observational units in interactions (Krummheuer, 2015; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski, 2013) and recorded practices of inclusion and exclusion. Data were described to explore the encounters to provide sample material for further theoretical investigation, analytical innovation and, possibly, professional supervision. Second, they described a single-case analysis of the case participant’s abilities through a participation lens focusing on possibilities and opportunities. Even when Søren participated with criticisms that counterclaimed the co-present professionals, this enhanced his possibility of developing relational communication skills, conceptualized from an integrationist point of view at the outset. Notwithstanding the identification of critical instances of manifest misalignments, this thesis’ empirical analysis is not meant as a critique of professionals. Rather, it foregrounds how-ability (Raudaskoski, 2013): how communication is managed between the case participant and their therapist in practice, seen from the individual’s perspective — how they initiate action and how these are responded to by the therapist. This frame is opposed to considering aphasia a condition and, foremost, as a communicational disability (Goodwin, 2003a; Harris, 2009a; Hughes, 2007; Parr, 2008). An omitted feature of this framing is the question of power, which is not made explicit, though I characterize the therapist’s responding to Søren’s actions as categorizing him as non-ratified participant, leading to his exclusion. However, I have chosen to downscale this important question further. Purposefully, my focus is, in line with a critical social ontology in disability studies, sat on how-ability and the proficiency of the case resident to skillfully participate communicatively (Hughes, 2007). Therefore, I, in line with Harris (2008b), apply the term “proficiency” rather than “competence,” since competence alludes a normativity perspective, as discussed in Chapter 6.9.

Ontologically, my analysis draws on the integrational linguistic concept of radical indeterminacy, discussed in Chapters 2.3.7; 3.2.2; and 7.2.1. I analyzed the case participant’s participation as embodied actions during activities in the material environment to get closer to life situations as they unfolded, in my perception of their lifeworld. This focus on participation, discussed in Chapters 1–6, specifically in

Chapter 5.3, has been an important analytical endeavor since an outspoken social indignation on behalf of the individuals who have ABI would have distracted this study in at least three ways. First, it would have taken focus away from describing their how-ability thoroughly. Second, it would victimize them unnecessarily, following critical disability studies (Hughes, 2007). Third, and perhaps most importantly, it would have biased the reliability of the analysis due to personal interests of the analyst. Therefore, I have carefully considered my analytical contribution not to be conceptualized as a criticism.

As stated in the beginning of this thesis, policies, practices, and routines are implemented around individuals who have impairments and conceptualized with good intentions. At instances, however, they may seem harmful rather than beneficial; meaning that, regardless of local inclusion policies, exclusion of individuals who have impairments recurs in interaction. Inclusion/exclusion are interactional consequences, as demonstrated in the analysis. My wish is to highlight the trouble spots in interaction trajectories in a fine-grained analysis drawing on EMCA tools. Importantly, exclusion is not considered a fixed concept in this thesis. On the contrary, exclusion is considered emergent: instantaneously, occasions of both inclusion and exclusion emerge which can transform into something else or vanish in the next instance, much in the same way all other signs are made (Klemmensen, 2020).

Since inclusion/exclusion are concepts, they do not possess agency: rather, a *someone* responds to a *somebody* as *someone* perceives or misunderstands an action that *somebody* made available. This action can then be responded to with another action that, in a certain manner, perceives as building upon it with a new aligning or misaligning action, or even with an ambiguous action track, following Fig. 4 in Chapter 4.1. This is not to reduce all response to yes/no/perhaps tokens, but to point to the relationality between the interactions and the analyst by oversimplifying the complexity of the agents' possible conceptualizations, demonstrated in Fig. 5 with Duncker's model (2005), discussed in Chapter 4.2. The dynamics of communication emerge due to the participants' ongoing sign-making, which characterize as radically indeterminate, from an integrational perspective (Klemmensen, 2018), and because this sign-making is embedded in continuous affective activity (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). In considering emergent action, Raudaskoski and Klemmensen draw on the theoretical idea of affect as a social phenomenon following Wetherell (2012), and since participation defines social practice, affect is studied empirically as lived social practice (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019, p. 1). The study of affect in interaction contributes to explain the interconnectivity between events that neither the integrational perspective nor EMCA alone can describe, as demonstrated in Fig. 2 in Chapter 3.3.1



Over the course of this study, the reason for changing methods and analytical strategies was that the perception of the object of study developed into a new understanding of phenomena, a development demonstrated in Fig. 1 in Chapter 1.8. Increasingly, this caused a need to approach the participants communicating closer in detail, using new transcription formats, and applying more layers to grip the action in detail. The research process itself turned out to become a zooming exercise (Nicolini, 2009). In contemporary practice studies, this is believed to reveal more aspects about practice (and interaction), and, in my view, became a way to relate closer to the case participant's lifeworld phenomenologically, as discussed in Chapters 3.2; 3.2.1; and 5.2.

Zooming in was aimed at revealing more details about the trajectories and connectivity (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019) than about the logistics of the interaction. This belief, however, turned out to have a dark side to it. When approaching analysis with Mondadaian transcription practice, as demonstrated in Figs. 6.4, 6.7 and 6.8 in Chapter 6, on the one hand, it finally gave me tools to show exactly when action happened coordinately. However, it also affected my perception of the data to such a degree that, in the end, track was almost lost of the research question and it almost drowned the analysis in all the possible details available to the vision. This is why I chose to follow the path back to Goodwinian EMCA-style analysis (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019) and embed it with integrational insights. Rather than intensifying the revelation of interaction details by the use of different transcription traditions within EMCA, the enrichment of analysis turned out to be the introduction of an integrational linguistic perspective to the *object* of analysis. The replay of clips was supported with experiential commentary to validate the first-person perspective as a *reported perspective* and not to be confused with the notion of first-order experience (Harris, unpublished), discussed in Chapter 3.2.1.

### 8.1.1 An integrational approach to inclusion/exclusion practices

The empirical part of this thesis investigates deficiency and how-ability discourses in professional and informal settings: how they are traced and responded to by the participants. Zooming out, the empirical study detected and mapped discourses as generated and responded to in interaction. As discussed by Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019), not much research exists on the investigation of brain injury or memory loss as a matter of participation possibilities, nor on how to enhance the surrounding world's awareness and acceptance of the individuals with impairments' interaction styles and the modulated communication abilities of people with brain injury — aside from the recommendations from the WHO's ICF model that many researchers point to. The features of the interaction of individuals who have

impairments can be considered a qualitative different fashion, an individually determined style of communication, rather than “an impaired interaction style.” This is a result of my conceptualization of an integrational linguistics ontology applied to the study of atypical interaction, as opposed to a conceptualization of interaction by normative standards characterizing their interaction style as atypical (Wilkinson & Antaki, 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2020).

The altered perception of this study, derived from integrationism, is that all situated communication is done by individuals who arrive at social encounters with historical bodies that contribute to an enhanced need for creative problem solving, and who construct innovative communication skills and creativity. The purpose of outlining this ontological and praxeological conceptualization of the individual in interaction was to offer a perceptual tool to create awareness of the benefits of a participant’s perspective, which is an analytical perspective seen from the individuals who have linguistic and communicational impairment (Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 86–88) to be applied in care and rehabilitation contexts (p. 89). This applied perspective is important to support the further development of the how-abled discourse in disability studies (cf. Hughes, 2007; Raudaskoski, 2013; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019).

## 8.2 Benefits from the combined integrational EMCA analytical perspective

In the following, mutual benefits of the combination of integrational linguistics and EMCA are summarized.

### 8.2.1 Integrational contribution to EMCA

The integrational linguistic conceptualization of integrational proficiency underpinning creativity has analytical priority in this thesis. Likewise, the notion of co-construction is seductive in an integrational linguistic perception. With an integrational linguistic approach, the terminology in the CA analytical perspective would presuppose the individual who has impairment to be less proficient than their assistant meaning-makers, who build on the co-construction of activity and meaning with them. This is not the case in an integrational conception of language and communication disorders, where all communication is uniquely contextualized by the individual participants: the analytical perspective of person-centered. The communication strategies applied are not rated by categories but based on the proficiencies applied in the situation by individual agents, individuals integrating with each other.

As counter example to the claim of this study's single-case analysis, another case participant with impairments from the project's data is analyzed by Raudaskoski (2013). The case participant in Raudaskoski's analysis insists in a number of ways to counterprove the therapist's understanding of what they are trying to state using only sounds, until determinacy relevant to their intention (stating a correct email address, which is negotiated over several turns with a care worker) is actually accomplished. On the contrary, in the therapy sessions analyzed for this study, phatic communication seems to be the dominant interaction order. Whenever trouble arises (countermoves, criticisms, complaints and counterclaims), initiated by the case participant, they are responded to with non-compliant disagreement, resulting in their next sequence resignation from the dialogue and affording the crucial result: exclusion from participating in the interaction. In a normative perspective, the case resident's countermoves could be analyzed as their self-categorization as being open to conflict, leading to the regulating aggravated repair from the therapists. However, the non-preference for self-correction in aggravated repair categorizes the case participant as "incompetent," which they respond to with withdrawal from dialogue. The limited data analysis in this thesis is submitted to analytical diffraction, because of this consideration.

An aspect of talk-in-interaction that is evident across many different forms of atypical interaction is that there are delays in progressivity in the interaction, often in the form of participants' practices concerned with highlighting and attempting to resolve trouble sources and other kinds of difficulties in talk. Many of these trouble sources and difficulties can be seen to be linked to the presence of communicative impairments (Wilkinson et al., 2020, p. 23).

In an attempt at answering the questions that this thesis addresses, namely, how the approaches can combine, person-centeredness it thus examined and documented in the diffraction itself. Why would the therapist respond to attempts at participating by responding in ways that made the participant withdraw and experience exclusion from the dialogue?

However, in an integrational practice perspective, it is not the case participant's language and communication disorders that are central to the case of the analyzed excerpts. As disagreements evolve and circulate, it seems obvious that something is at stake in the situations, and that something is at stake for more than one of the persons. Disagreements and counterclaims may be initiated by the case participant for phatic purposes or for the purpose of gaining an authentic response in an integrational practice account. And he may have justified reasons for doing so. After trauma, for example, the brain injury such our case participant experienced many years ago, habitually acquired knowledge about the world and self is impaired. This requires constant cognitive and physical effort in order to activate synaptic brain activity with the purpose of encouraging the brain to benefit from its plasticity features (Naur, 2008, discussing James, 1950). We must not forget that the therapeutic participants are care workers with whom the case participant has a whole historical body of past and future communication routines to draw on. Therefore, disagreement might be a conscious strategy. This might be Søren's only way to provoke a real response in an extremely ordered and routine everyday life at the care center. Noticeably, several incidents like this are found in the project's data corpus. The example with newspaper reading from the dataset discussed in Nielsen (2015) demonstrates a similar disagreement. Seemingly, the topic is whether a journalist who had been covering an event at the center has referred data from the event correctly or not. According to the case participant's recollection of the event, the journalist refers to several points in the event incorrectly. As noted, in the event that the journalist describes, the case participant took part both in the planning and in the actual activity, which took place at the center. Then, it was described in the local newspaper by a third party. However, the discussion never explored the case participant's memory, rather it discussed the event as a matter of facts. The facts that were assessed by the care worker, who

decided that the case participant's memory was insufficient, which again questions the accountability of Søren's contribution on the event in the current situation. The interactional consequence of non-compliance triggers a series of explicit cognitive and interactional repairs on behalf of the therapist present. The participant raises an issue of recollection and of memory and is targeted as the problem himself. Likewise, the interactional result is resignation after the extortion of non-compliance to agreeing with the care worker, who tries to convince the participant that it is their memory of the event that is deficit. Accordingly, a bio-discourse is invoked in this case. Interestingly and similarly to the beer assessment, the care worker at no point approaches what it actually was that the participant could state about their own memory in order to explore multiple descriptions of the event. The interactional work carried out is directed towards the activity of correcting the presupposed impaired memory. Likewise, in the beer excerpt discussed in Chapter 6.5.1, the activity of correcting the participant's statement of his first-order perception of the beer in the glass right in front of him is what takes up the whole attention of the therapists.

The norm is that therapists and peers perform corrective practices with individuals who have aphasia, as in the examples presented. However, consequences of such practices have further ramifications, at least in institutional settings, as they are not affording the purpose of training and the strengthening of interactional participation. So, in this integrational view, repair is something completely different to that in CA terms. However, somehow, it aligns with the recommendations for best practice formulated by CA experts.

### 8.2.2 EMCA contribution to integrational linguistics: best practice of "letting it pass"

The cumulative study of EMCA affords knowledge transfer from generically similar situations (note "similar," not "same"). In the analysis, following Wilkinson's (2011) useful notion of letting pass, it is suggested that, instead of aggravating trouble-talk, professional practitioners can choose to downgrade the force of apparent misalignments and minimize interactional exclusion, thus promoting a person-centered approach to QOL. Wilkinson, a speech pathologist and CA analyst who specializes in interaction with participants with aphasia, recommends that therapists and peers set interactional goals in order to change practices and enhance participation with aphasia (Wilkinson, 2011, p. 37). The corrections in the beer example, as well as in the paraphrased journalist-got-it-wrong example (from the same dataset, discussed by Nielsen, 2015), are highly problematic. Wilkinson suggests the exact opposite response from the professional practitioners as an example of best practice:

that care workers and care partners do not correct memory and facts (Wilkinson, 2011, p. 39). Instead, Wilkinson proposes to apply an interactional let it pass strategy (p. 44), a basic idea in ethnomethodology coined by Garfinkel (1967, p. 3).

Applying interactional tools in therapy and peer communication with individuals who have aphasia invites possibilities of inclusion practices. In conflicts such as the examples demonstrate, Wilkinson's notions point to the possibility of approaching the case participant's displays differently on behalf of the care worker. Instead of responding with correction and treating contributions as displays of improperly placed criticisms caused by deficiencies and impairments, the care workers could have chosen a let it pass strategy (Wilkinson, 2011, p. 44). Treating the participant's contributions as *relevant*, rather than *wrong*, could have changed the interactional order. Making the fact that Søren shares his experiences relevant and important (by asking questions rather than initiating assessment practices, by repeating his wording in order to encourage him to continue his contributions and by engaging with him rather than with themselves and their own understandings), would have created the basis of an other-directedness. Nielsen discusses a series of possible approaches that the care workers could have operated (2015, p. 271).

What Nielsen does not realize and account for, is the relevance of the actual encounter; the practices are corrective, and the corrections happen for a reason. Nielsen leaves this reason uncovered (2015) as does Wilkinson (2011), who Nielsen leans upon. To an integrationist, uncovering the presupposed underlying understanding of language, communication and sign-making constitute the very reason for the practices practiced. In combination with nexus analysis, the underlying discourse of deficiency is investigated further.

### 8.3 Cross-disciplinarity with nexus analysis

This thesis is a cross-disciplinary exploration of language and communication targeting atypical interaction. This is done in an overall nexus framing. *Nexus* essentially means to put in a row, to join, link; it means to consider the connectivity between entities and things. As understood grammatically in a sentence, the nexus is the very linkage between the subject and the verbal statement. As discussed by Scollon and Scollon (2004), discourse studies have either (a) focused on the small-scale discourses in the discourse study of language. Language as discourse is usually studied in simple face-to-face social interaction encounters between individuals. Or studies have (b) overly focused solely on the larger frames of discourse that are taken to exist in society. These are considered oppositely as macro, as cultural fashions,

namely, currents of habit, political or institutional ways of materializing power-based structures, which favor some practices and ideas over others. Gee labeled the study of these large-scaled discourses as “‘Discourse’ with a capital ‘D’” (1999). To this, Blommaert (2005) coined the response that the Scollons have used as their point of departure: that semiotics would be a more appropriate term (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 5),<sup>xxxiii</sup> and why they refer to semiotics and semiotic cycles of Discourse. The idea of introducing nexus analysis at this stage in the thesis is to account for and clarify the research journey undertaken in a sideways movement through the publications.

With the Scollons’ nexus analysis as framework, they show how to include linguistic and trajectories of macro-Discourses with a capital “D” in an interwoven broadening perspective that aims at covering as much as possible of a given phenomenon. Considering the institutional ramifications of the troubles in interaction recorded in this study, nexus analysis allows another zooming exercise, which includes larger cycles of discourse and categories invoked from outside the local interaction. This broadening perspective on the local practices is operated by the concept of connectivity and by localizing instances of the nexus of practice and its intersections with other cycles of discourse, which can be someone or something traced backward historically and forward prospectively. So, the introduction of nexus analysis at this stage is an attempt at broadening the analytical perspective, to reach outside of the recorded data, including as much as possible. By this token, nexus analysis differs from other discourse analyses, which have mainly dealt with either specific narrative discourses, such as political discourse, close studies of language or close studies of the working of society. Nexus analysis is conceptualized as “the study of the semiotic cycles of people, objects, and discourses in and through moments of socio-cultural importance” (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. x).

### 8.3.1 Discourse and interaction orders

The notion of *interaction order* is an analytical concept derived from Goffman (1971), which includes the various orders by which we are assumed to organize ourselves in various interactions and settings using a variety of resources, and as individuals and social groups drawing on experiential knowledge (or integrational proficiency) about different forms of interaction (Scollon & Scollon, 2003, p. 46). Interestingly, this inclination towards the notion of always emergent integration of past, present, and future is discussed by Harris as a distinct human feature conceptualizing every human activity (2008c):

Everything we do as human beings involve the integration of the present with the past and the future: this is temporal integration. The past we can only remember and the future we can only anticipate. But unless we could relate the here-and-now to both of these, our lives would not be those of human beings (...) human beings communicate with one another not by exchanging thoughts but by integrating their many activities (p. 111).

Even if haptic perception, actions, and the body are increasingly in focus in processual meaning-making studies (Enfield & Sidnell, 2017), talk and sequentiality still tend to be a recurrent methodological focus in EMCA studies (Klemmensen, 2018). Including nexus analysis extends the range of the analysis to reach outside language practices and consider the impact of discourse categories imposed from outside of the local interaction but practiced by the participants, especially by the therapists from their gatekeeping position. Clearly, the instances of manifest misalignments in the data extracts demonstrate how practices of inclusion and exclusion are emergent in the interaction itself and not imposed by any agency. Yet, the training of the therapists, for instance, form part of their historical bodies and thus their interpretative (cf. contextualization) repertoire, and is why certain habits are reproduced, for instance, regarding the handling of trouble-talk, perceived criticisms or rebellion. In sum, the trouble spots can be identified when the case resident takes initiatives and/or addresses criticisms, which may be heard by the occupational therapist as complaints about institutional life (Heinemann, 2009). Demonstrably, they are responded to as such.

### 8.3.2 An interdisciplinary discourse study

The impact of discourses circulating from outside specific social encounters is recurrent, following Scollon and Scollon (2004). They argue that social action is ordered by the co-present historical bodies and the discourse in place which, together, contribute to determine the course of interaction. The nexus analysis, the augmented version of discourse analysis, drawing on Gee's (1999) Discourse with a capital "D", includes all scales of co-present factors managing interaction:

The term 'discourse' simply refers to the ways in which people engage each other in communication at the face-to-face level or it might refer to the much broader set of concerns signaled with such terms as 'public discourse', 'academic discourse', 'legal discourse', or 'medical discourse'. As a consequence, discourse analysis as a field of study might either be micro-



analysis or unfolding moments of social interaction or a much broader socio-political-cultural analysis of the relationships among social groups and power interests in the society. (...) the most mundane of micro-actions are nexus through which the largest cycles of social organization and activity circulate (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 8).

All of the examples from the dataset are affected by recurrent cycles of discourse from different timescales and other frames of action, which produce them, following Scollon and Scollon's nexus analysis. In this, lies the idea of a nexus of practice: an intersection of a number of these that are linked and intertwined in specific moments, unfolded at specific places, between specific participants. Social action is thus nexus-analytically governed by multiple events and historical bodies, where some are co-present while others are absent aside from their socio-material traces.

For instance, in Fig. 6.4, the case participant participates and co-constructs the therapist's critique of the design of a tea kitchen at the centre. The very material design of the kitchen, discussed in Klemmensen (2018, pp. 118–127), was already there in the event prior to the social encounter. The kitchen's presence was a result of planners' decisions two years earlier than the discussion about the poor design for persons who have disabilities was occasioned and discussed in the social encounters (see Figs. 6.4–6.6, 6.9). These occasions demonstrate how social interaction, seen through nexus analysis, is embedded in large-scale circumferences, including socio-materiality. Other aspects of the examples analyzed in Chapter 6 demonstrate the co-presence of policymaking, educational training of the therapists and many other aspects of the semiotic resources available because they are occasioned by co-present individuals. For example, the instance analyzed with the beer tasting at the shopping mall (see Fig. 6.1) demonstrates how the case participant's social participation depends on managing a social "hang-on strategy." The analysis concludes that the construction of the case participant as irrelevant is through the assessment of him as unaccountable: Søren's contributions are categorized as "incorrect" in a normative perspective. However, the therapists in all the studied examples fail to grasp his participation ability and make it a basis for further elaboration and expanded participation. Instead, Søren is silenced and withdraws from participating. By abandoning the idea of normativity and correctness in situations that is intended to afford participatory training, therapy could benefit from a shift in perception of language and communication disorders and of language and communication altogether. That is, shifting away from a decoding perspective and towards an integrational consideration and the situational spatiality of the situation, in which flux-action takes place.

The research agenda of an integrational linguistic perspective applied to interaction analysis and its potential analytical perspective is twofold. First, it is creating an outline for the possible application of an alternative theorizing on language and communication. Second, it is developing a potential methodology for analysis. This agenda of applied integrational linguistics is departing from traditional linguistics. As well epistemologically and ontologically, it is considered an alternative or, rather, a supplement to the established traditions in modern applied linguistics. For instance, the study of the dynamics of dialogue within a traditional framework in modern applied linguistics draws on presuppositions of orderliness and normativity in language use, such as word order or adjacency pairs (Schegloff, 2007; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). This is a major unresolved divergence between EMCA and integrational linguistics, as EMCA perceives by integrational linguists as overtly rule-bound by orders (Duncker, 2018; Hutton, 2017; Perregaard, 2016; Taylor & Cameron, 1987). Yet, EMCA researchers would argue this is a misperception. Rather, as opposed to integrational linguistics, EMCA, at the outset was *not* driven by a theory. So, orderliness is oriented to and done by the participants. New concepts arise or are revisited when they demonstrate in data. However, a dedicated integrationist would not buy in on this claim, because of a number of reasons raised in Chapters 2–4 of this thesis. Theories of integrational linguistics on the workings of language and communication consider and describe discursive order as mythical and based on the assumptions of structuralism (Harris, 1996, 1998; Toolan, 1996). It also departs from traditions in discourse studies. The questions of “who?”, “where?”, and “what?” is often raised in criticism of discursive matters. Due to the specific problem of agency in the studies of discourse phenomena, the methodology of discourse analysis is considered problematic in an integrational linguistics’ perspective.

As such, the agenda of applied integrational linguistics offers a solution to this central question with the applied notion of contextualization. By converting the noun “context” to the verb “to contextualize,” the question of agency is solved. Simply put, actions always require a subject, an agency. Integrationally speaking, when the notion of contextualization is applied, it is presupposed that somebody is engaged in the activity of contextualizing. This way, agency is made central to any interpretation of discourse in an integrational linguistic analytical perspective. Agency, too, is central to EMCA, though not only as individual understanding, but as effect in the ongoing situation. However, an understanding of something always belongs to someone. The displays of such are what the analyst has the opportunity to describe, inquire into the workings of and study further. Then, what an integrational linguistics framework offers is an alternative approach — or, at the least a fresh supplement — to the modern traditions within the study of language and communication. It is principled by the theory of the three factors described by Harris (1998, p. 25), which, entangled, are

assumed to govern any communication situation in various configurations of the biomechanical, macrosocial, and circumstantial factors. As such, the configuration of the three is determined by the persons communicating, as well as being given in advance by the materiality of the situation and its configuration. This is in comparison with Scollon and Scollon's model of social interaction (2004, p. 3), where historical body, discourses in place and interaction order are drawn as separate overlapping circles entangled at the center with the constitution of social action. Seen from another perspective, the importance of each factor is rated by the participants and will thus determine the actual configuration and the interplay of the factors in any given situation.

The combination of the two approaches in this thesis is a leap forward in the theoretical understanding of integrational linguistics principles. As stated, many scholars have truly had a hard time discovering the relevance of integrational linguistic theory, since it has been regarded as radical and obstructive because it clearly dismisses traditional theory of language and communication. However, I find it useful in the close inspection of participation with impairments since it adds observations points for the analyst to attend to.

This thesis' illustrative analytical perspective is its prime contribution, since it elaborates on the theoretical, methodological and analytical contributions, and illustrative analysis by uniquely incorporating innovative aspects of language and communication theory, and includes an innovative (diffractive) methodology (cf. Barad, 2007, p. 72; Klemmensen, 2018, p. 70) to analyze language and communication with impairments. This affords a close inspection of an experiential participant's perspective of individuals with impairments and to create awareness of their participant perspective.

### 8.3.3 Discussion

If we are to assess the social consequences of practices in, for instance, care and rehabilitation, then we must be able to consider the real consequences for certain individuals and not merely assess the interactional scene. This assessment can be applied both to the individuals with impairments and to the professional practitioners. The education and training of professionals could benefit from exemplary situations which praise best practice examples. This way, students in occupational therapy and carers would be able to consider social consequences of their professional practice. For individuals with impairment, examples could be conceptualized to give input to recommendations for changes in practices. For example, when required by an organization or demanded by family and peers, then a body of exemplary analyses

would serve in decision- and policymaking. Also, it could give them insight into alternative practice methods. This would help them to train the people around them, as to how they prefer communication and social interaction agendas conceptualized (cf. Robillard, 1996). A step further, in this way, rehabilitation and therapy truly become a collaborative partnership between the individual and the professional assisting them. Since this study draws on an underlying integrational linguistics ontology of language and communication, the single-case analysis presented in this thesis allows the analyst to approach the person's understandings as displayed and integrated in the data, and not only as treated by the other participants and thus proofed by the next-turn proof-procedure of the framework of social interaction, as laid out in traditional CA.

#### 8.3.4 Person-centeredness as analytical aim

This empirical study had the form of an ideographic analysis and is based on integrational linguistic assumptions and a practice theoretical approach to meaning-making, as discussed in the analysis. By the same token, this thesis makes an attempt to analytically frame a new participant perspective through the creation of an illustrative analytical perspective. In this analysis, the trajectories of a person's communicational body and a person's historical body are described and investigated. Following the above and building on person-centeredness as an analytical concept, I raise the question of how to install a person-centered participant perspective. Pointing back to James, for instance, bodily sensations are entanglements of the above mentioned. The expression of feelings is processual. To James, emotions are experiential consequences of bodily contractions; this leads James to describe feelings as emotions felt (James, 1950, chap. 15). The point of departure is, therefore, processual triggers in interaction. The social role of aphasia in interaction is given attention, but the organizational frame and the discursive frame are also included, and, from this combined approach, the underpinning practice theory is drawn. As demonstrated, elements of competing discourses were manifest. Repair work were found in the dataset in many instances. Consequently, the data suggested a methodology taking a practice-approach to meaning-making in discourse. In other words, a nexus of practice was found and, hence, investigated.

#### 8.3.5 Approaching a data-driven, person-centered perspective

Importantly, the notion of actions as individual moves undergoing a process of co-constituted ratification is enhanced in social studies. However, Enfield and Sidnell

(2017) discuss how sense-making, traditionally, has been conceptualized as a methodologically “convenient” work of typologizing actions into certain kinds “ (...) ‘request’, ‘promise’, ‘compliment’, ‘complaint’ – suggesting a list or inventory of actions.” (Enfield & Sidnell, 2017, p. xi). This is a shared critique within the integrational linguistics approach (Hutton, 2017; Taylor & Cameron, 1987). In line with Enfield and Sidnell and their interdisciplinary approach to language and agency by combining linguistics and anthropology, this thesis’ approach explored practices of meaning-making by merging approaches, which can describe intelligible sense-making accomplished with other resources than thought and talk. Furthermore, this novel approach considers the identified actions as unique, *individual* moves rather than “ (...) a matter of selecting from a pre-existing list” (Enfield & Sidnell, 2017, p. xi) of typologized, *atypical* moves. Contemporary EMCA has a growing body of studies of multimodal and sensorial interactions,<sup>xxxiv</sup> including gesture and touch between people describing interactional resources (Goodwin & Cekaite, 2018; Routarinne et al., 2020). Accordingly, a practice approach to meaning-making with *atypical resources* was introduced as underpinning the overall analytical frame. Yet, focus on the joint-construction was replaced with integrational notions.

Indeed, integrational linguistics combined with EMCA underpinning practice theory offers a new analytical perspective as it attempts to draw a profile of processual communication, e.g. a person’s communicational habit, organizational practices, or professional practices. It contributes with a complementary perspective, which surpasses generally-known approaches to social interaction, such as discursive psychology which draws mainly on EMCA and CA in isolation. Contrastingly, a person-centered approach as outlined in Chapter 4 is an approach to meaning-making that goes beyond specific sequences and builds trajectories of actions over time; it summarizes consequences and presents new understandings of everyday practices. Therefore, it offers an alternative to existing approaches to situated meaning-making of discourse, analytically framing a person-centered approach to a participant perspective.

## 9 Findings

### 9.1 Background

Traditionally, studies in language disorders followed a clinical discourse where the processes in persons with language disorders and ABI were considered broken. Results generated from experimental research are limited to cover individuals with language and communication disorders' responses to the experimental framing (Leudar & Costall, 2011; Schegloff, 1999). In studies of language and communication disorders, there is a discrepancy between the dire deficiency discourse in experimental and clinical studies focusing on individuals' deficiencies, impairments and their lack of engagement in trials, and the more optimistic discourse in interaction-based studies focusing on individuals' abilities performances beyond their diagnoses and surprising outcomes in interaction (Goodwin, 1995; Klemmensen, 2018; Krummheuer, 2015; Raudaskoski, 2013; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019; Wilkinson, 1999a, 1999b). Interaction studies with a detailed understanding of action have shown that individuals who have impairments often do not behave according to their diagnosis, where studies decipher that several competences are overlooked (Dickerson et al., 2005; Goodwin, 1995, 2003b; Schegloff, 1999; Sterponi, 2004; Sterponi & Shankey, 2014a, 2014b). Thus, the components of this thesis (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019) theoretically link the research journey towards investigating its literature, carrying out its own research and, as a result, contribute to this interaction turn. Competing discourses from both arenas — what can be conceptualized as the bio-perspective as opposed to the social perspective — dominate the research field, policymaking, professional practice, and institutional discourse. Whereas the more dominant discourse has been the neuroscientific discourse derived from experimental and clinical studies (Dindar, 2017). However, this is starting to change (Wilkinson et al., 2020).

In contrast to clinical approaches, it is suggested in this thesis' conceptualization of language impairment, that the analyst is required to align, phenomenologically, with the individuals who have impairments. In this study, an individual who has aphasia due to ABI is, therefore, assumed to know a great deal more about communicating than clinicians, psychologists or therapists assume. In this study, aphasia and ABI were approached as a person's qualitatively different lifeworld (Björne, 2007). This approach agrees with current trends in language disorders of informing development of QOL (Isaksen & Brouwer, 2015; Wallace et al., 2017),

following the ICF. Emphasis has been put on patient-centeredness in health communication studies (Sarangi, 2007b). Recommendations from the WHO suggest a shift from patient-centered towards person-centered care (WHO, 2016) and, thus, terminology. The notion of person-centeredness is discussed throughout this thesis as suggestion of a new analytical approach.

## 9.2 Summary of results of this thesis

In summary, the descriptive analysis of this thesis uncovered how troubles in interaction were responded to and managed. Inclusion/exclusion are considered situated in local practices of talk and situated activities. Sample analyses from the study's data collection of (video) recorded troubles in everyday interaction were scrutinized. Furthermore, suggestions were made for an alternative perception of the troubles at the site of inclusion/exclusion. In sum, the conceptualized new analytical perspective probed a participant's perspective as linked to the activity of contextualizing, rather than focusing on the traditional mechanisms and logistics of the interaction. Therefore, this study's focus attended to the way in which responding to trouble, for instance, caused by expected memory problems, afforded the situatedness of inclusion/exclusion practices within the encounters scrutinized. The analysis benefitted from an approach that combined integrational linguistics and tools offered by EMCA. The ontology of integrational linguistics underpinning practice theory proved to have a more fine-tuned understanding of the researcher's interpretative relation to the study of emergent practices (adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 150–151).

In line with a series of researchers of atypical interaction, this study contributes to a lived practice turn (Björne, 2007; *Clinical linguistics and phonetics*, 2016; Dindar, 2017; Korkiakangas et al., 2016; Leudar & Costall, 2011; Rae & Ramey, 2015; Sterponi, 2004; Sterponi & de Kirby, 2016; Wilkinson, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2020, to name a few). This thesis outlines a novel analytical perception of the individual in interaction by applying an integrational linguistic perspective to a study of atypical interaction and linguistic deficiency, which is missing. The novel perception of the individual in interaction within studies of atypical interaction is conceptualized as a person-centered perspective. This was pursued through a critical discussion of the differences and agreements between integrational linguistics and EMCA, where the latter has a tradition for studying participation within interaction studies in aphasia. By switching theoretical lenses back and forth between and an integrational linguistic approach to language and communication, reflecting of the concept of communicational proficiency (Harris, 2008b) and a social interaction approach

(Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2020), I described their divergences and meeting points.

My research question targeted answering to what extent the two could combine and how the observational study of inclusion/exclusion could be approached with this combination. In answering to what extent the approaches could combine, I scrutinized their analytical foci. The very focus in the analysis turned out to change when applying the person-centered approach of integrational linguistics. It changed from the CA perspective of observing interaction and context as a scenario where conversation takes place, to a person-centered approach that deals with and focuses upon the persons communicating about their understandings, verbally or nonverbally. Signs can be private signs and meaningful for one individual (Harris 2009a, p. 76). Therefore, I argued that integrational analysis includes individual timescales as well as shared timescales and, as a result, may be conducted in a forward as well a backward perspective (temporal integration, Harris 2009a, pp. 72–73). This is not an option in traditional EMCA studies, where the analysis is always directed sequentially forward. In consequence, the history of every individual is unique (Harris, 1987, p. 7), and a person-centered approach indeed encourages including a lay perspective in scientific descriptions (Pablé & Hutton, 2015, pp. 50–51; this paragraph is adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p 79).

In an integrational linguistic perception, sense-making cannot be made factual by multiple interpretations and supportive arguments informed by data sessions, as is the case in CA and EMCA traditions. However, data sessions can help foreground certain aspects of the data and direct the researcher's attention towards this. In contrast, practices are coordinated performances of private contextualization that may be traceable in, for instance, documents, video data and transcripts, or that may not be traceable at all, since the analyst can only observe (Harris, 2012, p. 43; adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 79). Therefore, the inclusion of the notion of communicational proficiency, necessarily, encouraged revisiting the ontology of language and communication, as well as the notions of context and shared understanding (see Chapters 2–4 of this thesis).

According to the integrationist's stance, processes of communication are characterized by the activities that they integrate (Harris, 1996, p. 63). Hence, the activity of interpretation as a process of communication is as much characterized by the integrational proficiency of the participants engaged in the activity as by aligning interpretations between the participants and the analyst (see Fig. 4, Chapter 4.1). From this principle, it follows that any communication process is determined by the configuration of participants — rather than by a decontextualized, predetermined meaning established by a language system applied by someone — as their linguistic expression of any experience they may have had in another context. Because of an



emphasis on proficiency rather than competence, the concepts of "how-ability" and "how-abledness" (Raudaskoski, 2013, 2020) are foregrounded, and similarly theoretical emphasis is put on downgrading terms such as "dis-abledness" and "deficiency" (discussed in Nielsen, 2011), in order to put the social intelligibility of individuals who have impairments at the center of the research interest. Individuals' social intelligibility is considered proficient, regardless of any disability, to respond to the complex knowledge of responding and integrating oneself in the midst of the complex flow of everyday life.

By this token, communication is considered as ongoing and not as something which can be stopped and then re-accessed at any point in the future "as it were" (Demuth, 2018), despite the existence of advanced video technology for recording and preserving communication traces (Duncker, 2018, p. 146). Yet, the analytical direction I suggest may go in both directions due to the experiential, personalist perspective of integrationism including both visible and invisible aspects, drawing on abduction as opposed to the objective strategy of EMCA (see Fig. 3.1, Chapter 3.3.1). Furthermore, the paradox of biased memory and the entanglement of association and emotion inevitably affects participants when presented with analyses of their interaction (Svenstrup, 2008). Therefore, it is deemed an impossibility to try to fulfil Sarangi's suggestion (2007a) of aligning observer and participant interpretations, at least in this study's approach, which lies within the boundaries of a Harrisian semiology (further elaboration towards the end of this chapter).

On a number of points, divergences were identified, yet the advances in EMCA and practice studies within the past decade has developed further understanding of aspects (Enfield & Sidnell, 2017; Goodwin, 2018) that were heavily criticized earlier (Fleming, 1995; Taylor & Cameron, 1987). EMCA and the integrational perspective share similarities, for instance, on the notions of a lay perspective, ethnomethodology and situated understanding. The contrast turned out to be, still, whether meaning was considered entirely a social phenomenon or an individual, personalist phenomenon. Furthermore, divergence was found in the possibility of empirical studies between EMCA and integrational linguistics (see Fig. 7.1, Chapter 6.9).

### 9.3 Areas emphasized

The contributions of this dissertation are threefold:

1. A theoretical emphasis.
2. A methodological and analytical emphasis.
3. A single-case analysis of inclusion/exclusion practices.

#### 9.3.1 Theoretical contribution

In drawing upon the approach of integrational linguistics underpinning practice theory, this study is informed by several contemporary traditions in discussing divergences and agreements between the adopted approaches. The theoretical contribution is a close investigation of the differences and overlaps of the integrational linguistic approach proposed by Harris (1996, 1998, 2008a, 2009a, 2012) and the EMCA approach (Clinical linguistics and phonetics, 2016; Goodwin, 2018; Wilkinson et al., 2020).

A Harrisian approach states that participation is governed by biomechanical, macrosocial, and circumstantial factors (Harris, 1998, 2009a). Impairments are considered to be present at all times, integrating biomechanics, circumstances, and macrosocial factors in real-life situations whenever brain injury emerges (von der Lieht, 2004). In consequence, this thesis describes communication as *participation abilities* due to this theoretical point of departure and my positioning.

This study is the first empirical study of language and communication disorders, more specifically the case of aphasia after trauma, applying the biomechanical, macrosocial, and circumstantial factors of integrational linguistics and its ontology. The present work points towards a new empirical ground for investigations drawing upon integrational linguistics entangled with a multimodal EMCA approach. It contributes to develop a theoretical and methodological resource for further investigation of the social, relational, and communicational aspects of language disorders and aphasia as well as promoting empirical venturing within integrational linguistics.

#### 9.3.2 Methodological contribution

Together with a line of researchers, this work forms part of a lived practice turn that is on the rise in studies of aphasia due to ABI (Goodwin, 2018; Krummheuer, 2015; Raudaskoski, 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2020). This thesis promotes this new discourse

in aphasia and linguistic impairment research, drawing on empirical investigation of social practice with a detailed understanding of action to decipher how individuals with language and communication disorders creatively use resources other than verbal ones to communicate (Goodwin, 1995, 2003b).

Yet, this thesis does not intend to provide a completely unfolded version of this view, nor a complete description of the implications of such view, since the focus is sat on combining integrational linguistics and EMCA. Therefore, it will modestly draw the outline explaining the background for an integrational EMCA approach, but not propose a model for it. This will be a matter for future investigation. The purpose of this study is, however, important for several reasons. It shows the possibility of integrating a participant perspective in the study of language and communication disorders by changing the presuppositions of language and communication common to the field (from clinical approaches to ethnomethodological ones). By implementing an integrational linguistic perspective of language and communication, analytical concepts are demythologized (Klemmensen, 2018). This implementation also adds to a new agenda in EMCA studies. This contribution foregrounds the individuals communicating and how they are engaged in complex ways in this world (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2018). On this ground, language and communication (disorders), therefore, should be revisited as phenomenon at a reflective stage of the communication and practice turns (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015).

### 9.3.3 Analytical contribution: discursive social exclusion

The analysis demonstrated that not only the ownership of knowledge was at stake, but also apparent gatekeeping of participation opportunity, displayed by the occupational therapist's recurrent highlighting of the case participant's deficient memory, categorizing them as a non-ratified participant, and resulting in their resignation from dialogue. Demonstrably, manifest misalignments that can have further institutional ramifications. In the excursion to a local shopping mall (see Figs. 6.2 and 6.3 in Chapter 6.5.1), a conversation emerged regarding the contents of the glass of the case participant, which they claimed was a beer. A longer stretch followed, where first the case participant and one therapist assessed the contents of the glass. Whether it was beer or elderflower juice was not my analytical point made. Rather, the observation that, over the course of this episode, the case participant moved from participation towards exclusion as a result of the interaction itself. This participant was excluded by the co-present group, including the participant researchers, by the beer claim perceived and responded to as interactional troublemaking. In consequence, towards the end of the sequence, the case participant is constructed as a third-party by the

group, who were increasingly not attending to him as a co-present participant (cf. Heinemann, 2009), through jokes about the “beer” being the flattest beer on earth and laughter (see Chapter 6.5.1 of this thesis; adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 117).

Distinct implicit aspects of routinized assistance were mounted and offered in the cases analyzed, even when the request of the case participant explicitly was to scaffold another outcome. As a result, therapy was initiated as response to participation requests (Klemmensen, 2018, pp. 117–118; Nielsen, 2015, p. 271). With reference to the encounters between the case resident and the therapist, the trouble spots identified when the case resident took initiatives and/or addressed criticisms, which were seemingly heard by the occupational therapist as complaints about institutional life. Perceived criticisms were responded to by the occupational therapist from their gatekeeping position, regulating behavior, for instance, by excluding the case participant. In drawing attention to instances of manifest misalignments in the data extracts, I discussed how practices of inclusion/exclusion were emergent in the interaction itself, which have further institutional ramifications. Following Wilkinson’s (2011) useful notion of letting pass, it was suggested that instead of aggravating trouble-talk, professional practitioners could choose to downgrade the force of apparent misalignments and minimize interactional exclusion, thus promoting a person-centered approach to QOL.

The discussion of repair is of central importance to CA and other interaction analysts. Ways of monitoring co-participants’ talk by providing correction have been investigated thoroughly within the paradigm of CA and EMCA. Correction is an important feature in this study’s investigation of membership categorization of competent versus incompetent participants monitored in social encounters (cf. Goodwin, 1983, 2006). The aggravation of the activity of other-correction, is that it presupposes a lack of confidence in the ability of the initial speaker. Moreover, suspicion of incompetence is displayed: the second speaker does not trust initial speaker’s competence to perform a preferred self-correction.

Demonstrably, organizational practices have consequences for resignation and exclusion from the dialogue. The analytical account of a recurrent non-preference for self-correction has the consequence of placing the participant with impairments in the membership category of incompetent. In studies of aphasia, central figures draw on CA and EMCA terminology to characterize aphasic conversation as atypical (Goodwin, 2003; Perkins, 2003; Wilkinson, 2011, Wilkinson et al., 2020). The question remains whether the falsification of atypicality in interaction, rather, reveals the mythological character of the concept itself. Likewise, the notion of co-construction is seductive in an integrational linguistics perception. An overall reflection of the excerpts linked the empirical observations to theory of language and communication disorders, specifically using a personalist integrational approach to

language and communication. Thus, this study considered the interactional consequences of linguistic impairment and functional disability due to ABI from a lived practice perspective.

### 9.3.4 Contributions and limitations

The application of an integrational EMCA perspective demonstrates the possible scaling of analysis and transcription practice for various purposes, which offers new methodological fine-tuning. Theoretically, it introduces a novel, interdisciplinary, analytical perspective, which derives from an interdisciplinary diffraction (Barad, 2007) of various traditions that turned the spotlight from the social of the EMCA and CA traditions to the individual within the social ensemble (Duncker, 2017) through the application of an integrational linguistic lens to existing EMCA analysis.

This work contributes with knowledge about consequences of practices and in identifying discrepancies of practice. Thus, points of improvements and focus areas in communication with individuals who have ABI are identified, for instance, in downgrading the force of apparent misalignments and minimizing interactional exclusion. The study maps trajectories of one case individual who has impairments due to ABI and their explicit navigation in interaction through observation of the laminated actions in a number of occasions (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015; Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019). The analyses are assimilated in a framing of the research process (see Fig. 1, Chapter 1.8), which allows a multi-level discussion of the results from the analyses distributed over the publications.

In conclusion, the thesis presents a number of theoretical and methodological innovations. Besides an interdisciplinary discourse analysis of interaction with impairments, larger cycles of discourses were included to understand how local interaction is impacted by discourses at institutional and organizational levels (see Chapters 6.4.2–6.4.4). It demonstrated and discussed how such discourses as a “deficiency discourse” impact (and damage) local social actions in a care residency for individuals who have ABI (Klemmensen, 2018; Nielsen, 2015). Relatedly, Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019) show how a similar but broader discourse, namely, the “disability discourse,” impacts local interaction in a care home that enhanced social inclusion in their policies. However, the investigation of this study has a limited discussion of how discourses impact local interaction. Primarily, the study centered on discussing the theoretical and empirical prerequisites for applying an integrational EMCA perspective to linguistic impairment and aphasia through analytic strategies.

The point of departure for this study was that the board of the center where we recorded our data called for an innovative investigation of inclusion practices that focused on the residents' ongoing development rather than on their lack of resources. This study attempted at answering what inclusion/exclusion would be to a resident at a care center. Notwithstanding the praiseworthy wish for inclusion as the point of departure, this study found several discrepancies between policies and actual local practices. Participation was studied as it unfolded between the participants through interaction in communication situations. Slips of autobiographic details, breaks in short-term memory or alternative modes of expression, however, created situations where the residents' how-abledness became issues and, at times, created problematic situations between the residents and the care personnel, leading to the social exclusion of the individuals who have ABI.

This type of qualitative study contributes to advancing the lived perspective of aphasia and ABI. The description of the case resident's participation in social interaction was investigated in order to analyze their inclusion/exclusion as a dynamic, multimodal, materialized matter, demonstrating integrational linguistics as a practical undertaking. Aphasia and ABI were thus investigated as a consequence and not as a prerequisite. This study's components aimed at contributing to the development of a theoretical and methodological resource for further investigation of the social, relational, and communicational sides of living with language and communication disorders, introducing integrational linguistics and the notions of contextualization and communicational proficiency. Obviously, limitations are part of any scientific, and thereby non-exhaustive, analytical approach, following Popper's notion that any scientific approach's value as scientific should be justified partially through its falsifiable classification (Popper, 1992).

### 9.3.5 Implications

Considering the ethical consequence of adopting a participant's perspective, the theme of professionals-on-professionals must be attended. Sarangi (2007a) proposes a rather interesting view on conducting interpretations of the participants. This view is elaborated here to respond to the possible misunderstanding of this work being a critique of professional practitioners, which is completely unintentional. Sarangi labels the term "the analyst's paradox" (Sarangi, 2007a, p. 567) and developed a description of the anatomy of interpretation so that the interpretation in research is actually owned by the participants, further elaborated in the author's later work (Sarangi, 2015). Sarangi discusses the professional relationship between the

professional interpreter and the professional practitioner and pleads for realizing the analyst's paradox as entangled in the enterprise of analyzing discourse.

In general, Sarangi has high standards regarding the professional conduct of ethnographic interpreters and regards the professional practice of interpretation as entangled with ethical conduct in research as professional practice (Sarangi, 2015). Sarangi's solution, in both cases, is to strive towards an interpretive practice of aligning the researchers' interpretations with the participants' elaborated interpretations of the observed. However, as stated in Chapter 9.2, I deemed it an impossibility to try to fulfil Sarangi's suggestion of aligning observer and participant interpretations in this study, which lies within the boundaries of a Harrisian semiology. Furthermore, the paradox of biased memory and the entanglement of association and emotion inevitably affect participants when presented with analyses of their interaction. This relationship is explored and discussed thoroughly by Sarangi as an almost Mobius-bound expert-on-expert relationship (Sarangi, 2015). An important mutual ethical issue of trust is, however, that it, when violated, will have real, costly consequences. My solution to this is to mitigate the force of my conclusions but firmly assert that they should be presented as observed, following the conceptualized protocol of an integrational EMCA perspective.

In a person-centered approach, the analyst should try to understand the participants' ways of communicating (Goode, 1994b) rather than presuppose them as having specific standards, or, more mundanely put: In the person-centered perspective promoted in this thesis, the analyst investigates what the participants are trying to do creatively with the available resources (i.e. biomechanically, socio-mechanically and circumstantially). The methodology for this is careful in noticing, long-term, engaged observation and attention. The analyst must try to understand the actions being displayed from their knowledge and acquaintance with the participants, which they should take time to get to know and follow over a period of time (possibly in video recordings). Rather than depending on a pre-established analytical system based on structural strategy, rules and normativity, creativity and the unique aspects of the participation abilities of individuals could be investigated to enhance the understanding of their communicative proficiency through their social practices. This discourse of understanding the individual is needed to supplement a clinical discourse in the rehabilitation of language and communication.

In my perception, we cannot take attention away from the understandings displayed by the participants and direct attention towards a fictional, normative scenario of best practices, which, ideally, would create a better world for participants with aphasia. Such an approach is not grounded in the data, but in wishful thinking and a researcher-based corrective practice of the professional practice of health practitioners. However, we need to fine-tune the analytical instruments continuously

to capture a person-centered perspective and analytically inform QOL in appreciative standard (WHO) terminology (WHO, 2016). Normative suggestions as a result of studies in aphasia and ABI ideally impact practices of rehabilitation at the policy level (Glintborg et al., 2018; Wallace et al., 2017; Wilkinson, 2011). The workings of discourse are, thus, considered entangled with the participant analyst's interpretations, the professionals' perception of what atypical interaction means and the patient's enacted experience of such discourse in interaction.

### 9.3.6 Further healthcare perspectives

Modern health and social care define as patient-centered and other-oriented, at least ideologically (Sarangi, 2007a, pp. 567–584). Trends in research in language and communication disorders aim at creating awareness by informing the development of QOL for individuals with language and communication disorders (Isaksen & Brouwer, 2015; Wallace et al., 2017). The trend suggests implementing and following the ICF model (Wallace et al., 2017; WHO, 2001, 2013). By informing the care institution's board and practitioners, long-term QOL improvements are sought enhanced for individuals with impairments through raising professional awareness, which may impact political decision-making and funding. Yet, this is an area to be explored much further, as the WHO has, over the past decades, cumulated burgeons of knowledge within this particular area and given recommendations for standards and new uses of non-excluding terminology. These are recommended as standards for a Danish model (Wallace et al., 2017). However, it is necessary to conceptualize and develop analytical approaches to partake in the investigative assessment of social relations. A way forward could be to communicate conclusions in a way that stimulate change for practitioners rather than to perceive as criticism of professional practice. A collaborative framework is discussed by Roberts and Sarangi (1999, p. 498), "In presenting findings in a non-conclusive way, social scientific researchers, including discourse analysts, can distance themselves from a problem-solver role by underscoring the fact that practical solutions are not in a one-to-one relationship with research-based knowledge." Purposefully, analytical approaches could aim more at capturing the individual with impairments, and thus afford measurement of QOL and person-centeredness within the area of functional impairment, yet the problem solution to apparent manifest misalignment must be solved in collaboration with professional practitioners and not by policy enforcement.

This investigation's analytical approach aligns with this discursive turn. The focus on patient-centeredness has accelerated inquiries into the living and experiencing body. In this thesis, the experiential side of health and social care is sought explored. The aim and topic of this thesis has been to understand inclusion/exclusion practices.



Instances of recurring aphasia and ABI are discussed in an empirical observation study through a theoretical lens that combines integrational linguistics and EMCA underpinning practice theory. The dissertation is two-folded in combining a theoretical part and an observational study; however, the emphasis of the thesis is a theoretical investigation. First, the theoretical part discusses how to grasp the lived experience and competence of the participants, underpinning central questions of the ontology of language and communication, for instance, the justification of models for studying language and communication. Second, the empirical part includes an observational study that probes the theoretical part, which conceptualizes an individual participant perspective. On this basis, the second part discusses findings of inclusion and exclusion practices with this new lens.

Social practice studies have contributed to analytically conceptualizing a participant perspective (Sacks et al., 1974, pp. 696–735; Schegloff, 1992, pp. 1295–1345). The integrational linguistic concept of integrational proficiency is foregrounded throughout this study (Harris, 2009a, p. 71). The study adds a person-centered perspective to existing ethnographic approaches. Thus, person-centeredness is applied in an interaction analysis and discussed critically to refocus the perception of aphasia and ABI. This study's conceptualization of a participant perspective is somewhat different, as it is based on an integrational linguistically-inspired ontology, which distinctly contextualizes the individual participant perspective (this paragraph adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 149).

## 10 Conclusion

The thesis proposed and discussed a novel analytical combination of notions from integrational linguistics and EMCA targeting atypical interaction processes. The adopted approach draws on the radical development into inquiry on language formulated by Harris, who termed the approach integrationism (1996) and integrational linguistics (1998). The suggested new analytical approach framed an interdisciplinary perspective, which combined basic assumptions of integrational linguistics with descriptive elements from the EMCA program. These were joined in a framework underpinning the research agenda of practice theory. As a result, an integrational EMCA perspective was conceptualized. This innovative approach allowed new analytical insights to be gained, especially concerning the status of the analyst. The study offered a fresh theoretical and methodological resource for further investigation of the social, relational, and communicational sides of linguistic impairment and aphasia following ABI, focusing on a deeper analysis rather than an analysis on the surface, occupied with logistics of interaction.

The advances of this study lie in the framing of an interdisciplinary perspective, and in suggesting an implementation of it in the sub-areas of Nordic integrationism and health communication. Furthermore, it informs developers of QOL assessments with empirical insights into living with ABI and aphasia. Finally, it offers a formative evaluation tool in health and social care. This study's idea of a participant perspective distinctly afforded an empirically-based understanding of the individual, experiential side of living with ABI and aphasia.

Data were analyzed by switching lenses and by zooming in and out (Nicolini, 2009). Zooming in, recorded moments of individuals in action in situated practices were approached with analyses of the interaction. Zooming out, the discursive trajectories circulating the actual sites of engagements were included analytically. These stemmed from elsewhere but served as circumferences related to the close analysis and the actual site of engagement: The concept of historical body and a broader societal discursive framing are, thus, embedded in the fine-tuned analysis of empirical data. This was done to closely explore a participant's perspective on the indeterminacies which generally define social practices. In the final chapter, the ground for the new analytical perspective was discussed and recommendations were proposed.

Crucially, individuals who have language and communication disorders are likely to be hindered in their display of meaning-making and in the co-construction of meaning with therapists and peers (Rasmussen, 2016, p. 849). The main conclusion

of this contribution was that the *effort to communicate* was essentially the main challenge to an individual with a language or communication disorder. Notwithstanding this, indeterminacy was a present element in communication, also in deficit communication, if such can be said to exist outside a normative paradigm. Integrationism problematized any linguistic assumptions or methods predicated on norms or typicality/atypicality of linguistic communication. Hence, from an integrational linguistic practice perspective, this study introduced a demythologized view on how all communication was communicative as it unfolded. This view accounted for a participant's perspective. Empirically, it was demonstrated that persons seemingly engaged in efforts far beyond their apparent abilities. This pointed to the fact that communicating mattered to them regardless of the burden it was to perform it. Therefore, this thesis can be said to offer a new contribution to the field as it speaks against the frequently applied concepts of theory of mind and atypical interaction in the study of language and communication disorders.

This study does not intend to provide a completely unfolded version of this view, nor a complete description of the implications of such a view. Therefore, it did not propose a model for a new analytical perspective but modestly drew an outline explaining the background for it. This study was, however, important for several reasons. It showed the possibility of integrating a participant's perspective in the study of language and communication disorders by changing the presuppositions of language and communication common to the field from clinical approaches to ethnomethodological ones. By implementing an integrational linguistic practice perspective, the very concepts of language and communication were sought to be demythologized at a philosophical level. Rather, this study's implementation of a new perspective demonstrated that the individuals communicating are engaged in this world in complex ways. On this ground, language and communication (disorders) should be revisited as phenomena at a final stage of the communication and practice turns.

Furthermore, this study contributes to improved peer understanding of the integrational proficiency (Harris, 2009a, p. 71) of individuals with communication deficiencies such as linguistic and cognitive impairments (Nielsen, 2011, 2015). Organizational intervention (Nielsen, 2015; Simmons-Mackie & Damico, 2008; Wilkinson, 2011) could draw more closely on the experienced understandings of the people communicating. This study also aids policy development and evaluation. Finally, it suggests that local QOL assessment practices of the psychosocial consequences of ABI and aphasia follow the standards of the ICF (WHO, 2001, 2013; this section adapted from Klemmensen, 2018, p. 142).

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## Notes

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- <sup>i</sup> Certain diseases can cause brain injury, among others meningitis and (terminal) cancer disease.
- <sup>ii</sup> Each region has national care homes while other regions also have care homes with private investors.
- <sup>iii</sup> See [www.integrationists.com](http://www.integrationists.com).
- <sup>iv</sup> The ICF is endorsed by all 119 member states. The ICF frame is recommended by the Danish Service Law as standard, and practices and norms are therefore assessed by the individual state.
- <sup>v</sup> The chapter articles are organized as articles each with separate abstracts and sold individually from the publisher.
- <sup>vi</sup> For further information on traditional linguistic studies and information on applying speech act theory tools, see Austin, 1962; Grice, 1967; Lyons, 1971; Searle, 1969; Togeby, 1996.
- <sup>vii</sup> See [www.integrationists.com](http://www.integrationists.com).
- <sup>viii</sup> In 1996, Harris published *Signs, language and communication: Integrational and segregational approaches*. The book distinguishes integrational linguistics from other theories of language and communication by pointing to the structuralism-based (segregational) presuppositions in basically all other sign theories.
- <sup>ix</sup> See for instance, Damm, 2008; Duncker, 2011, 2018; Harris 1996, 1998; Harris & Wolf, 2008; Love, 2004; Orman, 2017; Pablé, 2011, 2019; Toolan, 1996; [www.royharrisonline.com](http://www.royharrisonline.com); [www.integrationists.com](http://www.integrationists.com).
- <sup>x</sup> See for instance, Hutton, 2016; Linell, 2018; Lund, 2012; Pablé, 2018, 2019; Weigand, 2018.
- <sup>xi</sup> Since individuality is a main focus, a new notion of “multimodality” would need to be outlined in an integrational perspective. For instance, Norris’ (2004) work on multimodal interaction analysis focuses on other aspects than language, which can be appreciated. Yet, Norris applies a linguistic vocabulary tied to traditional linguistics referring to “units of analysis” to be made up by “mediated action” (p. 13) referring to “indexes of gestures” (p. 28). Hence, Norris conceptualizes a multimodal framework based on “different levels of awareness and attention” (p. 5) with categories that, to a large extent, are associated with structuralism. The idea of this work is useful; however, the linguistic vocabulary would require a redirection.
- <sup>xii</sup> See for instance, Conrad, 2011; Damm, 2016; Davis, 2001; Duncker, 2011; Nielsen, 2011; Pablé & Hutton, 2015; Worsøe, 2014.
- <sup>xiii</sup> When visited in Oxford, Harris himself encouraged me to take integrational linguistics where the research needed it to go.
- <sup>xiv</sup> See for instance, Goodwin, 2003; Wilkinson, 2011.
- <sup>xv</sup> See for instance, Mondada, 2018; Mortensen & Wagner, 2019; Nevile et al., 2014; Norris, 2004; Raudaskoski, 1999; Raudaskoski, 2010b; Streeck, 1996.
- <sup>xvi</sup> Originally published close to the main publication in 1945 and 1946. For this investigation, the Danish (1994, 1995) and the English (1964a, 1964b) translations of Merleau-Ponty’s original texts have served as basis.
- <sup>xvii</sup> The personal perspective is opposed to the traditional central perspective of the Renaissance, as discussed by Nielsen (2005, p. 21). I earlier elaborated on the essays of Merleau-Ponty and applied their insights to the conceptualization of ontological principles of language psychology in the book chapter *Perception as the basis of understanding* (trans.) (Nielsen, 2005). The publication is peripheral thematically to the central theme of language and communication disorders in the present thesis, yet the notion of a person-centered perspective is central, and a further elaboration of this.
- <sup>xviii</sup> Unfortunately, the original French version of the text, *La doute de Cézanne*, has not been accessible to this study, but the English and the Danish carry different messages from Merleau-Ponty.
- <sup>xix</sup> In their discussing the progress of my master’s thesis between 2001–2002, I received this piece through Jesper Hermann from Harris’ hand to apply in my master thesis, since I had shown an active interest in integrationism (Harris, unpublished; Nielsen, 2002).
- <sup>xx</sup> See for instance, Cowley, 2011; Duncker, 2018; Pablé, 2017; Pablé & Hutton, 2015; Steffensen, 2016; Thibault, 2011.

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<sup>xxi</sup> Across the country, a survey of rehabilitation services after ABI in Denmark indicate low QOL-related guidance and help offered to individuals with impairments (National rapport, 2020, pp. 4–8).

<sup>xxii</sup> Autism played a founding role in the beginning of my research, since I mentor young adults with autism spectrum disease and Asperger’s in my work as a high school teacher.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Leudar and Costall (2011) and a group of researchers with a similar dislike for a bio-perspective on language and communication disorders called for a new discourse in research in autism, and the understanding of language and communication disorders as *lived* rather than assessed clinically by questioning, for instance, the dominant theory – theory of mind – primarily applied in autism research (Björne, 2007; Korikiakangas & Rae, 2014; Leudar & Costall, 2011; Nielsen, 2011; Sterponi, 2004) The Theory of mind suggests that a theory is working in us in mundane interactions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, pp. 37–46; Leslie, 1987, pp. 412–426). The inability to operate a theory of mind means a failure to put oneself in other people’s places and thus to understand their emotions and intentions. On these grounds, the problems the individuals with autism spectrum disease experience are believed to categorize within language and communication disorders, since deriving and expressing “correct” meaning verbally forms part of the problem. The development in aphasia studies has developed somewhat different. Greatly indebted to the research of Goodwin, CA has shown to be a reliable tool with its detailed understanding of action to decipher how individuals with language and communication disorders creatively use other proficiencies than verbal ones to communicate (Goodwin, 1979, 1995, 2003b). Also, individuals with language and communication disorders perform differently outside of testing, where they manage the interactional tasks that they “fail” in tests (Schegloff, 1999). The problem with EMCA is a penchant for cumulatively establishing an area of study, such as “atypical interaction” (Antaki & Wilkinson, 2013) that turns the interest away from the first-person perspective and more towards the analyst’s interest in categorizing.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Even though *gatekeeping* as a phenomenon and what can be referred to as “gatekeeping encounters” are not the primary foci of the study, still, gatekeeping is important in accounting for the meaning-making trajectory of the case participant’s interaction in the analysis. Gatekeeping is thus applied to help illustrate the positioned asymmetry in the interaction — positioning derived from ideologies circulating from outside the encounter that can impact the therapist’s responding to the case participant in the local encounter (for further information on CA perspectives on gatekeeping in interaction, see Fosgerau, 2007; Roberts & Sarangi, 1999; Tranekjær, 2015).

<sup>xxv</sup> <https://danskelove.dk/serviceloven/85>. Accessed May 8, 2020.

<sup>xxvi</sup> <https://danskelove.dk/serviceloven/141>. Accessed May 8, 2020.

<sup>xxvii</sup> Goffman (1981) referred to the terms “ratified” and “unratified” in relation to footing in his model for participation. In Goffman’s terms, unratified thus refers to participation rather than to persons, while Heinemann (2009) uses the notion non-ratified for participants. I draw on Heinemann’s conceptualization of the exclusion of participants as third-party that are thus constructed as non-ratified.

<sup>xxviii</sup> I have chosen the term “the place” over “the institution” or “the institutional environment,” since the architecture as well as the institution and the institutional ramification of practices are included in invoking this phenomenon.

<sup>xxix</sup> The term “let it pass” is first found in Garfinkel (1967, p. 3), targeting unclarity.

<sup>xxx</sup> “Wetherell (2012) highlights that the Deleuzian concepts of affective experiences such as force and intensity are analyzed in unaccountable ways. (Raudaskoski & Klemmensen, 2019, p. 11).

<sup>xxxi</sup> In generalizing from this single case study, the use of abduction is applied to “test” the extent to which the combination of two theoretical approaches is possible. Hence, the recovery of the experience of the participant is done with a close analysis of their behavioral trajectory by applying principles from both approaches in novel synthesis (for further elaboration of generalization from case studies see Saint-Georges, 2018 and Zittoun, 2017).

<sup>xxxii</sup> Complementarity as premise in research practice: The challenge of complementarity is ever present in research. Only, it seems to have been downgraded or left out of reflection upon research practices in programs. Simply, it is not often discussed as a prerequisite but presupposed. Presupposition, however, seems confused with forgetfulness. As noted by Danish physicist Bohr, all observation contains arbitrariness. This was demonstrated by the principle of complementarity. The principle states that it is of utmost interpretive importance what the analyst researcher ascribes to the system of observance (Bohr, 1985, p. 134). With the principle of complementarity, Bohr shed light upon the composition of observational phenomena. Observations are not objective but rely on the choices of methods for observing

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and detecting phenomena made by the researcher. The observer and methods together form the observational system, which frames and “shapes” the phenomena observed. Therefore, the phenomenon must be considered part of, and thus perceived as inseparable from, the researcher’s “established observational system” (Bohr, 1985). The product of the system, one would think, was the data of the phenomena, yet with Bohr’s principle, data cannot be isolated and includes the observational situation in which it was produced as part of the apparatus. This stated, the compound system of data, observer and observational instruments together state the phenomena observed and interpreted (Bohr, 1985). For obvious reasons, interaction data gets disturbed and biased by the mere recording of it. However, the research goal guides the investigation, otherwise there is nothing to analyze (Silverman, 2001, p. 163). The principle of complementarity is an underlying premise for all research, including modern applied linguistics and social studies; this is just not very often taken into consideration. Integrational linguistics calls for such reflection.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Scollon and Scollon (2004) refer to Blommaert’s forthcoming publication (2005) *Discourse: A critical introduction*.<sup>xxxiv</sup> Studies of rum-tasting, beer-tasting, and probing of cheese are recent examples of such; see for instance, Mortensen & Wagner (2019) and Mondada (2018).



## **Appendices**

### **Appendix 3-1.**

Harris (unpublished). *Notes on language and first-order experience*. (Original produced between 2001–2002).

### **Appendix 4-1.**

Overview of the data

### **Appendix 4-2.**

Introductory paper to the participants

### **Appendix 4-3.**

Consent form

### **Appendix 5-1.**

Raw transcription applied in Nielsen (2015)

### **Appendix 5-2.**

Goodwinian transcription applied in Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019)

### **Appendix 5-3.**

Transcription notations applied in the thesis

2 Paddox Close  
Oxford OX2 7LR

### Notes on Language and First-order Experience

1. First-order experience is the experience I have of being a living person here and now. First-order events in my life, physical and mental, are the events that I am aware of as and when they happen, as and how they seem to me. Writing this sentence is such an event, but it cannot be for you: on the other hand, you can have your own first-order experience of reading it.
2. Whatever I am not aware of does not belong in this first-order domain, even if it affects me without my knowing, and regardless of whether or not other people are aware of it. (If *N* has contracted a disease of which there are as yet no detectable symptoms, then *N*'s illness is not, as yet, part of *N*'s first-order experience. Similarly, if *N* has been exposed to subliminal advertising techniques without realizing it, then whatever the subsequent effects may be on *N*'s behaviour, *N* has no first-order experience of the advertisement.)
3. First-order experience is the basis of the integrationist 'principle of cotemporality' (*Introduction to Integrational Linguistics*, p. 81 *et saep.*) and is thus implicated *ab initio* in the determination of linguistic facts (*Intro.*, pp.140-144). (Without linguistic facts, there is nothing for the linguist to investigate. Hence for the integrationist to speak of a 'linguistic fact' is already to presuppose the reality of (some kind of) first-order experience.)
4. The connexion between first-order experience and cotemporality is established as follows. First-order experience presents itself to me as an incessant flow of actions, sensations, thoughts, feelings, etc., the dynamics of which provides me with an intuitive grasp of the passage of time. The movements of my own body, giving rise to changes in the continuum of first-order experience, underpin my intuitions not only of temporal sequence but of spatial location. (NB. *intuitive* and *intuition* : I assume here a form of structuring that is not arrived at by explicit reasoning or analysis but is based on accumulated experience and is adequate to guide programmes of motor activity. In this sense, all higher animals presumably have intuitions of space and time and the demonstration of this is that they successfully negotiate the many hazards presented by their environment and the various spatio-temporal tasks that are necessary for their survival as living creatures.)
5. The term 'first-order' suggests a contrast with 'second-order', 'third-order', 'fourth-order', and so on. But the construction of such a series or hierarchy of types of experience is unnecessary. For integrationist purposes it will suffice to contrast 'first-order' phenomena with others

which are, by definition, not 'first-order' phenomena. And for these the term 'second-order' will suffice.

6. Cumulative first-order experience sets us up with a first-order domain of knowledge, and this contrasts with second-order knowledge, which is derived on the one hand from the results of reflecting on first-order knowledge, and on the other hand from information that others provide us with. The death of Julius Caesar, as far as I am concerned, is a second-order event. Whatever I know about it – if I know anything at all – is certainly not first-order knowledge, because I was not alive at the time. Whereas knowing that if I go out in the rain I am likely to get wet falls within my domain of first-order knowledge, being based on my previous experience of going out in the rain. Many areas of knowledge span the two domains. If I (think I) know what causes rain, my first-order experience of rain has most likely been supplemented by meteorological information from a second-order source.

7. Since what happened yesterday is no longer first-order and has already been displaced by what is happening today, the notion of 'cumulative first-order experience' may at first sight appear self-contradictory. But that self-contradiction would only hold for creatures without memory or some equivalent biomechanical equipment (which might include what is now called 'cellular memory'). Human experience is itself an integrational process in which, in accordance with the principle of cotemporality, our present is continuously linked to our past and our future in such ways as to make the recognition of both novelty and recurrence possible. In other words, in an integrationist perspective, for  $x$  to be experienced  $x$  has to be integrated into that living continuum. As Wittgenstein might have said (but didn't): 'I experienced  $x$ , but it left no impression whatsoever on me at the time' is nonsense. That statement contradicts the grammar of the transitive verb *to experience*.

8. The facts of first-order experience, being immediately given, are facts of an order it would usually make no sense for me to doubt. This does not mean that first-order experience supplies an infallible basis for error-free knowledge. I may be convinced I posted the letter, only to find it still on my desk when I get home. But what I cannot doubt is that I *thought* I had posted it: *that* is the relevant fact of first-order experience. And it is the conflict between that fact and another first-order fact (discovering it later on my desk) which gives rise to my realization that I was mistaken. Realizing the mistake is a second-order experience, in that it presupposes the two first-order experiences.

9. It is possible for me to be uncertain about what it is that I am doing, or seeing, or hearing, or feeling, or thinking, in particular instances. But those specific uncertainties themselves could hardly arise except in respect of some first-order event, i.e. the experience that originally prompted the uncertainty. Furthermore, if I had such uncertainties concerning most of my first-order experience, and constantly sought reassurances about its validity, I should deserve to be treated not as an unusually cautious or sceptical person but as some kind of psychiatric case. In other words, a *general* doubt about first-order experience, even if philosophically sustainable in theory, is pragmatically incompatible with the everyday business of living. Concerning the current happenings of daily life, I have not the slightest hesitation in accepting facts of this order as incontrovertible, and in so doing I usually seem to have no option. It does not occur to me to suppose that my eyes or my ears are deceiving me, that my hands are not touching the objects they feel as if they are touching, that I might be somewhere else than where I seem to be, or that I might be dreaming when I feel wide awake. In this sense the facts of first-order experience do not so much present themselves for acceptance as force themselves upon me. This property I will call *ineluctability*. Samuel Johnson's famous "refutation" of idealism consisted in kicking a stone. I would say that what Johnson was doing here was appealing to the ineluctability of first-order experience. Wittgenstein (*Philosophical Investigations* §246) seems also to be appealing to the same ineluctability to argue that it makes no sense to claim that I know that I am in pain (since it makes no sense either to claim that I don't know). What I am here calling first-order knowledge is not the spurious domain of items that Wittgenstein rightly rejects, such as 'knowing I am in pain'. Rather it is the domain of knowledge based on first-order experience, e.g. knowing what it is like to be in pain. I know this irrespective of whether or not I am, at the moment, actually in pain; just as, on the basis of first-order experience, I know what rain is, regardless of whether it happens to be raining here at the moment.

10. But if we accept the above as it stands, it might seem that various crucial difficulties are already being bypassed. We might meet an objector who argues along the following lines: 'All this sounds very reasonable. Nevertheless, even your most elementary examples are question-begging. 'Pain' and 'rain' are very sophisticated concepts. It is quite unclear how you think they could be derived simply from what you call 'first-order experience'. Your cat, for example, can feel pain when you step on its tail, and probably doesn't like going out in the rain any more than you do. But do you want to say that your cat too has first-order knowledge of what pain is? Or what rain is?'

11. It is tempting to reply to this objector: 'Well, why not?' But that riposte will almost certainly lead into a discussion that is best postponed for the moment; namely, a discussion of whether it is possible to have knowledge of  $x$  without having a word for  $x$ . (And since *ex hypothesi* the cat has no words for 'pain' or 'rain'.. etc.) So it is probably better to meet the objector by conceding that we do not wish to attribute to the cat a grasp of human concepts, or even feline concepts, if that is supposed to entail that the cat has in some sense already thought about its first-order experiences. For thinking about a first-order experience is in any case something we need to distinguish from having the experience.

12. For a start, thinking *about* first-order experience does not share the ineluctability of first-order experience itself. It is to a considerable extent under the control of the will. My first-order experience of tripping over the doorstep I have no option but to accept, but whether, how and what I think about it is largely up to me. I can simply dismiss it from further consideration. Or it might start me wondering about whether my eyesight is failing. Or whether I had too much to drink at lunch. Or any one of a dozen other things. Engaging in such thought is a second-order activity precisely in that, and insofar as, it was triggered by and to some extent requires attention to be focussed upon the fact of first-order experience. It also requires the deployment of mental constructs; that is, concepts enabling one to interrelate various features and episodes of first-order experience, to categorize, generalize, compare, differentiate – in short, to make judgments, raise questions, entertain possibilities. That is the difference between (i) seeing the person on the other side of the room and (ii) wondering 'Who on earth is that?' or 'Is that John Smith?'. The former is a first-order experience and the latter are mental responses to it.

13. Thus it would appear that thinking is essentially a second-order matter. And this gives the objector an opportunity to leap in again. 'Surely having a thought is itself an event in your ongoing mental life, located in the same temporal continuum as seeing the man who might (or might not) be John Smith, as tripping over the doorstep, etc? Indeed, it has to be, since by your own account the thought is a response to seeing the man, tripping over the step, and so on. So doesn't your distinction between first-order and second-order immediately break down? For if seeing the man constitutes one first-order event, wondering who on earth he is constitutes, in its own right, another. Having that thought is a fact of which you have first-order awareness, distinct from your awareness of seeing the person in question.' The objector certainly has a point. But it is not quite the point he thinks. There is no need to construe the difference between first-order and second-order as delimiting mutually exclusive kinds of experience or

sequences of events. In other words, the same event may have both first- and second-order properties. That is very characteristic of those forms of activity which predominate in human life.

14. Language provides countless examples of this. If I say "Good morning" on meeting an acquaintance, that is a linguistic act – and a linguistic fact – in its own right, on a par with my experience of recognizing the acquaintance in the first place. That the greeting was a reaction to or consequence of the recognition is indeed important. That does not make it any the less a first-order linguistic fact. I can subsequently report this linguistic fact ('I met an acquaintance and said "Good morning"'). The report is second-order, inasmuch as it is based on prior first-order events; but its articulation in that form is still an act constitutive of my first-order linguistic experience. Thus the second-order character of the report is, as it were, concealed inside a first-order presentation. Now this curious hide-and-seek relationship between the 'first-order' and 'second-order' categories is a direct consequence of the reflexivity of language. Reflexivity and metalanguage are head and tail of the same coin. Language enables us not only to reflect on first-order experience, but immediately to identify that reflection as a new event in our mental lives. It provides for an indefinite multiplication of items that appear to involve mirror-like replications of their own immediate progenitors. Having once said "Good morning" projects an endless series of reports of having said it, of reporting reports of having said it, of reports of those reports, and so on. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same goes for thoughts about thoughts, and their progeny, at least insofar as thoughts deploy signs which, if not linguistic signs, have the same reflexivity. (On the difference between reflexive and non-reflexive signs, see *Introduction to Integrational Linguistics*, pp.24-28.)

## Overview of data and selection of excerpts

The following four tables provide an overview over the entire dataset used for this study. Orienting to the dataset, below (see Table 1) a list of the number of recording days is provided, likewise a list of recording sites and a list of important participants of the study. The three days selected for further analysis are listed (see Table 2) with a list of important activities included in the analytical sections (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Finally, a list of data types and a list of additional information important to contextualize the study are provided (see Table 3). A list of cues for selection of excerpts is provided in Table 4, demonstrating exemplary sequences and their response recurrent in the dataset. The qualitative single-case analysis focuses uniquely on the trajectory of actions from the perspective of the case participant. External validity is purely methodological.

**Table 1**

Recording days, recording sites, present participants

Recording days	Recording sites	Important participants
<b>2012</b>		
First visit	Culture and Competence Center [CUCOC]: Introduction to project Communication training	Two occupational therapists: Pia and Bente Four residents: Rikke, Søren* and two other residents Two students Two researchers: Charlotte and Pirkko
Second visit	CUCOC: Evaluation of first visit Communication training	One occupational therapist: Pia Two residents: Rikke and Søren Two researchers: Charlotte and Pirkko
Third visit	Shopping mall Excursion lunch Communication training	Two occupational therapists: Pia and Bente Two residents: Rikke and Søren Two researchers: Charlotte and Pirkko
Fourth visit	Care home lobby A celebration Informal talk	All employers, guests, press All residents: including Søren, but only brief talk Two researchers: Charlotte and Antonia
Fifth visit	Conference room Research workshop On site data-session	Two part time employers Invited researchers, guest lecture on video ethnography Project researchers
<b>2013</b>		
Sixth visit	Video tour: Central areas tour Physiotherapy Home visits	Several care team members Several residents: including Søren, but only brief talk One new resident interviewed, one home visit Two researchers: Charlotte and Antonia

*Note.* Only the residents Rikke and Søren are named, since they are important to this study.

**Table 2**

Recording days and sites selected for analysis, important activities

<b>Recording days</b>	<b>Recording sites</b>	<b>Important activities</b>
<b>Year one</b>		
First visit	Culture and Competence Center [CUCOC]: Introduction to project Communication training	Tea preparation with Søren Introduction of cameras Pirkko and Charlotte as co-participant researchers Project introduction Informed consent Signing of consent forms Break with talk Discussion of upcoming sports event for activity
Second visit	CUCOC: Evaluation of first visit Communication training	Tour from corridor to CUCOC Talk with administration and staff about showing videos from the first visit to the residents Talk with therapist Viewing of videos from last with Rikke and Søren Reading of newspapers and magazines for activity Discussing the news Tea drinking Talk with therapist again
Third visit	Shopping mall Excursion lunch Communication training	Car ride to a nearby shopping mall Excursion with residents Rikke and Søren and their therapists Pia and Bente Lunch at the cafeteria at the mall Back to the center in car



**Table 3**

Data types, additional important information with a list of the visits

Visits	Data types	Additional important information
<b>Year one</b>		
First visit	<i>Video recordings:</i> GoPro Hero head GoPro Hero static Stationary Camera <i>Observations:</i> Ethnographical observation/field notes Post-visit auto ethnographic notes	New residents move in Initial talk with administration about residents and routines Talk about perceived challenges: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Residents' self-determination</li> <li>- Their response to the "care given"</li> <li>- Inclusion aims and visions of the study site</li> </ul> Informal evaluation with staff and administration Students of occupational therapy participate at CUCOC this day Participants' general positive response to video recording One single resident negative and deselected for analysis
Second visit	<i>Video recordings:</i> GoPro Hero 1 GoPro Hero 2 Stationary camera <i>Observations:</i> Ethnographical observation/field notes Post-visit auto ethnographic notes	Talk with administration about reviewing recordings Talk with staff about reviewing recordings with residents Residents' general positive response to the video recordings Talk with the occupational therapist about the content of therapy Talk with the occupational therapist about the center Talk with the occupational therapist about their background Recording of documents in the material setting Further information about residents and their background
Third visit	<i>Video recording:</i> GoPro chest/table <i>Observations:</i> Post-visit auto ethnographic notes	Permission granted to join the excursion to the shopping mall from administration. Administration positive while one therapist expressed uncertainty about "what people might think" Lunch activity makes up a major sequence of the recording

**Table 4**

Selecting criteria for excerpts for analysis, important cues for participating, clip collection

Participants	Cues for selection of excerpts, moves	Examples of participatory actions	Clip collection
<b>Year one</b>			
Case participant	Invoking storytelling, counterclaiming, blaming; Repeating other participants' vocal; Enacting other participants' vocal — — Resignation: —	<i>Initiated with: er, er + gesturing:</i> Er I wondered when I moved here (pointing towards therapist) Er er the journalist is wrong Er er er er this here that is a beer <i>Initiated with gesturing:</i> Grasping table edge as response to poor kitchen design Hitting themselves on the forehead Drinking tea as response to therapist Yeah yeah as response to therapist	Criticism of the place 2 — Newspaper reading Shopping beer  Criticism of the place 1 — Criticism of the place 3 Newspaper reading Shopping beer
Therapist Bente	Orienting to case participant's contributions; Exclamation; explicit repair	<i>Initiated verbally:</i> Is it a BEER It smells like elderflower apple=elderflower aj det dufter altså af hyldeblomst <i>Initiated with gesturing:</i> Smells the content Takes the glass and looks down into it. Smells again the surface (...) from side to side	Shopping beer — — — — — —
Therapist Pia	Orienting to case participant's contributions; Countermove towards the case participant Support Reaffirmation	<i>Initiated verbally:</i> -yes now you are going in the right direction no it is because I thought it was a beer what is it you mean we can discuss this later on if it is <i>Initiated with gesturing:</i> Steps towards the case participant with arms open to help and grasps kettle	Criticism 1 — Shopping mall — Criticism 2 —  Criticism 1 — —

*Note:* Criticism of the place 1 refers to the first excerpt, 2 to the second and 3 to the third excerpt of criticisms.

Kære beboere, pårørende og medarbejdere

Hen over efteråret vil forskningsgruppen fra Aalborg Universitet Institut for Kommunikation komme på besøg ca. en gang om ugen for at lave videoobservationer på XXXXXXXX

Den første gang kommer vi med to kameraer, hvor vi også vil planlægge resten af forløbet. Sidenhen vil der være flere kameraer til stede og vi beder måske om at få lov til at montere et lillebitte kamera f.eks. på nogle beboeres kørestol. Vi vil gerne på forhånd at I tager stilling til hvor meget vi må bruge af materialet vi indsamler når vi er sammen med jer (I får et skema at udfylde hos XXXXX). Vi interesserer os for hvad senhjerneskade betyder hverdagssituationer. Vi synes der mangler denne her slags forskning som – vi håber – kan hjælpe med at forbedre hverdagen for senhjerneskadede. Derfor husk venligst at udfylde skemaet og give det tilbage til XXXXXXXX eller os!

Vi kommer om formiddagen

torsdag d. 6. september

torsdag d. 20. september

fredag d. 28. september

torsdag d. 4. oktober (måske)

Vi ser frem til at få bedre indblik i jeres rutiner og oplevelser ved at deltage som observatører i jeres hverdag.

Med venlig hilsen

Antonia Krummheuer, Charlotte Nielsen og Pirkko Raudaskoski

Aalborg Universitet

Institut for Kommunikation

Nyhavnsgade 14

9000 Aalborg

Tlf. XXXXXXXX (Charlotte), XXXXXXXX (Pirkko)

## Appendix 4-3

### Undersøgelse af kommunikation på [REDACTED]

Institut for Kommunikation og Vidensgruppe Mattering  
Aalborg Universitet

Til vores undersøgelse har vi brugt videooptagelse. Nogle af optagelserne vil senere blive udskrevet i skriftlig form. Nedenfor vil vi gerne, hvis du ved afkrydsning vil indikere i hvilket omfang, vi må gøre brug af materialet. Det er helt op til dig, hvordan du krydser af, og vi bruger kun materialet i det omfang, vi er blevet enige om. Dit rigtige navn ændres i al brug af materialet.

1. Optagelserne må gerne benyttes af forskningsgruppen til brug i forskningsprojektet.

Foto       Lyd       Video       Ingen

2. Optagelser må gerne vises til deltagere i andre eksperimenter.

Foto       Lyd       Video       Ingen

3. Optagelserne må gerne bruges i forbindelse med akademiske publikationer.

Foto       Lyd       Video       Ingen

4. Optagelserne må benyttes af andre forskere.

Foto       Lyd       Video       Ingen

5. Optagelserne må gerne vises til konferencer og møder for forskere inden for kommunikation.

Transkription (skriftlig)    Foto    Lyd       Video       Ingen

6. Optagelserne må gerne benyttes i forbindelse med undervisning.

Transkription (skriftlig)    Foto    Lyd       Video       Ingen

7. Optagelser må gerne benyttes til foredrag uden for det akademiske miljø.

Transkription (skriftlig)    Foto    Lyd       Video       Ingen

8. Optagelserne må gerne benyttes i forbindelse med radio- og TV-udsendelser.

Foto       Lyd       Video       Ingen

Øvrige kommentarer eller forbehold:

Jeg har læst ovenstående og giver hermed min tilladelse til brug af materialet i det omfang, som er indikeret ovenfor.

Navn + underskrift:

Dato:

E-post: Tlf/Mobil:

og vist Søren's langsomme sammenhængende tale i transskriptionen (Nielsen, 2014a; 2014b), men har fravalgt at gengive hans messende talerytme i følgende uddrag. Følgende uddrag er gengivet som grovtransskription for ikke at ændre væsentligt i dokumentet, som blev præsenteret på konferencen på centret, og for at holde læsefokus på, hvordan senhjerneskade og 'deltagelse' konstitueres i uddraget, som analyseres efterfølgende.

**Transskriptionsuddrag** (GO020014. Mp4. start: 1:16)

01. Søren: men ((løfter finger)) men men må jeg lige orientere nu øh
02. Charlotte: ja
03. Søren: -der er flere ting den journalist har fået galt i halsen
04. Pia: nå
05. Charlotte: nej ((slår blikket ned))
06. Søren: det passer ikke
07. Charlotte: hva hvad passer ikke
08. Søren: det for eksempel ((klør sig ovenpå hovedet))
09. Søren: øh øh øh øøøøoh med det han (.) skrev øh med med hva hvad der foregik
10. Pia: joooh han har faktisk fået det meste med Søren
11. Rikke: ((nikker til Pia))
12. Søren: det passer ikke ((rækker ud efter kaffekop))
13. Pia: det vi snakkede om der ikke passede
14. Søren: ((drikker)) ja
15. Pia: det var at han havde skrevet at det var Bente der tændte faklen
16. Søren: ja ((sætter kop ned))
17. Pia: Det var jo dig der tændte faklen
18. Søren: ja↓
19. Pia: og Bente der holdt den
20. Søren: ja↓
21. Pia: det er rigtigt det har han skrevet forkert ja.
22. Søren: m↓
23. Pia: men ellers så passer det faktisk det han har skrevet
24. Rikke: ((nikker))

25. Pia: ja  
 26. Søren: hm↓  
 27. Pia: det har han faktisk fået meget rigtigt  
 28. Søren: mja↓  
 29. Pia: men jeg ved ikke om det var det du tænkte påé  
 30. Søren: jo det var det nok↓ ((kigger ud i luften))  
 31. Søren: det det  
 32. Pia: det var mig og Bente der fortalte det og så ha ha har han gengivet det.  
 33. Søren: ja ja↓  
 34. Pia: så ((larm)) Det er faktisk meget (godt) men men det vi snakkede om det var  
 35. Søren: ((løfter kaffekop))  
 36. Pia: at det kommer jo også i Ugeavisen  
 37. Søren: ((drikker af koppen))

### Karakteristik og grovanalyse af uddraget

I sekvensuddraget deltager Pirkko, Charlotte, beboeren Søren, den anden beboer, Rikke, og den sundhedsprofessionelle, Pia. Beboeren (Søren) fremfører at 'indholdet' i en artikel fra en begivenhed på hjernekadecentret, som lokalavisen har bragt en reportage fra, er fejlagtigt og fejlciteret (tur 03). Søren tager initiativ til at tale om artiklen med følgende åbning (turnumre markeres med kursiv):

01. Søren: men ((løfter finger)) men men må jeg lige orientere nu øh  
 02. Charlotte: ja  
 03. Søren: -der er flere ting den journalist har fået galt i halsen  
 04. Pia: nå  
 05. Charlotte: nej ((slår blikket ned))

Tur 06-07 er efterfølgende interessante steder i uddraget, idet Søren fastholder det fejlagtige i artiklens indhold. Søren påbegynder et oprør. Oprør skal her forstås i forhold til ledelsens fordring om, at beboerne bliver mødt som sig selv i deres oplevelse af verden:




FIGURE 1 | The kitchen as a difficult material setting for people with ABI.

change of state token and affirmative feedback (turn 7). She then gives a formulation (“so you gain actually energy from it”) of how she understands R’s contribution. R’s next turn (“all day and all night”) is at the same time a continuation of his first turn and an acknowledgment of RA’s formulation. RA now formulates the gist of R’s further explanation (turn 10) with “so you cannot rest very well,” to which R agrees with a more extreme case formulation of no longer being able to sleep.

Resident builds his counterclaim carefully. Instead of telling RA that her generalization is wrong, he builds his case about his body with his body; he laminates the talk about the problematic part of it with a demonstration or visualization. The problem with the left arm already had become noticeable with his difficulty to move the water kettle lift by right hand only. His “diagnostic work” (cf. Büscher et al., 2010) could be seen to laminate to that occasion, too, and not just as a preparation




FIGURE 2 | The resident's body (spastic right arm) causing insomnia.

to adjusting the claim that RA had made. By introducing the problem with the left arm and by letting RA formulate the contradictory point of view (“you cannot rest”) to her previous announcement of being extremely tired, R is being highly pedagogical and, therefore, a skillful “informant.” There are small acknowledging voices in addition to RA’s empathetic agreement. The mood is sober.

In this extract, the affective activity is more in line with the traditional focus on private feelings as shareable emotions. The resident incrementally corrects the RA’s category-bound generalization of ABI always meaning tiredness (teleoaffectivity) to him not being able to sleep because of the spastic arm.

After this, the talk goes to discussing how each and every person with ABI is a specific case. There is a long episode of talk by the researchers and staff members about each case being different, how there is no one type that people can be categorized into. After the general agreement about each individual case being different OT relates it back to “this place here” (“this is why we define this place as a specialized residence”). The first turn in the following excerpt (Figure 3) continues from this statement, giving her reason for it.

In turn 1, OT connects the general discussion about each brain injury being different to the residency they live and work in. R turns to OT, calling her by her name, and starts






FIGURE 3 | The problematic professional discourse of the site.

a counterclaim in the form of a complaint (cp. Klemmensen, 2018, p. 123). R builds his complaint by giving an account of his first thoughts when he arrived to the “enormous place that has been built” in his extensive turn (turn 4), laminating his turn-at-talk with that of OT’s mention of the place. He then contrasts the sophistication of the building with a lack of medical understanding of his condition. He can be seen to laminate to the situation in the kitchen (Figure 1) where OT criticized the interior design of the building: It is not just the building but the care given in it that is under criticism. We

can detect the nervousness (intensity) of his participation in his small headshakes and the smacks that are hearably produced in a dry mouth (turn 4). Resident is using the highly charged word “ignorance” to describe the institutional knowledge about his situation. R’s contribution also laminates to the refuting of RA’s claim in the previous discussion (Figure 2). The general formulation of “my situation,” together with the extreme case formulation “complete ignorance” seems to throw OT off guard: “wha- wha- I’m uncertain what it is you mean by ignorance [name]” (turn 6).

## Appendix 5-3

### Transcription notations

The transcription uses spelling from dictionary with a multimodal commentary. Analyst observation of the use of voice and body; volume, pace, coordination between talk, bodily orientation and gesture are included. A simplified version of CA conventions, by Gail Jefferson as described in Atkinson & Heritage (1999), with multimodal commentary, by Goodwin (2003b, 2013, 2018) and Mondada (2014), has been applied (see Chapter 6). Below, a list of notations is presented.

<b>Notation</b>	<b>Description</b>
:	Colon: prolongation of non-fonemic vowel
hhh	Hearable breathing
h[ave they]	Square brackets: start/end of overlapping talk
↑	Arrow up: high tone pronunciation
↓	Arrow down: low tone pronunciation
→	Focal line
(.)	Micro-pause, less than a second.
<u>bad</u>	Emphasized word
(3.0)	Pause in whole seconds
small-	Hyphen at the end of word: cutoff
>not<	Fast paced talk
<yet>	Slow paced talk
°	Low volume
BEER	High volume
=	Latched pronunciation, here typically for aphasic talk
(sound)	Uncertain hearable
((.))	Double parentheses: multimodal comments
grey	Multimodal commentary
*	Coordination of talk and initiation of new non-verbal action
§	Coordination of talk and initiation of new non-verbal action
+	Coordination of talk and initiation of new non-verbal action
++	Coordination of talk and initiation of new non-verbal action
\$	Coordination of talk and initiation of new non-verbal action
--->	Non-verbal action type continued
#1	Spot of the screenshot figure